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 Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses inter-group conflict in Fiji within the framework of inter-group 
theory, popularised by Gordon Allport, who argued that inter-group conflict arises out of 
inter-group prejudice, which is historically constructed and sustained by dominant 
groups. Furthermore, Allport hypothesised that there are three attributes of violence: 
structural and institutional violence in the form of discrimination, organised violence and 
extropunitive violence in the form of in-group solidarity. Using history as a method, I 
analyse the history of inter-group conflict in Fiji from 1960 to 2006. I argue that inter-
group conflict in Fiji led to the institutionalisation of discrimination against Indo-Fijians 
in 1987 and this escalated into organised violence in 2000. Inter-group tensions peaked in 
Fiji during the 2006 general elections as ethnic groups rallied behind their own 
communal constituencies as a show of in-group solidarity and produced an electoral 
outcome that made multiparty governance stipulated by the multiracial 1997 Constitution 
impossible. Using Allport’s recommendations on mitigating inter-group conflict in 
divided communities, the thesis proposes a three-pronged approach to inter-group 
conciliation in Fiji, based on implementing national identity, truth and reconciliation and 
legislative reforms. 
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Chapter 1: Setting the Scene 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Fiji has an established history of inter-group conflict and violence. The post-
independence constitutional settlement brokered by the colonial authorities in 1970 
collapsed under the weight of inter-group and intra-group tensions in May 1987 when an 
Indo-Fijian dominated government with multi-ethnic orientation was overthrown by an 
Indigenous nationalist military, which removed Indo-Fijians1 from positions of authority, 
imposed restrictions on future political processes and implemented a racially slanted 
1990 Constitution. As a result of the coups of 1987, discrimination against Indo-Fijians 
was institutionalised from 1987 to 1997 as Indigenous Fijian2 nationalists became 
politically assertive and refused to accept the multiethnic constitutional order and the 
inclusion of Indo-Fijians in the national government, mandated by the 1997 Constitution. 
Following a third Indigenous nationalist coup in 2000, there was widespread violence 
against Indo-Fijians and as a consequence Indo-Fijians became inward focused as the 
Indigenous government that came to power in 2001 re-introduced discrimination against 
the community and attempted to pardon the conspirators of the 2000 coup. The division 
between Fiji’s two communities peaked during the 2006 general election, and the military 
that previously supported the Indigenous nationalists in 1987 challenged the ethno-
                                                  
1 The descendants of Indian indentured workers brought to Fiji from 1879 to 1920 are referred throughout 
this thesis as Indo-Fijians. Indo-Fijians, instead of Indians, is used in this thesis to locate Fijians of Indian 
origin in Fiji’s history. 
2 The first people of Fiji are referred throughout this thesis as Indigenous Fijians which includes the first 
people of the Island of Rotuma. The term ‘Indigenous Fijians’ is used in this thesis instead of Fijian to 
locate the Indigenous peoples’ in Fiji’s history. 
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nationalist policies of the Indigenous government and executed Fiji’s fourth military coup 
in December 2006. 
 
Geographically, Fiji consists of 18,376 square kilometres of land and includes about 330 
islands, of which about 100 are inhabited. There two main islands of Fiji, Viti Levu and 
Vanua Levu, are illustrated in Figure 1 below. The largest island and population centre is 
Viti Levu, which has an area of 10,388 square kilometres, and Vanua Levu, located 
northeast of Viti Levu, is the second largest island and is slightly more than half the size 
of Viti Levu (Mataki, Koshi & Lal 2006: 50). 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Fiji Islands 
 
 
(Source: Pacific Travel Guide website: http://www.fiji.maps-pacific.com/) 
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The population by ethnicity in Table 1 shows the distribution of the population in Fiji 
between 1966 and 2007, the historical period covered in this thesis. The 1996 Census 
records a decline in the Indo-Fijian population in comparison to the total population by 5 
per cent due to the impact of the 1987 military coups. The 2007 Census data 
demonstrates that the Indo-Fijian population was reduced further compared with the 1996 
Census by a margin of 7 per cent, following violence against the community in the 
aftermath of the 2000 coup.  
 
Table 1: Population of Fiji by Ethnicity-1966-2007 
   
   Population of Fiji by Ethnicity (1966-2007)   
Census 
Year 
Indigenous 
Fijian 
Indo-
Fijian Others 
Total 
(Pop) 
Indigenous 
Fijians (% 
of the 
Total Pop) 
Indo-
Fijians (% 
of the 
Total Pop) 
1966 202,176  240,960  33,591 476,727  42% 51% 
1976 259,932  292,896  35,240 588,068  44% 50% 
1986 329,305  348,704  37,366 715,375  46% 49% 
1996 393,575  338,818  42,684 775,077  51% 44% 
2007 475,739  313,798  47,734 837,271  57% 37% 
 
 (Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics website: 
http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/census07_index2.htm) 
 
 
This thesis sets out the framework for analysing inter-group conflict in Fiji by utilising 
inter-group theory as its methodological paradigm. Researching inter-group conflict in 
divided communities is challenging and complex because of overlapping cross-cultural 
dimensions. However, this complexity is addressed by adopting an analytical historical 
approach designed to: 
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(i) provide meaningful context to the inter-group conflict in Fiji; 
(ii) promote analysis and insights across different historical intervals; and 
(iii) propose solutions that will enable inter-group cooperation and harmony.  
 
This thesis maps the inter-group conflict in Fiji since 1987. The theoretical framework 
used in this thesis is based on the seminal 1954 work of Gordon Allport, The Nature of 
Prejudice, who identified, through his research on post-war United States that conflict 
between groups is caused by prejudice which is historically constructed and has multiple 
behavioural levels including discrimination, organised violence and in-group solidarity. 
After, dissecting the nature of prejudice, Allport provides recommendations for inter-
group cooperation and harmony.  
 
This thesis examines Allport’s theory and develops a methodology to elucidate historical 
moments to explore inter-group conflict in Fiji. This includes, a comprehensive review of 
existing literature on Fiji and setting the context by providing a story of Fiji from 1960 to 
2006, a period within which the country had three coups, and where Indigenous Fijian 
nationalists instituted discriminatory policies and organised physical attacks against Indo-
Fijians (Trnka 2008b). By 2006, respective communal groups rallied behind their own 
ethnic political parties in a show of in-group solidarity resulting in a divisive general 
election. 
 
Following the historical setting, I will utilise Allport’s recommendations and argue that a 
three-pronged approach, based on national identity, truth and reconciliation and 
legislative reforms, are required to build inter-group cooperation in Fiji. 
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1.2 Methodology 
 
 
Inter-group conflict in divided communities is a complex issue (Huddy 2004: 947-67). It 
is complex because there are underlying prejudices including inclinations of ethnic 
groups to form generalisations and oversimplify the world of out-groups. After World 
War II, researchers in the United States, influenced by the growing civil rights 
movement, started looking at the sociology of race (Allport 1954). One such researcher 
Gordon Allport (1954) identified four conditions for a successful inter-group contact. 
Firstly, he argued that all social groups, regardless of their size, should have equal status; 
secondly, there has to be social enablers, such as a common identity, that promote inter-
group cooperation; thirdly, inter-group cooperation can only come about if there are 
shared goals and values; and fourthly, the whole structure of inter-group collaboration 
has to be assisted by an agreed authority.  
 
One of the most important acknowledgements of Allport is that prejudice in society is 
historically constructed and “only a total background of a conflict can lead to its 
understanding” (Allport 1954: 208). Prejudice for Allport is “an avertive or hostile 
attitude towards a person who belongs to a group and is therefore presumed to have the 
objectionable qualities ascribed to the group” (Allport 1954: 7). According to Allport, 
inter-group conflict is characterised by the actions and omissions of powerful social and 
economic groups. These include avoidance, discrimination, physical attack and in-group 
solidarity (1954: 14-15). Avoidance for Allport is the least damaging expression of 
prejudice, however, discrimination is a more structured form of prejudice to deny out-
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group equality thus “discrimination comes about when a dominant group deny to 
individuals or groups of people equality of treatment” (1954: 51). Allport’s four stages of 
prejudice manifest as distinct escalation points in history as he identifies discrimination 
as a pre-condition for violence. Besides equality, discrimination entails long periods of 
categorical prejudgment where suspicion and blaming of out-groups become firmly 
rooted in society (1954: 58). The next stage following discrimination is inter-group 
violence. Allport makes historical reference to the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany and 
the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan movement in the Southern United States (1954: 58), 
and argues that extreme nationalism (1954: 416) leads to direct and indirect violence 
against the out-group. The ideological positioning of the dominant group to push out the 
out-group from the community and the country is conceptualised as extropunitive 
violence (1954: 160). Allport theorised that extropunitive violence was characterised by 
obsessive concern and suspicion of the out-group, strengthening of in-group ties and 
increased prejudice against the out-group. Intropunitive violence, distinct from 
extropunitive violence, entailed aggression by members of the in-group against their own 
group (1954: 160). According to Allport, extropunitive and intropunitive characteristics 
operate in both the dominant group as well as the out-group, depending on the historical 
context. 
 
Allport defines inter-group differences based on types and degrees of differences and 
differences based on abilities and cultural practices and beliefs. Moreover, he 
acknowledges that the most prominent difference that is emphasised by the current social 
sciences is that of racial and ethnic (1954: 107). Allport argued that there are ways in 
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which inter-group relations can be strengthened and these include strengthening 
legislative provisions that foster inter-group cooperation, formal education methods, 
acquaintance and contact programs, group retaining methods and individual or group 
therapy (1954: 480). Besides, Allport believed that national character or national identity 
is important to cement inter-group relations (1954: 97-116). 
 
Allport’s inter-group theory, in particular his analysis of inter-group discrimination, 
violence and in-group solidarity as a form of extropunitive violence can be utilised to 
develop an analytical framework for the study of the history of the inter-group conflict in 
Fiji. As a result, it is proposed in the thesis that Allport’s inter-group theory allows for 
the: 
  critical investigation of the history of inter-group conflict in modern Fiji; 
 application of inter-group theory in Fiji, in particular the role of discrimination, 
violence and extropunitive in-group solidarity in crystallising inter-group 
discourse; and  
 proposals for inter-group conflict resolution in Fiji by utilising Allport’s 
recommendations on national identity, truth and reconciliation and legislative 
reforms in the form of multiparty legislative committees. 
 
To tackle the themes of inter-group conflict in divided communities, academia must 
develop a more effective inter-group theory. The historical approach can offer a starting 
point here but the key task will be the formulation of an adequate comparative 
historiography of inter-group conflict, and the development of a deeper understanding of 
 8 
 
the micro and macro linkages that shape inter-group discourse. More importantly, 
Allport’s inter-group theory does not recognise the pervasiveness of racial politics in 
contemporary society (Winant 2000: 169-189) including the fluidity of cultural identity, 
social inequality and inter-group psychology on inter-group discourse. These limitations 
of the application of inter-group theory are acknowledged from the outset. 
 
Besides limitations of inter-group theory, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2006: 753) 
have criticised Allport’s inter-group theory and, following an extensive study of inter-
group behaviour in conflict settings, argued that his conditions were not essential for 
prejudice reduction. As a result, they recommended that further research in this field 
should focus on negative factors that prevent inter-group contact from diminishing 
prejudice as well as the development of a more comprehensive theory of inter-group 
contact. 
 
1.3 The Research Questions 
 
Allport’s theory and its potential application to Fiji form the basis for two essential 
claims: 
(i) the history of inter-group conflict in modern Fiji, in particular the role of 
discrimination, violence and in-group solidarity acts as historical moments 
and;  
(ii) inter-group theory can be applied to analyse inter-group conflict and 
foreshadow its resolution. 
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In Fiji, inter-group conflict is characterised as a struggle between Indo-Fijian moves for 
political equality and Indigenous nationalists’ moves to cement a permanent Indigenous 
political paramountcy (Kurer 2001: 302). This inter-group conflict has taken various 
forms throughout colonial and post-colonial periods (Lal 2006), but for the purpose of 
this thesis, the approach will be to focus on the history of inter-group conflict by 
examining in detail the coups of 1987 and 2000 and the racially divisive elections of 
2006. The historical approach is essential to Allport’s theoretical framework and indeed 
to inform this analysis via his main recommendations for building consensus and 
cooperation among contesting groups. 
 
1.4  The Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis structure has three parts: Part 1: Introduction, Part 2: History of Inter-group 
Conflict in Fiji and Part 3: Application of Inter-group Theory in Fiji. 
  
In the introduction, I highlight the rationale for history as a method in the application of 
Allport’s theory to inter-group conflict in Fiji. Fiji has a history of contested identities 
and inter-group conflict forms the central theme of this thesis; that inter-group conflict in 
Fiji is located in history and as such only through historical analysis of the Fiji coups of 
1987, 2000 and the general election of 2006, can we fully appreciate the Fiji context. 
Why this period is taken into account is that following the coups of 1987, structural and 
institutional violence against Indo-Fijians in the form of discrimination was 
institutionalised leading to organised violence and fear of violence in 2000 which in turn 
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triggered in-group solidarity and extropunitive violence, all key aspects of Allport’s 
theory.  
 
In Chapter 2, I conduct a review of the literature on inter-group conflict in Fiji. I focus on 
the three dominant  types of approaches to research on Fiji namely discourse analysis, 
ethnography, and critical theory and argue why historiography will assist in locating 
inter-group conflict in Fiji. I emphasise that an historical approach fills the void in the 
literature of inter-group theory and more importantly allows us to examine the 
manifestation of prejudice in the Fiji context. 
 
Part 2 details the history of Fiji, in particular the history of inter-group conflict from 1960 
to 1987, the 1987 coups, the 2000 coup and extropunitive in-group solidarity between 
Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians. In Chapter 3, I provide a history of Fiji from 1960 to 
1987 as a background to Chapter 4 where I look at the history of the coups of 1987 by 
utilising the work of published scholars and draw upon information used in the 
mainstream Fiji press. In Chapter 5, the history of the 2000 coup is narrated through 
mostly popular press, and information from fieldwork conducted in December of 2000 on 
Indo-Fijians, who fled Indigenous nationalist violence in rural areas of Fiji. A sample of 
three cases of violence against Indo-Fijians is used to highlight the plight of the 
community living in rural Fiji. In Chapter 6, I utilise both the scholarly literature and 
press reports to examine the history of the 2006 general elections, where Indo-Fijians and 
Indigenous Fijians rallied behind their own communal constituencies to produce an 
ethnically polarised electoral outcome. The ethnic division highlighted the failure of the 
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multiracial constitution and the electoral strategies adopted in 1997 to bring about inter-
ethnic moderation and accommodation. 
 
In Part 3 of the thesis, Allport’s inter-group theory on structural and institutional violence 
in the form of discrimination, fear of violence and physical violence and extropunitive 
violence in the form of ideological positioning of the dominant group against the out-
group provides for the reinterpretation of Fiji history. Following the 1987 military coup, 
overt discrimination was instituted against Indo-Fijians after Indo-Fijian members of the 
coalition government were removed from office at gun point by an Indigenous military, 
and senior Indo-Fijian public servants, including magistrates and judges were summarily 
dismissed. The history of the 1987 coup discussed in Chapter 4 provides the context for 
the analysis of institutional and structural violence in Chapter 7 where I utilise Allport’s 
theory on discrimination to examine why discrimination against Indo-Fijian was 
implemented and later constitutionalised via the 1990 Constitution. While discrimination 
against Indo-Fijians featured prominently in the 1987 coups, organised violence against 
the community, particularly in rural Fiji, by Indigenous nationalists became the central 
focus in 2000. In Chapter 7, I use Allport’s theory on inter-group violence to analyse 
such organised violence against Indo-Fijians.  
 
Despite the new multiracial constitution in 1997, discrimination and violence against 
Indo-Fijians led to in-group solidarity and extropunitive violence as ethnic groups 
became inward focused. Besides Indo-Fijians, Indigenous Fijian nationalists also 
emphasised in-group solidarity and established ideological justifications for pushing the 
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Indo-Fijians out of the country. Many in the Indigenous community saw the affirmative 
action programs of the Indigenous nationalist government of Laisenia Qarase as a 
mechanism for bridging economic disparity between Indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
Using Allport as a theoretical reference, both Fiji communities’ in-group perspectives as 
well as extropunitive and intropunitive violence are analysed in Chapter 7. Not only 
analytics using Allport allows us to reinterpret Fiji’s inter-group conflict but also enables 
us to consider approaches for inter-group conflict resolution. In Chapter 8, Allport’s 
recommendations, based on national identity, reconciliation and legislative reforms are 
projected on to the inter-group conflict situation in Fiji in order to foreshadow inter-group 
cooperation and harmony. 
 
The thesis concludes by emphasising that in the past there was increasing emphasis on 
the nature of inter-group conflict in Fiji but there was an inherent lack of a theoretical 
model that provided a framework for historical convergence in divided communities. 
Allport’s inter-group theory fills this gap by emphasising constructive strategies for inter-
group engagement through national identity, national therapy via truth and reconciliation 
and the use of legislative instrument, in the form of parliamentary committees. While 
Allport provides a comprehensive theoretical foundation for the study of inter-group 
conflict in Fiji, further research should be carried out on contrasting theoretical 
approaches to inter-group relations. According to Leonie Huddy (2004), the strengths and 
weaknesses of social dominance, social identity and system justification theories are 
required to be fleshed out in detail in order to leverage new and exciting approaches to 
the study of inter-group conflict.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Claims 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Ethnic conflict in Fiji has been a subject of academic inquiry including discourse 
analysis, ethnography, and critical theory. These approaches have been utilised to 
examine underlying social and political forces that inform inter-group tensions in Fiji. In 
this chapter, I will examine major themes of interpretation of modern Fiji and suggest a 
new historical epistemology, using inter-group theory (Allport 1954). I argue, that 
besides an examination of the past, history can be utilised as an epistemological tool for 
refocusing the issues on national identity, truth and reconciliation and the power of 
multiparty parliamentary arrangements. Previous academic research regarding Fiji has 
not utilised inter-group theory as an analytical lens through which to refocus historical 
context. In this regard, my approach and analysis fills an important gap in the inquiry of 
inter-group conflict in Fiji. 
 
2.2 Discourse Analysis 
 
Nelson Kasfir (1979:365-366) has argued, within the discourse analysis framework, that 
ethnic identities are both fluid and intermittent in developing multiethnic communities. 
Using the case study of Uganda, he argued that “when political participation is based on 
ethnicity, individuals are necessarily constrained (though to a greater or lesser degree) by 
those objective indicators of common ancestry thought to be especially salient-culture, 
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myths, language, or territory” Kasfir (1979: 371). Kasfir continued that shared perception 
creates social solidarity and turns “individuals assigned to an ethnic category to an active 
ethnic group”.  Kasfir (1979: 371) further noted that the British colonial rule created 
multiple ethnic identities, which according to Carmen White (2002: 14) are either 
“ranked or unranked”.  
 
White (2002: 14) argues that “while in ranked societies, social conventions prescribe 
difference in subordinate groups concomitant with the pejorative assessment of their very 
worth, ethnic relations in an unranked system are marked by mutual ambivalence, with 
negative perceptions balanced by begrudging allowances for other group’s competence in 
a given sector”. In her case study of Fiji, White highlighted that colonial policies 
structured conflicting political and economic interests for Indigenous Fijians and Indo-
Fijians, while colonial ideologies about the “nature” of groups have survived in the form 
of invidious comparisons.  
 
The impact of colonial rule in establishing ethnic compartments and grooming the 
Indigenous elite in Fiji is often under-emphasised in the study of post-colonial Fiji 
politics. Benjamin Reilly (2004: 486) noted that colonial rule had diverse impacts in the 
South Pacific Islands, where “post-colonial state-building led to the growth of new 
cleavages which served to restructure politics along a more confrontational axis”. Martha 
Kaplan who approached inter-ethnic conflict as a study in contending discourse argued 
that in Fiji, the colonial encounter led Indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians to “construct 
each other in terms of their own, quite different cultural systems” (Kaplan 1989: 350). 
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The British colonial rule, according to Kaplan, consciously divided the communities 
along ethnic and cultural lines and continuously intervened to circumvent cross-cultural 
collaboration. However, Robert Norton (2002: 154) disputes this claim and suggests that 
the argument that Britain willingly perpetuated ethnic division is not supported, because 
there were instances, especially during the move towards independence, to provide a 
framework for leaders of both communities to work together. Nevertheless, Norton 
(1993: 741-759) acknowledges that discourse about the importance of tradition has been 
a central feature of Indigenous Fijian participation in national politics, including the 
celebration of tradition figures prominently in the way ordinary people contrast the 
Indigenous Fijian way of life to lives of immigrants.  
 
Ralph Premdas (2002: 26), in his analysis of the promise of the 1997 Constitution, 
observed that Fiji’s problems stem from “Fiji’s unintegrated multiethnic structure and 
history of inter-sectional conflict”, which reflects a more broad-reaching concern of 
managing diversity in multiethnic settings through institutions, policies and practices. 
Premdas (2002: 34) concludes that “while the Fiji case suggests the need for consensus 
political systems of power-sharing requiring special kinds of institutional arrangements 
which deviate from standard Western zero-sum adversarial parliamentary models”, there 
are limitations to this approach due to existing ethnic divisions. 
 
Anthropologist Margaret Jolly utilises discourse analysis to approach ethnicity in Fiji as a 
fluid identifiable response to context and transformation. According to Jolly (2005: 423), 
the native and migrant distinction is more compelling for Fiji where “the white settlers 
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were never a majority and where difference between native Fijian and migrant Indo-
Fijian is still seen by many Indigenous Fijians in the country as a relation between guest 
and host” whereas Sind Emde (2005) analysed the Fiji 2000 crisis as an emotional 
discourse, examining fears and anxieties that influenced inter-ethnic relations in Fiji since 
the arrival of Indian indentured workers in 1879. Emde concluded that a “dialectical 
relationship existed between rumours and fear during the political instability of 2000 
which was emotionally embodied and used to nourish ethnic antagonism and politicise 
ethnicity” (Emde 2005: 398). While discourse analysts focused on difference, identities 
and ethnicity in Fiji, Fiji ethnographers examined similar themes in different social 
contexts. 
 
2.3 Ethnography 
 
Ethnographic research is concerned with how social realities are constructed. It ventures 
into an area of cultural studies that allows the researcher to analyse the actions of 
communities and place them into a formal context. Paul Atkinson and Martyn 
Hammersley (2007: 3-14) explained that ethnographers source data from a range of 
sources, focus on a few cases and “interpret the meanings, functions and consequences of 
human actions and show how these are implicated in local, and perhaps into wider 
contexts”. The authors conclude that ethnographic research should not only be concerned 
with understanding the complexities of the cultural environment but also applying the 
findings to initiate change. 
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Ethnographic studies of Indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have played a significant 
role in providing the conceptual framework for greater insights into ethnic categories and 
practices, symbols, perceptions and beliefs in Fiji. Influenced largely by anthropology, 
Hirokazu Miyazaki (2004: 6-7) investigated the “character of hope across different forms 
of knowing in Indigenous Fijian philosophy and anthropological points of replication, 
and presented a modality of ethnographic engagement predicated on reception and 
response”. Miyazaki conducted detailed ethnographic research on the Indigenous 
community of Suvavou, located near the capital of Fiji Suva and started his research by 
asking a question about how the people of Suvavou kept “their hope alive generation 
after generation when the knowledge has continued to fail them” (Miyazaki 2004:3). In 
order to answer this question, his book The Method of Hope: Anthropology, Philosophy 
and Fijian Knowledge investigated the concept of hope across the different generation of 
the Suvavou people ranging from archival research to gift giving, Christian Church 
rituals, and business practices. The ethnographic study by Miyazaki is not only important 
in understanding the contours of hope but the larger socio-political context of the struggle 
such as compensation for the use of ancestral land by the government of Fiji. Some of 
these concerns were highlighted by George Speight during the insurrection of May 2000 
and many in the village supported the nationalist call to return all ancestral land to the 
Indigenous owners.  
 
Kevin Miller (2008) for his doctoral thesis conducted an ethnographic account of Indo-
Fijian ethnomusicology and analysed three layers of ethnic intercourse: the sub-ethnic in 
which the Indo-Fijian community negotiates internal difference, the national based on 
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social and political relations between Indo-Fijian and the Indigenous Fijian and the 
transnational in which global diasporic movements engender new points of attachment to 
the concept of community. Miller discovered that Indo-Fijians have drawn boundaries for 
their community through songs and through cultural performance and utilise them to 
negotiate the constitution of their community (Miller 2008: 430). An important 
observation of Miller was his analysis of mixed group performance, by Indo-Fijians and 
Indigenous Fijians for international visitors, commissioned by the Fiji government before 
the 2006 coup. Miller notes that the nationalist government was of the opinion that cross-
cultural understanding was not achieved through this initiative. However, Indo-Fijians 
were of a view that the performance “transcended the requisite correlation between the 
performer’s ethnicity and the ethnicity represented” (Miller 2008: 432). Miller concluded 
that the productivity of mixed-group performance was limited due to the small number of 
such singers and their “marginal space in the national imaginary” (Miller 2008: 433). 
 
One of the causes of this marginal national space for inter-group discourse is Indigenous 
nationalism, which continues to play a dominant role in shaping inter-group relations in 
post-colonial Fiji and strong distinctions are made between Indigenous groups and 
migrants based on contested cultural values and heterogeneous Indigenous Fijian 
strategies of “de-legitimising non-Indigenous elements” (Cretton 2005: 415), including 
parliamentary democracy, constitutional rules, and human rights. Vivian Cretton through 
her ethnographic study of Indigenous Fijian nationalism notes that Indigenous cultural 
strategies are “located in the continuity of the past in the present, consolidating cultural 
identities to various degrees, depending on the situation of the parties concerned” 
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(Cretton 2005: 415). Culture, therefore, has been exposed as a political tool for the 
unification of the Indigenous Fijian society against the immigrant and less secure Indo-
Fijians.  
 
An important ethnography on violence against Indo-Fijians in Fiji, following the 2000 
coup, is compiled by Susanna Trnka (2005: 354-67). Trnka used the concept of 
‘empirical citizenship’ to explore how Indo-Fijians articulate and live out their place in a 
nation. Drawing on the ethnographic fieldwork she conducted in Fiji from 1999 to 2000, 
Trnka examined physical violence and the fear of violence among Indo-Fijians. 
Following the 19 May 2000 coup, a national campaign of violence against Indo-Fijians 
was orchestrated by the supporters of George Speight throughout Fiji. According to 
Trnka (2008a: 145), “Speight, unabashedly, made race the centrepiece of his 
revolutionary rhetoric, attempting to inspire Fiji’s Indigenous Fijians to stand up for their 
rights and support what he called the cause”. Despite the uncertainty facing Indo-Fijians 
during the height of the 2000 coup, Trnka observed that while the “atmosphere following 
the coup was one of fear and confusion, there were moments of overwhelming hilarity” 
(Trnka: 2008b:79). Utilising the theoretical framework of Gordon Allport and Leo 
Postman (1947), Trnka developed a conceptual framework around jokes and rumours: 
 
Jokes suggested a limit to the chaos. While fantastical rumours acted to expand the 
possibilities of violence into the realm of the bizarre, jokes indicated that some things 
were not to be taken seriously but could indeed still be laughed at. By purposefully 
playing with people’s credulity, jokes enabled individuals to point out the absurdity of 
what was already occurring and to assert that there were still things that were indeed 
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incredulous. In times of acute uncertainty, the production of humour thus imparted to 
those who partook in it a sense of orderliness and “normality” that was otherwise in 
question (Trnka 2008b: 80). 
 
How Speight was able to stir Indigenous Fijian passion could be understood by the recent 
ethnography on Indigenous Fijians in the book Our Wealth Is Loving Each Other by 
Karen Brison (2007) who observed that Indigenous Fijians express pride in their culture 
and this makes them feel equal to others, including Indo-Fijians. However, in 2000, 
George Speight was able to project the view that Indo-Fijians were more “equal” and as a 
result was able to instil fear of dispossession among Indigenous Fijians by playing with 
their emotions. The works of Trnka, Brison and Miyazaki create a trajectory of fear, pride 
and hope that has added value to the study of both contemporary Indo-Fijian and 
Indigenous Fijian ethnographies. A more political account lies in critical theoretical 
studies of Fiji. 
 
2.4 Critical Theory 
 
A common theme running across a number of critical theorist political commentators on 
Fiji is that a lack of inter-group contact has played a significant role in amplifying ethnic 
conflict, especially competition for political power. Moreover, the study of influences of 
military and ethno-nationalists on state power (Ratuva 2007), history of ethnic tensions 
and conflict (Lal 1988, 1992a, 2006, 2008), Indigenous nationalism (Lawson 1991, 
2004), moments in Fiji’s political history (Fraenkel & Firth 2007), cycle of ethnic 
conflict (Field, Baba & Nabobo-Baba 2005), the role of  Indigenous ruling class in 
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political formations (Halapua 2003) and post-colonial orthodoxy (Durutalo 1998, 
Robertson 2008) is located in the annals of critical theory. 
 
Stephanie Lawson’s research focused on the complexities of ethnicity, nationalism, and 
democracy, combining comparative and normative approaches to the study of Fiji 
politics. Her book Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji (Lawson 1991) was a study of 
the failure of democracy in Fiji. Lawson argued that the political parliamentary and 
constitutional structures that were planted by the colonial authorities in Fiji failed to 
encourage inter-ethnic cooperation and resulted in ethnic suspicion, antagonism and 
upsurge in nationalism resulting in the coup of 1987. Besides Lawson, Steven Ratuva 
(2007) and Robbie Robertson (2007) analyse the influences of ethno-nationalism in state 
making in Fiji and various challenges to the neo-colonial orthodoxy in the form of 
multiethnic alliances in 1987 and in 1999. 
 
Critical historian Brij Lal (1992a) undertook a detailed synoptic study of the major 
contours of Fijian history in the twentieth century in his book Broken Waves. Lal’s 
analysis is based on a critical historicist methodology as he unmasked the terrains of 
ethnic conflict in Fiji. His approach has become, as he described, a “journey of self-
exploration” (Lal 1992a: XV). In a volume published by the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies (Lal 2006), Lal highlighted the tensions between Indigenous Fijian political 
paramountcy, Indo-Fijians and Europeans. These tensions were carried over after 
independence of Fiji in the form of a three-legged stool with Indigenous chiefs in control 
of the state, the Indo-Fijians in control of the economy and the Europeans in control of 
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international relations. Since independence, the Europeans in Fiji have claimed solidarity 
with Indigenous Fijians against the Indo-Fijians. However by 1987, Lal claims that ethnic 
tensions in Fiji were softening due to non-racial voting behaviour.  
 
The elections also disrupted the conventional calculus of Fijian politics. A Fijian-
dominated party, representing the Fijian establishment, was defeated. The number of 
Fijians voting for the Coalition was small, fewer than 10 per cent; 77 per cent of the 
Fijians voted for the Alliance, and 83 per cent of Indo-Fijians for the National Federation 
Party. The shift was slight, but the fear of the spreading of the trend of non-racial voting 
challenged conventional thinking about the operation of politics in Fiji (Lal 2008: 85) 
 
The theme of the role of ethnicity in national politics is also taken up by New Zealand 
journalist Michael Field, and academics Tupeni Baba and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba. 
According to Field, Baba and Nabobo-Baba (2005: 20), it is Fiji’s diversity of “language, 
culture and politics, which is at the core of a tragic cycle of conflict over power. They go 
on to say that Indigenous cultural assertions have played a major role in nationalist claims 
on state power. Indigenous Fijians, in particular the “militant section of the Indigenous 
community” (Lal 2003: 158), have precipitated a coup culture, and Fiji’s post-
independence constitutions and legislature have failed to manage underlying communal 
divisions. 
 
Indigenous Fijian chiefs have throughout Fiji’s history protected their position in the 
Indigenous cultural hierarchy and at times taken the role of the colonial overseer by 
ensuring that Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians remain divided. Even the new “Fijian 
ruling class” or the Indigenous elite (Halapua 2003: 122) championed Indigenous 
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communal living because it provided the cultural legitimacy for claims on wealth, power 
and privilege.  
 
Critical theorists are not only concerned with power, nationalism and social forces in the 
making of Fiji history but they also look at the electoral systems and the structure of voter 
behaviour in Fiji. A pioneering study was conducted by Bernard Grofman and Jon 
Fraenkel (2005 and 2006) who argued that in Fiji, Alternative Vote (AV) failed to 
encourage inter-ethnic moderation. Using neo-Downsian methodology on median voter 
behaviour, Grofman and Fraenkel studied the voter behaviour in the 1999, 2001 and 2006 
general elections and concluded that AV did not moderate communal voting patterns. 
Donald Horowitz (2007: 13-23) has challenged this view, arguing that Grofman and 
Fraenkel have failed to consider the role of political parties and strategic voting in 
influencing electoral outcomes. Indigenous Fijian academic Alumita Durutalo (2007: 
580) observed that ethnic and communal orientation continues to influence election 
results in both communal and open seats and that “multicultural politics may take a while 
to gain acceptance across the ethnic divide”.  
 
In the book From Election to Coup in Fiji edited by Stewart Firth and Jon Fraenkel 
(2007: XXIII), both academics map the “jagged course of Fiji’s modern history” and 
make some important observations for the future: 
 
More doubtful is whether or not communal solidarity can and will prevail, in the way the 
constitution-framers envisaged, as the forces that bound both communities into a bipolar 
two-party system dissipate. If communal solidarity fades and the people of Fiji begin to 
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divide along different lines, the mechanics and campaign strategies at future elections 
will be very different from those of 1999, 2001 and 2006. That will complicate 
matters, and may, by that odd, long and painful route, make the victors in future elections 
those who are less steeped in the communal politics of the past (Firth and Fraenkel 2007: 
9). 
 
The observation highlights the potential fluidity of Fiji politics where future 
constitutional and electoral engineering could engender a new non-ethnic trajectory and 
perhaps greater in-group political competitions and better inter-group cooperation. 
 
Inter-group theory has advanced rapidly following Gordon Allport’s seminal work The 
Nature of Prejudice. The most notable scholars in the field of inter-group contact after 
Allport are Thomas Pettigrew and Roel Meertens (1995, 2001) who extended Allport’s 
theory and analysed subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe by using a tri-
modular social psychological framework around traditional values, cultural differences 
and positive emotions. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Nature of Prejudice, Thomas 
Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2005: 266) introduced meta-analytical methodology to the 
study of prejudice following a five year research project which “covered 515 studies that 
examined relationships between inter-group contact and prejudice, which were gathered 
from 1940s through to the year 2000 and together represented responses from 250,493 
individuals in 38 nations”. The analysis of the data showed that “effects of inter-group 
contact are significantly stronger for majority groups than for members of minority 
groups” (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008: 922-934).  
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In his normative interpretation of inter-group contact, Pettigrew argues that the 
recommendations of Allport for successful inter-group contact are basically facilitating 
conditions and should be subjected to meta-analytic testing. Furthermore, he recommends 
four interrelated directions for the study of inter-group relations: “(1) specifying the 
processes of inter-group contact; (2) a greater focus upon inter-group contact that leads to 
negative effects, increased prejudice, distrust, and conflict; (3) placing inter-group 
contact in its longitudinal, multilevel social context; (4) applying contact to social policy” 
(Pettigrew 2008: 189).  
 
Research on inter-group conflict in Northern Ireland (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, 
Hamberger & Niens 2006: 99-120) has shown that successful implementation of the pre-
conditions for inter-group contact, as suggested by Allport, result in better inter-group 
relations and inter-group trust and forgiveness. Such empirical data from Ireland on inter-
group conflict supports Allport’s notion that pre-conditions are effective when 
implementing strategies for better inter-group relations in divided communities. In the 
current inter-group contact literature, there is, however, a lack of appreciation on the role 
of history in the study of inter-group relations. John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner (2006: 
385) acknowledge that an historical approach is complementary to the overall literature 
on inter-group theory and allows the existing literature to cross disciplinary boundaries. 
Stephen Worchel and Dawna Coutant (2008: 427) support this observation and add that 
“the role of history is not given sufficient credence in many explanations of inter-group 
conflict”. As a result, the history of inter-group conflict is lost under the weight of 
quantitative data and statistical analysis.  
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Therefore, my approach to the study of the history of inter-group conflict in Fiji is an 
attempt to fill this void. To some extent, it can be argued that historical analysis is more 
closely related to critical theory as discussed earlier in the approach taken by Brij Lal. 
However, unlike Lal’s historical narrative, this thesis integrates critical theoretical 
framework as reflexive historiography by utilising Fiji history not only to examine inter-
group conflict but to actively seek its resolution. 
 
According to Allport (1954: 479), there are historical manifestation of prejudice through 
discrimination, violence and in-group solidarity. These three stages form the central 
themes of this thesis and are utilised to locate inter-group conflict in Fiji’s history, 
namely the coups of 1987, the coup of 2000 and the 2006 general elections. The 
examination of these events as moments in time provides an appreciation of the depth of 
inter-group conflict in Fiji. However, the application of Allport’s theory on inter-group 
conflict to Fiji has some shortcomings especially in relation to cultural identity, social 
inequality and inter-group psychology. Nevertheless, this thesis proposes a further step 
and argues that an analysis of historical moments provides the possibility of conflict 
resolution by adopting a three-pronged strategy on inter-group conciliation proposed by 
Allport (1954: 495)-national identity, national therapy (truth and reconciliation) and 
legislative reforms via parliamentary committees-the links between history and conflict 
resolution can be established in Fiji. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
There are common themes running across all approaches. Discourse analysis has brought 
plural narratives to the socio-cultural understanding of Fiji. The ethnographers in Fiji 
locate a diverse community within the larger cultural context and through field work 
identified, hope, perception, fears and motivations in the community. The critical 
theorists are concerned with power, nationalism and the history of Fiji, in particular the 
ongoing political tensions between ethnic groups. Inter-group theory, as espoused by 
Allport, has developed its own unique application that focuses on the nature of prejudice 
mainly through the history of institutional and structural violence. It is within this 
theoretical context of Allport that I examine inter-group conflict in Fiji and propose this 
form of analysis as a tool for conflict resolution. 
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Part 2: History of Inter-group Conflict in Fiji 
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Chapter 3: 1960 to 1987-Establishing Inter-group Conflict 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Following British colonisation in 1874, the Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon, moved 
to protect the Indigenous Fijians from the rigours of European plantation life by 
importing Indians from India as indentured workers. As a result, by the end of indenture, 
some 60,000 Indians had made Fiji their home (Lal 1983b). Despite the large number of 
Indians living in Fiji, there was very little interaction between the Indians and Indigenous 
Fijians. The colonial authorities ensured that both these communities lived in their own 
communal settlements and any inter-group contact was unlawful as Indigenous village 
administrators were empowered to be on the outlook for any Indian attempting to live in 
a Fijian village (Kelly 1992: 246-267). As a consequence of the colonial policy of 
keeping the two communities apart, inter-group prejudice developed, resulting in inter-
group conflict. In this chapter, I will focus on the history of Fiji from 1960 to 1987. In 
this period, Fiji gained independence and Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians for the first 
time had to learn to co-exist with each other without the oversight of the colonial 
authorities. Initially, there were overtures of cooperation between the two communities 
but this interim inter-ethnic compact crumbled as Indigenous Fijian nationalists asserted 
themselves on to the national stage (Premdas & Steeves1991: 540-558). The origins of 
inter-group conflict lay with the ethnic outlook of Indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian 
leaders in the 1960s. While throughout the post-colonial period these positions shifted, 
the underlying inter-group prejudice caused by ethnic divisions continued resulting in the 
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collapse of the constitutional and political settlement brokered by the British colonial 
authorities.  
 
Social distance between two the communities is an important measure that reflects the 
degree of underlying prejudice prevalent. Before independence of Fiji in 1970, David 
Thomas (1969: 269-270) measured the social distance between Indigenous Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians during a series of attitudinal studies which highlighted inter-group 
differences. Furthermore, in 2000, Robert Norton research looked at the socio-cultural 
factors influencing inter-group differences, indicating that Indo-Fijians saw Indigenous 
Fijians as culturally inferior while Indigenous Fijians remained concerned about the 
impact of an increasing Indo-Fijian population on their community (Norton 2000: 95). In 
addition, Indigenous Fijian views on Indo-Fijians were shaped by the discourse among 
land, church and hereditary chiefs (Ryle 2010). Many Indo-Fijians leased fertile 
Indigenous land to produce sugar, were predominantly Hindus and their leaders often 
engaged in vitriolic debates with Indigenous chiefs on Fiji’s political future. Out of the 
three triggers for prejudice against Indo-Fijians, land was the most critical for it was the 
collective view of the Indigenous community that political control was necessary to avert 
the possibility of Indo-Fijian alienation of Indigenous land (Leckie 2002: 132). Indo-
Fijians, however, argued that Indigenous land ought to be given to the cultivators as an 
appreciation of Indo-Fijian hard work and contribution to the economic development of 
the country since indenture. In summary, the socio-cultural positions of both the 
communities revolved around ownership and access to Fijian land which to date remains 
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unresolved, and underpins much of the inter-group tensions (including claims of 
discriminatory policy) and violence. 
 
3.2 1960 to 1987 
 
In 1965, Indigenous leader Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara created a three-tier party structure to 
manage Fiji's ethnic politics and formed the Alliance Party of Fiji which had three 
distinct arms-the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance and the General Voters (Newton: 
1970: 33). The Fijian Association was active in promoting Indigenous Fijian political 
paramountcy since the 1950s when Indigenous Fijian chiefs rose within the ranks of the 
colonial bureaucracy, providing political leadership to their community. For example, the 
Fijian Association was behind the Wakaya Letters of 1956 wherein the chiefs of Fiji 
invoked the Deed of Cession of 1874, arguing that transfer of political power should be 
from the Crown to the Indigenous chiefs. In 1959, Fiji witnessed challenges to the 
colonial authority by a multiracial Fiji Retail and Wholesale Workers Union. The protest 
by the union ended up in race riots (Howard 1991: 53). However, with the intervention 
by Indigenous chiefs-Ratu Edward Cakobau and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara-the short lived 
rebellion was defeated. The chiefs argued that Indigenous Fijians were manipulated by 
cunning Indo-Fijian leaders to facilitate their own political agendas (Bain 1989: 15). As a 
result, inter-ethnic contact was defeated. 
 
In the 1960s, the Indo-Fijian Federation Party was formed following a prolonged sugar 
cane strike and its leader A.D. Patel called for land reform and spearheaded the 
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independence campaign. The Federation Party, besides being an Indo-Fijian dominated 
political party, was led by a lawyer, A.D. Patel, and his colleagues from the Sangam 
Organisation (formed in 1925). After initially focusing on Indo-Fijian issues, the party 
formed an agreement with the Fijian National Party in 1969 and attempted to cement 
inter-ethnic contact and cooperation. During the 1960s, the Indigenous Fijian chiefs 
remained suspicious of Indo-Fijian leaders (Premdas 1978: 35). However, with the 
formation of the UN Decolonisation Committee, the international stage was set for Fiji to 
move towards independence (Alley 1970: 150) despite domestic political condition in Fiji 
being one of distrust and mutual disrespect. Eight decades of colonisation had created a 
sharp wedge between the Indo-Fijian and the Indigenous Fijian communities. 
Demographics also played a key role in ethnic struggles for power. A majority of Fijians 
in the 1960s were living in rural areas and only a handful of Indigenous chiefs had 
emerged with any significant training and education, and these chiefs were committed to 
Indigenous political paramountcy in a new post-colonial order. The colonial Fijian 
Administration, entrenched after cession, allowed for social hierarchy to be cemented in 
villages, districts and provinces and most Indigenous Fijians were entirely removed from 
commerce. Church, chiefs, customary obligations and basic agriculture were central to 
the Indigenous Fijian village life while politics and governance was the sole domain of 
Indigenous chiefs. Indo-Fijians on the other hand had chosen non-agrarian careers and 
lifestyles and were predominantly middle class doctors, engineers and public servants 
taking over from Europeans in business (Mamak 1978). The two communities had very 
little knowledge of each other and as a result both were susceptible to malicious racist 
propaganda on both sides. One problem was that the Indo-Fijian leaders lacked political 
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vision and mistakenly pushed for independence when the two communities had virtually 
no meaningful contact since 1879 when the first boat-load of Indians arrived in Fiji as 
indentured workers. The Indigenous Fijian leaders saw independence as a chance to 
reclaim the state from the Crown. Although Indigenous chief Ratu Mara developed some 
rapport with Indo-Fijian leader A.D. Patel, this was hardly the case at the grassroots level, 
where racial bias and prejudices were evident (Brookfield 1972). The Ratu Mara-led 
Alliance Party of Fiji won the election of 1966, but the Indo-Fijian leaders cried foul and 
resigned, forcing a by-election. Indigenous Fijians immediately took offence and as a 
consequence the first significant racial tensions flared up in 1968 (Newton 1970: 34).  
 
Indo-Fijian leader A.D. Patel, as a result of race riots in 1968, softened some of his 
positions on land reform. Ratu Mara continued holding discussions with A.D. Patel and 
was responsible for achieving consensus with the Indo-Fijian leadership from 1970-1972. 
In 1969, A.D. Patel died and Siddiq Koya assumed the leadership of the National 
Federation Party. Koya adopted a more conciliatory approach towards Indigenous Fijians 
but maintained the push for “common roll”, which was supposed to enhance political 
equality (Vasil 1972: 25). Nevertheless, under the 1970 Constitution, the Senate had a 
number of Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) nominees who had powers of veto over 
legislation affecting Indigenous Fijian interests. However, this provision of the 
constitution was never properly explained to Indigenous Fijians, who were extended 
voting rights from 1962 whilst Indians had been electing their representatives since 1929. 
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The relationship between Koya and Mara was cordial until 1975. Following the 
announcement of the Street Commission recommendations where Harry Street 
recommended that Fiji was ready for a common roll electoral system, Ratu Mara was 
ambivalent and changed his earlier undertaking that he would abide by the Commission's 
recommendations. Koya and Mara had a fall out and the so called “Fiji's honey moon 
period” premised on cooperation between two communal leaders was over (Lal 1986: 
78). Also, in 1975, an Alliance Member of Parliament caused uproar when he called for 
the expulsion of Indo-Fijians from Fiji, sparking calls from Indo-Fijian leaders that the 
Alliance Party was racist. Sakeasi Butadroka, in fact, highlighted the perceptions and 
concerns of many Indigenous Fijians and was able to tap into Indigenous fears and 
concerns caused by a lack of interaction between the two communities (Lal 1986: 96-97).  
 
With the formation of the Fijian Nationalist Party, the racial politics entered a new phase 
as the illusion of multiracial harmony created by Ratu Mara’s “Pacific Way”, premised 
upon the concept of a happy and a peaceful multiracial society, crumbled (Fiji-Report for 
the Year 1970: 5). Fiji was a racially stratified society where cultural isolation of the two 
communities reinforced prejudices and biases, which were exploited by political leaders 
for personal ends. In the April 1977 elections, Indo-Fijians moved away from the 
Alliance Party and the Nationalist Party split the Alliance Party’s Indigenous Fijian vote 
allowing the National Federation Party (NFP) to win power. However, the split within the 
NFP ranks and the indecision on the part of the NFP leader forced the intervention of the 
Governor General Ratu Sir George Cakobau, who appointed Ratu Mara as a care-taker 
Prime Minister (Lal 1986). Seeing the prospect of the repeat of the April 1977 results, 
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Indigenous Fijian voters came back to the Alliance fold. Race played an important part in 
the second general elections of 1977 and showed that dissention within Indigenous 
Fijians could compromise the political position of their leaders. Race continued to 
dominate Fiji politics until the April elections of 1987 when the Fiji Labour Party and the 
NFP coalition put forward a new multiracial vision for Fiji and successfully convinced 
urban Indigenous Fijians to change their voting behaviour. Another important factor 
besides race was that Indigenous Fijians were a minority in 1987 and as a minority 
community were concerned by the economically dominant position of the majority Indo-
Fijian community. The minority-majority dynamics caused suspicion among Indigenous 
Fijian nationalists of Indo-Fijian political domination. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
By 1987, Fiji was a racially polarised society and lack of inter-group contact precipitated 
conflict and divisions. The Fiji Labour Party sought to lessen the effect of race in politics 
by forming a multiracial trade union sponsored party in 1985. Led by a doctor from 
western Viti Levu, the Fiji Labour Party formed a coalition with the National Federation 
Party in 1986 and fought the 1987 election under the banner: “Time for Change” (Bain & 
Baba 1991: 87-89). However, the entrenched elite of Fiji did not want to give up their 
control on political power and following the election, members of the Alliance Party 
formed the nationalist Taukei Movement and used race to mobilise Indigenous Fijians, 
who had little or no knowledge of the 1970 Constitution. Former Alliance members and 
Methodist Church Ministers organised a propaganda campaign and formed alliances with 
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a team from within the Fiji Military Forces, which overthrew the coalition government in 
May 1987 (Lal 1990: 189). The inter-ethnic tensions that were simmering in Fiji since the 
1960s had finally exploded on to the national stage in 1987 in the form of an Indigenous 
nationalist coup, resulting in the establishment of racial discrimination against Indo-
Fijians and the political marginalisation of the community through the promulgation of 
the 1990 Constitution. The discriminatory conventions established after the 1987 coup 
are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The 1987 Coups-Establishing Discrimination 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The coup of May 1987 occurred because of an escalation of inter-group prejudice caused 
by inter-ethnic tensions. Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians since independence 
continued to have their separate spheres of development and the Indigenous-dominated 
government of the Alliance Party ensured that the two ethnic groups remained isolated in 
respective communal camps and during elections, Fiji’s ethnic leaders exploited racial 
biases and prejudices (Lal 1983a: 138). While on the Indo-Fijian side, prejudice against 
Indigenous Fijians was more subtle, Indigenous Fijians since 1975 became aggressive in 
their anti-Indo-Fijian stand, caused by Indigenous nationalist activism. The military, in 
particular, started to sympathise with Indigenous nationalists and with the defeat of the 
Alliance Party, the military leaders intervened in politics resulting in the implementation 
of structural and institutional violence in the form of discrimination at all levels against 
Indo-Fijians, beginning with the abrogation of the multiracial 1970 Constitution. 
 
4.2 The 1970 Constitution 
 
 
The 1970 Constitution that was abrogated in 1987 was a product of a series of 
constitutional negotiations between the Indigenous Fijian and the Indo-Fijian leaders in 
the 1960s. During a debate at the Legislative Council, the late leader of the opposition 
Siddiq Koya warned that unless moderate attitude prevailed on both sides of the ethnic 
divide, fierce Indigenous nationalism would take hold, resulting in violent ethnic conflict 
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(Lal 1986: 76). The Indo-Fijian leadership remained firm on its support for a common 
roll franchise, which was seen by the Indigenous Fijians as a means to dominate them 
politically. Following the death of the Federation leader A.D. Patel, both communities to 
some extent moderated their position and agreed to a compromise constitutional 
arrangement called the 1970 Constitution.  
 
Under section 32 of the 1970 Constitution, Fiji was a parliamentary democracy with a bi-
cameral legislature where the Indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians elected 22 members 
each and the General Voters elected 8 in a 52 member Parliament. The Constitution also 
provided for communal representation of 12 seats for both major ethnic communities and 
10 non-ethnic national seats so that there could be inter-group contact. The General 
Voters had 3 communal and 5 national seats. 
 
Under the 1970 Constitution, a voter had four votes: One for the communal constituency 
and three votes for Fijian, Indian and General Voter seats. In the Senate, the Indigenous 
Great Council of Chiefs had a disproportionately higher number of nominees. Under 
section 45 of the Constitution, there were 22 appointed Senate members including 8 
appointed by the Governor General of Fiji on the advice of the Great Council of Chiefs; 7 
on the advice of the Prime Minister; 6 on the advice of the opposition and 1 appointed on 
the advice of the Council of Rotuma. 
 
In addition, changes to laws on Indigenous interests required endorsement by at least 8 
Indigenous Senators nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs. Under section 134 (a) of 
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the 1970 Constitution a person was regarded as “Fijian” if the persons descendants were 
Indigenous inhabitants-Melanesian, Micronesian or Polynesian. Indigenous Fijian 
nationalists were unhappy with the broad definition of “Fijian” under the 1970 
Constitution and agitated to have the Constitution changed but the urgency to change the 
Constitution increased after the 1987 April elections when Indo-Fijian and Indigenous 
trade union leaders won the election by forming a broad class alliance. 
 
4.3 The 1987 Coup 
 
Less than a week in government, the political framework established by the 1970 
Constitution crumbled and the multiracial FLP-NFP coalition government was deposed in 
a bloodless military coup. At about 10:00 am on 14 May 1987, the Royal Fiji Military 
Forces (RFMF) under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka abducted 
cabinet members from the Parliament in Suva and incarcerated them at the Queen 
Elizabeth Barracks (QEB) in Tamavua. According to Robertson and Tamanisau (1989: 
217-218), the coup leader-Sitiveni Rabuka-had  military training at the New Zealand 
Staff College in 1969 and 1972, the India Defence Services Wellington Staff College in 
Tamil Nadu, the United States Pacific Army Management Seminar in Manila in 1981, 
and trained with the 6th Gurkha Rifles and served in Lebanon in 1980 and Sinai (1984-
85). 
 
After overthrowing the government, Colonel Rabuka dismissed his superiors, 
Commander Epeli Nailatikau and his chief of staff, Jim Sanday. The news of the coup 
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started to spread from Suva city and many Indo-Fijians panicked for they feared that any 
new political order would lead to further institutionalisation of discrimination and erosion 
of their political rights. Some in the community thought that the abduction of the 
government was some sort of anti-terrorist exercise to protect cabinet ministers from 
Indigenous nationalists, who were involved in demonstrations throughout Fiji while 
others contemplated the military's complicity with the nationalists. Soon, it became clear 
that the military, in particular officers with strong nationalist inclination, had overthrown 
a constitutionally elected government. 
 
The coup leader Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka ordered the defeated Alliance Party of Fiji to 
form the Council of Ministers. Historian Brij Lal (1988:79) notes that the speed with 
which the Council of Ministers was put together, in a matter of hours after the coup, was 
truly astonishing; and the apparent enthusiasm of many of those who joined it-broad 
smiles, victory signs and clenched fists punching the air-gave strong hints of the Alliance 
Party’s collusion and the foreknowledge of the coup. The deposed ministers were at first 
incarcerated at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks and later moved to the deposed Prime 
Minister’s residence in Veiuto in Suva.  
 
Eventually, the Indo-Fijian MPs were separated and moved to Borron House in Suva. 
The actions of the military were troubling and the Indo-Fijian business community 
organised a strike on 16 May 1987. Fiji came to a standstill as a result and people rushed 
to stock goods. Foreign journalists poured into the country and attempted to make sense 
of the military coup. However, journalists were to operate under strict military censorship 
and according to Robertson and Tamanisau, “Radio Australia's Trevor Watson, who 
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broke the story of Bavadra's plea for help (relayed back to the country on short wave), 
was confined to his hotel room and later asked to leave Fiji” (Robertson and Tamanisau 
1988: 75). 
 
Media reports were heavily censored by the military as the people of Fiji relied on short 
wave transmissions from Australia and New Zealand for information (Robertson and 
Tamanisau 1988: 75). Coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka made a press statement where he 
emphasised that military had information that Indigenous nationalists planned widespread 
demonstrations against the deposed government and further argued that Indigenous 
Fijians had become foreigners in their own land and that he was chosen by god to restore 
Indigenous Fijian political power (Dean & Ritova 1988: 11). The Indigenous nationalist 
Taukei Movement openly supported the coup and called on Indigenous Fijians to 
embrace the military. Many Indo-Fijians including academics at the University of the 
South Pacific (Nandan 1991) questioned Rabuka's rationale for the coup and argued that 
the role of the military was to protect the constitutional government and not overthrow it 
on the pretext that a minority within the Indigenous community did not agree with the 
outcome of the April 1987 general elections. 
 
In order to further support military intervention, Indigenous nationalists and the military 
started to inform Indigenous Fijians that the deposed government was anti-West and had 
associations with the Libyan regime and the Soviet Union. This was a part of a carefully 
orchestrated campaign to justify the removal of a number of senior Indo-Fijian public 
servants from office (Hagan 1988). By 18 May, the Fiji military was in total control but 
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parts of the community were unhappy with the coup and near Nadi International Airport 
supporters of the deposed coalition government clashed with police and a frustrated Indo-
Fijian Fiji Labour Party supporter attempted, without success, to hijack an Air New 
Zealand aircraft to protest against discrimination and political marginalisation of his 
community. 
 
On the night of 19 May, members of the deposed coalition government were released by 
the military. The coalition members under the leadership of Dr. Bavadra attempted to 
restore parliamentary democracy and in an ABC television interview, Bavadra called the 
coup leaders “traitors” and suggested they be charged with treason. The utterances of Dr. 
Bavadra inflamed Indigenous nationalists, who argued that Bavadra was a puppet of 
Indo-Fijian leaders and on 20 May 1987, Indigenous nationalists armed with sticks and 
rocks attacked Indo-Fijians at Albert Park in Suva. According to Lal, this was the worst 
Indigenous Fijian-Indo-Fijian riot as “some 100 Indians were injured with many 
requiring hospital treatment” (Lal 1988: 86). After the riot, Indo-Fijians started to flee 
Fiji. 
 
While the Indigenous nationalists continued to harass and attack Indo-Fijians, the 
Governor General of Fiji Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau stunned the nation by granting 
immunity to the coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka. A New Zealand broadcaster responded to 
the amnesty in the following way by stating that “it appears that in Fiji if you hijack an 
airplane, you get hit over the head with a bottle of whisky, but if you hijack a 
government, you get pardoned” (Robertson & Tamanisau 1988: XV). The action of the 
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Governor General was seen with suspicion by many Indo-Fijians who argued that the 
Governor General was not in control and was in collusion with the military to institute 
discriminatory policies of the Indigenous nationalists (Robertson & Tamanisau 1988: 
XV). 
 
The strike by the Indo-Fijian community had started to lose strength because it was 
poorly coordinated. As the protest from the business community was winding down, 
Indo-Fijian farmers decided to boycott the sugar cane harvests over fears of loss to 
subsidised prices under the European Union's (EUs) Lome Conventions. Furthermore, the 
farmers were worried that harvest boycott would result in the military taking over farms. 
The Governor General promptly intervened and provided assurances to the farmers and 
obtained valuable time to attend to other pressing matters, including the establishment of 
an interim-government (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988: 82). 
 
The interim-government was made up of defeated politicians from the Alliance Party and 
members of the Indigenous nationalist Taukei Movement, including Ratu Mara, Sitiveni 
Rabuka, Filipe Bole, Jone Vaisamasama, Livai Nasilivata, Apenisa Kurusaqila, Josua 
Cavalevu and others. Only two members of the deposed coalition government, Dr. 
Timoci Bavadra and Harish Sharma, were included. However, after consulting with party 
members, both Bavadra and Sharma refused to serve on the interim government and 
argued that at least 50 per cent of the members should come from the ranks of the 
deposed government. The Governor General refused to acquiesce to the demands of the 
coalition and sought guidance from the Indigenous Great Council of Chiefs, which 
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endorsed the ethnically divisive agenda of the Indigenous nationalists and supported the 
actions of the Governor General to resolve that Indo-Fijians be compensated for their 
properties and given one-way tickets to India (Ramesh 2007b: 167).  
 
Furthermore, the Great Council of Chiefs failed to show national leadership and gave the 
military a free-hand to harass, intimidate, discriminate and suppress Indo-Fijian union 
activities. As a result, regional trade unions in Australia and New Zealand imposed 
sanctions on Fiji as the Reserve Bank imposed drastic economic counter-measures, 
including the devaluation of the Fiji dollar by 18 per cent in June 1987 and revision of 
figures relating to tourist arrivals, which continued with the downward spiral by as much 
as 71 per cent (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988: 118). Seeing the economy in difficulties, 
the Governor General of Fiji attempted to restore political stability and appointed a 
Constitutional Review Committee led by Sir John Falvey. According to the Terms of 
Reference of 11 June 1987, the Governor General Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau appointed a 
Constitutional Review Committee comprising of members from the Great Council of 
Chiefs, the deposed coalition government and the Alliance Party. The Committee was to 
review the 1970 Constitution and recommend amendments that guaranteed Indigenous 
Fijian political paramountcy (Terms of Reference for the Constitution Review 
Committee, 11 June 1987). The inquiry commenced on 6 July and the final findings were 
delivered to the Governor General on 31 July 1987. 
 
The Committee was aided by Professor Keith Patchet, Emirtus Professor of Law at the 
University of Wales and at the beginning of deliberations, the Committee noted the 
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Declaration of Commonwealth Principles agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government in Singapore in 1971, the Lusaka Declaration on Racism and Racial 
Prejudice and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. After receiving 
more than 800 written and 161 oral submissions, the Committee recommended that there 
shall be no change to the constitutional arrangement whereby Her Majesty is Queen of 
Fiji and the Head of State; the Senate be abolished and the Parliament become a single 
chamber; the House of Representatives consist of  8 Great Council of Chiefs members 
elected by the Council, 28 Indigenous Fijian members to be elected by communal voting, 
22 Indo-Fijian members to be elected by communal voting, 8 General Voters members 
elected by General communal roll, 1 member elected by the Council of Rotuma and 4 
members appointed by the Prime Minister . The Committee also recommended that there 
be no ethnic qualifications as to who could become a Prime Minister; a requirement of 
residence for the purposes of registering voters; a requirement for entry on the Indigenous 
roll to be consistent with the Indigenous Fijian birth register (Vola ni Kawa Bula); the 
national roll be abolished and all seats in the House of Representatives to be elected on 
communal basis; and the definition of “Fijian” in the Constitution be replaced by a strict 
determination rule that excludes descendants of Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia 
(Report of the Constitutional Review Committee, 31 July 1987). 
 
The above recommendations were classified as the “majority view” of Atfoa Varea, 
Isikeli Mataitoga, Adi Litia Cakobau, Ratu Jone Mataitini, Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, 
Senator Aporosa Rakoto, Tomasi Vakatora, Filipe Bole, Apisai Tora and David 
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Pickering. Members and supporters of the deposed coalition government represented in 
the Constitution Review Committee including Jai Ram Reddy, Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, 
Krishna Datt, Dr. Tupeni Baba, Dr. Sahu Khan and Kanital Parshotam formed the 
“minority view” according to which Indo-Fijians wanted to retain the 1970 Constitution 
and that 60 per cent of the submissions did not favour any changes to the Constitution. 
Seeing that the Governor General had compromised his position by aligning himself with 
the Indigenous nationalists and the military, members of the coalition government took 
their campaign overseas, arguing that the regime in Fiji had discriminated against Indo-
Fijians by ensuring that political processes in place excluded them from participating 
effectively in any post-coup political settlement (Lal 1990). 
 
The deposed Prime Minister of Fiji, Dr. Timoci Bavadra and his supporters went 
overseas to seek assistance from the international community in restoring democratic rule 
and ending discrimination against Indo-Fijians. There was widespread Indigenous in-
group belief that the deposed government was an affront to Indigenous interest, therefore, 
the military coup and the political marginalisation of Indo-Fijians were entirely justified 
(Lal 1990: 203). The members of the deposed government realised this emerging belief 
among Indigenous Fijians and went overseas with a hope that pressure from outside Fiji 
would arrest this emerging community pattern. In London, Dr. Bavadra tried to meet with 
the Queen but instead was granted an audience with her private secretary Sir William 
Hesseltine. According to Victor Lal (1990: 203), “the Queen declined to meet with 
Bavadra after meetings with the Governor General in whom she had re-affirmed her 
confidence in the restoration of parliamentary democracy”. Australia and the United 
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States reaffirmed their support for the Governor General but refused to directly call for 
the re-instatement of the deposed government. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, 
David Lange, however, ordered the New Zealand Defence Force to intervene but was 
advised against such a move by the defence chiefs (The Fiji Times, 10 April 1987). 
 
The Governor General realised that the nation was divided and his associations with the 
coup leaders had widened suspicion and distrust, in particular among the Indo-Fijians. As 
a result, Ratu Penaia embarked on a new political conciliation process and spearheaded a 
series of meetings between the Alliance Party of Fiji and the FLP-NFP coalition. 
Nevertheless, the process initiated by the Governor General was fundamentally flawed 
because it was based on the rejection of the Indo-Fijian out-group. The Governor General 
Ratu Penaia Ganilau instigated political rejection of the Indo-Fijians by ensuring that the 
post-coup political process he initiated was stacked in favour of Indigenous nationalists 
(Lal 1988). Meanwhile, the deposed coalition government continued with legal action 
against Ratu Penaia, arguing against actions of the Governor General in dissolving the 
parliament. The Indigenous nationalists were unhappy and argued that the coalition was 
putting pressure on the Governor General and had insulted Indigenous Fijians by taking a 
paramount traditional chief to court. On 5 September, “the Indigenous Taukei supporters 
dug a Lovo (a pit for cooking cannibal victims) in front of the government building in 
Suva, warning Dr. Bavadra to withdraw his civil suit against the Governor General” 
(Kaplan 1988: 98). The lovo was the beginning of an orchestrated campaign to derail 
conciliation talks as Indigenous nationalists went on a violent rampage across Suva. The 
military failed to quell the unrest and arrest Indigenous ring leaders (Ramesh 2007b: 
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168). The military warned the public to stay away from the city in preparation for a 
protest march by mostly Indigenous convicts (Lal 1988). 
 
Prisoners, under military escort, from the medium security prison protested against the 
deposed government and in particular against Bavadra's legal action against the Governor 
General. The deposed Prime Minister realised that the Indigenous nationalists were 
expanding their campaign and that it had the potential to derail talks between the 
coalition and the Alliance Party and as a result withdrew the writ. Nevertheless, the 
nationalist campaign against Indo-Fijians continued and on 21 September 1987, 
Indigenous nationalists once again attacked Indo-Fijians in Suva and rioted in the streets. 
The military in response failed to control the rioters, raising issues of the military's 
complicity in the incident (Howard 1991).  
 
The military was actively working with the Indigenous nationalist and there were reports 
that the coup leader did not want any form of conciliation between the deposed 
government members and the Alliance Party. Despite planned street violence in Suva, an 
agreement was reached between the opposing parties, known as the Deuba Accord, with 
a commitment to establish a Government of National Unity. According to Brij Lal: 
  
The Deuba Accord agreed upon the formation of a bi-partisan caretaker government 
which would guide the nation to a solution to Fiji's constitutional problems; re-establish 
Fiji's respect for law and order and put the economy upon a firm footing. The new 
Council of State, to be chaired by the Governor General himself, would consist of 20 
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Ministers, with an equal number from each of the two parties, sharing power on an equal 
basis (Lal 1988: 117). 
 
Before the Deuba Accord could be implemented, Rabuka, who was now promoted to the 
rank of commander, executed a second coup and deposed the Governor General, 
consolidating the nationalist grip on political power. 
 
4.4 The Second Coup of 1987 
 
At about 4 pm on 25 September 1987, Fiji once again fell into an abyss of political 
uncertainty. Radio stations were taken over by the Fiji military and members of the 
deposed coalition government were detained at the Naboro maximum security prison. 
Armed soldiers established checkpoints and warned the public not to engage in any anti-
coup activities. Rabuka went on air and justified the second military coup on grounds that 
the Deuba Accord had compromised the objective of the first coup by allowing power 
sharing between the two dominant communities.  
 
Members of the Fiji Trade Union Council were detained and their offices were closed 
down. According to Hamish MacDonald of the Far Eastern Review, “diplomats from 
Australia, New Zealand , Britain, France, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, China, Papua 
New Guinea, United States and Tuvalu met Rabuka on 28 September and told him that 
they only recognised the authority of the Governor General” (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 8 October 1987). Robert Keith-Reid noted that on 4 October Dr. Bavadra was 
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stopped and chased by soldiers and he feared for his life (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
15 October 1987).  
 
On 6 October Rabuka declared Fiji a republic and appointed a 21 member Executive 
Council. According to Victor Lal, the Council included two senior military officers, at 
least 6 members of the Indigenous Taukei Movement and 7 members of the Alliance 
Party. The only Indo-Fijian in the line-up was Irene Jai Narayan, who became the 
Minister for Indian Affairs (Lal 1990: 209). Besides the new Executive Council, the 
military promulgated the Fundamental Freedoms Decree No. 12 and the Sunday 
Observance Decree, which banned all recreational and commercial activities on Sunday. 
Not long after, reports started to surface on gross human rights violations by soldiers 
against Indo-Fijians, including forcing individuals to walk naked, stand for up to 24 hours 
in an iron water tank, lie or sit naked for hours on a hot tar-sealed road, submit to rape 
and other forms of sexual assault and walk long distances carrying a heavy load (Bain 
1989: 211). 
 
Under the Sunday Observance Decree, children playing soccer were detained for days 
and Indo-Fijian women were arrested and harassed for washing clothes near a river bank. 
A number of human rights abuses were documented by Amnesty International, the US 
Department of State and the Fiji Independent News Service (FINS). Reports of 
continuing human rights abuses and international condemnation forced Rabuka to hand 
over executive power to Ratu Penaia and Ratu Mara with the former becoming the 
President and the latter Prime Minister in the new Republic of Fiji. Despite handing over 
 51 
 
political power, Fiji was, more than ever, a deeply divided community with Indo-Fijians 
uncertain of their future and Indigenous Fijian supporters of the deposed coalition 
government unsure of their place in the Indigenous society (Bain 1989: 212).  
 
By the end of 1987, Rabuka established an interim government with Ratu Mara as the 
interim Prime Minister and Ratu Penaia as the President. Despite handing over authority 
to a “civilian” government, Rabuka continued as the Minister for Home Affairs and in 
1989, the constitutional review process restarted with the appointment of a senior military 
officer Colonel Paul Manueli to the Constitution Review Committee, which documented 
the grievances of the Indigenous nationalists, the chiefs and the army and largely ignored 
the submissions from the Indo-Fijians made up of the FLP and the NFP coalition 
(Premdas & Steeves 1991: 158-159). In 1990, a new racially weighted constitution was 
promulgated. Unlike the 1970 constitution, this constitution ensured that Indigenous 
Fijians, in particular Indigenous chiefs, had a monopoly on political power and the 
military continued to play a political role in the affairs of the state. Brij Lal (1992b: 388) 
noted that with diminishing fear of the threat of Indo-Fijian political dominance, 
“political fragmentation will be a continued feature of Taukei political life”.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this historical narrative suggests that a lack of inter-group and inter-racial 
contact allowed the military and the Indigenous nationalists to undermine an elected 
multiethnic government. Indigenous nationalists propagated ungrounded claims that the 
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government was dominated by Indo-Fijians who had ambitions to takeover Indigenous 
Fijian land. Moreover, the military sympathised with Indigenous nationalists and usurped 
political power on their behalf, highlighting the politicisation of ethnicised armed forces. 
Following the military takeover, Indo-Fijians were purged from senior government 
positions and draconian laws were imposed as the military leaders sought assistance from 
the traditional authority to get Fiji back to normalcy. An elaborate system of 
institutionalised discrimination was also established where Indigenous Fijians, especially 
those who supported the coup, rose quickly to positions of influence and power while 
Indo-Fijians were denied fundamental basic rights and suffered discrimination at all 
social levels. Without any meaningful inter-group contact or structures to improve inter-
group relations, the two communities in Fiji remained divided and some thirteen years 
later, the events unleashed in 1987 repeated resulting in organised physical violence 
against Indo-Fijians once again in the coup of 2000. 
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Chapter 5: The 2000 Coup-Establishing Inter-group Violence 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Discrimination against Indo-Fijians was strengthened with the implementation of the 
1990 Constitution as under the racially discriminatory constitution, Indo-Fijians were 
relegated to the opposition bench and discriminatory policies against them were 
strengthened. Moreover, continued Indigenous Fijian support for discrimination and 
political marginalisation of Indo-Fijians led Indo-Fijian political parties to focus on 
strategies of peaceful constitutional change. 
 
In 1990, the alliance between the union-based FLP and the business-centric NFP broke 
following the death of Dr. Bavadra and Sitiveni Rabuka was elected leader of the 
Indigenous nationalist sponsored Soqosoqo ni Vakevulewa ni Taukei Party (SVT), which 
won the 1992 general election. According to Ralph Premdas (1993: 1006), “the SVT won 
30 seats with 66.6% of all Indigenous Fijian votes”. As Brij Lal (1992b) predicted, once 
Indo-Fijians were removed from the political scene through state-sponsored 
discrimination, the fault lines within the Indigenous political order started to appear.  
 
There were two kinds of tensions within the Indigenous community. The first involved 
discord between the moderates and the ethno-nationalists. The moderate Indigenous 
Fijians expressed a desire for a multiracial Fiji and equal political partnership with Indo-
Fijians whereas Indigenous ethno-nationalists advocated Indigenous political 
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paramouncty (Duncan 1991: 221-239). The second involved political struggles between 
the chiefdoms of Lau and Bau for the hegemony of the SVT. On 31 October 1991, at the 
SVT Annual Conference at Suva Civic Centre, the interim Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu 
Mara, positioned his wife Ro Lala Mara to take over as the President of the SVT party. 
However, Sitiveni Rabuka won the presidency by nine votes and was endorsed by the 
chiefs of Bau as the leader of Indigenous Fijians (The Fiji Times, 1 November 1991).  
 
Despite the election of Sitiveni Rabuka as the leader of the SVT, Ratu Mara supported 
Joevata Kamikamica, the interim Finance Minister, who challenged Rabuka after the 
1992 election. The Tensions between two aspiring Indigenous candidates within the SVT, 
Sitiveni Rabuka and Josevata Kamikamica, erupted for the position of the Prime Minister 
after the 1992 elections but Rabuka survived the leadership challenge even though the 
discontent over the issue was not fully settled (The Fiji Times, 1 January 1993). The 
Rabuka government also got embroiled in a controversy surrounding a million dollar out 
of court settlement for Suva businessman Tony Stephen, who was allegedly wrongfully 
detained by the military in 1988 (Fiji Parliamentary paper no. 45, July 1993). The new 
Rabuka administration through its Attorney General Apaitia Seru offered a settlement to 
Tony Stephens to avoid an embarrassment of defeat in a major civil suit involving the 
military and hoped that such a settlement would thwart legal actions from others who 
may have had their freedom restricted under the security decrees imposed after the May 
1987 coups.  
 
 55 
 
After a tumultuous six months Prime Minister Rabuka on 4 December 1992 proposed a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) to deflect growing conflict and rebellion within 
the Indigenous Fijian community (The Fiji Times, 1 January 1993) but Rabuka’s calls for 
“the promotion of national reconciliation, stability and unity” were met with widespread 
criticism from the Indo-Fijian opposition parties and from within the Indigenous 
nationalist community. Senior FLP member Tupeni Baba remarked that while on one 
hand Rabuka was promoting the GNU, on the other he contradicted himself when he 
stated that “the NFP leader Jai Ram Reddy and his FLP counterpart Mahendra Chaudhry 
would gain very little from being part of such a government because it was based on the 
racially slanted 1990 Constitution” (The Fiji Times, 18 January 1993). Not only Baba but 
SVT backbencher Josevata Kamikamica expressed serious reservations about the GNU 
and Namosi MP Ratu Ifereimi Buaserau went further and called on Rabuka to step down 
as Prime Minister (The Daily Post, 15 March 1993). The final showdown between 
Rabuka and dissidents within the SVT erupted over the 1994 budget. Opponents within 
the SVT criticised the government for raising duties on basic consumer items, including 
powdered milk, canned fish and rice and on 29 November 1993, the 1994 budget was 
defeated (The Review, December/January 1994: 10). Seven SVT MPs voted against the 
budget including Ilai Kuli, Ratu Emosi Vuakatagane, Ratu Serupepeli Nailvalu, Ratu 
Viliame Dreunimismisi, Viliame Saulekaleka, Viliame Gonalevu and Josevata 
Kamikamica. On 15 January 1994, a new Indigenous Fijian political party, the Fijian 
Association Party, was formed in Suva (The Fiji Times, 17 January 1994). 
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In December 1993, the Great Council of Chiefs met to deliberate on Indigenous Fijian 
disunity. It was the same chiefs that had blessed Rabuka’s May 1987 coups and had 
sponsored the SVT, which was supposed to unite Indigenous Fijians against the Indo-
Fijians. Rabuka was asked to explain the defeat of the 1994 budget and he responded by 
arguing that if Indigenous Fijians were to protect and safeguard their collective future as 
a community the best guarantee was to ensure that they keep effective control of the 
national government (The Daily Post, 17 December 1993). In fact, Rabuka was sending 
contradictory messages to both the Indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian communities and as 
a result, Rabuka was alienating its most important support base-the Indigenous nationalist 
hardliners, who expressed concern about his proposed GNU. 
 
Fiji went to the polls again in less than two years due to Indigenous Fijian disunity and 
the SVT was once again returned to office by a thirty one seat majority. Tensions also 
increased during and after the elections within the Indo-Fijian camp, as the FLP lost 
support and won only seven seats compared to thirteen in 1992, whereas the NFP 
increased its total share of communal seats from fourteen to twenty. Prime Minister 
Sitiveni Rabuka quickly developed a working relationship with the NFP and finalised the 
composition of the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) (House of Representatives, 
Daily Hansard, 31 March, 1994: 7; also see: House of Representatives, Daily Hansard, 24 
June, 1994: 1337-1338).  
 
On 15 March 1995, the CRC was appointed with Sir Paul Reeves, Brij Lal and Tomasi 
Vakatora as members. After more than a year of hearings, the CRC Report was tabled in 
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the Fiji Parliament on 10 September 1996. A Joint Parliamentary Committee then started 
negotiations and by April 1997, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitution had 
reached a consensus. It was agreed by all parties that there would be forty six communal 
roll constituencies and twenty five common roll constituencies (The Fiji 1997 
Constitution). 
 
Under the new deal, the Prime Minister of Fiji could be from any ethnic group and the 
Senate would remain an appointed entity, contrary to the recommendations of the CRC. 
The Constitutional Amendment Act of 1997 allowed for a multi-racial cabinet, but 
retained some of the discriminatory provisions of the 1990 Constitution such as 
affirmative action programs for Indigenous Fijians. The new constitution deal was hailed 
by both the regional and the international community as a landmark achievement. 
However, not everyone in Fiji was in agreement with the constitutional outcome. The 
FLP leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, called the deal a "sell-out" and similar sentiments were 
expressed by Indigenous Fijian nationalists. Chaudhry, in fact, launched one of the major 
campaigns against the constitutional consensus, labelling it "a recipe for continued ethnic 
compartmentalisation" (Agence France-Presse, 11 April 1996). Following the consensus 
on the constitution, the political campaign among Indo-Fijian leaders shifted to India 
after the Leader of the Opposition Jai Ram Reddy informed the Government of India 
about the new constitutional deal and requested support in moving the country forward. 
However, Chaudhry urged India to be cautious and take into consideration the unresolved 
issue of expiring leases under the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA). 
Furthermore, Chaudhry sharply criticised the constitutional consensus and urged the 
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Commonwealth Heads of Government against Fiji’s re-entry into the Commonwealth 
(BBC, 13 September 1997). Indigenous Fijians largely saw Chaudhry’s actions as anti- 
Indigenous Fijian, which resulted in further erosion of the already dismal Indigenous 
Fijian support for the Fiji Labour Party.  
 
Dissent within the Soqosoqo ni Vakevulewa ni Taukei Party (SVT) increased after the 
promulgation of the new constitution as Indigenous SVT members further split and 
formed the Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito (VLV) Party in 1998. In the western 
part of Fiji, veteran politician Apisai Tora spearheaded the establishment of a regional 
based Party of National Unity (PANU) and the FLP successfully negotiated an agreement 
with the Fijian Association Party (FAP) and the PANU (The Independent, 5 May 1999). 
The VLV candidates in the lead up to the 1999 elections continually attacked the SVT, 
charging that the party had lied and cheated its way to power. In a long list of complaints 
against the SVT, the VLV argued that the government was largely responsible for the 
National Bank of Fiji scandal in 1995, high unemployment, the Tony Stephens’ deed of 
settlement fiasco, escalating crime, and impoverishment of Indigenous Fijians. In 
response, the SVT targeted the leader of the VLV, Poseci Bune, accusing him of misuse 
of office during his tenure as Fiji’s representative to the United Nations. However, the 
VLV remained undeterred and one of its candidates, Napote Vere, claimed that there was 
a mafia group within the SVT with plans to ensure that the party held power at all cost. 
According to Alumita Durutalo (1999: 90), “the 1999 elections saw the re-emergence of 
pre-colonial vanua under the guise of alternative Fijian parties, including the FAP, the 
VLV and the PANU”. The FLP successfully consolidated the Indo-Fijian votes and 
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fragmented the Indigenous Fijian ones through pre-election preference deals with its 
coalition partners and as a result won thirty six seats (Ramesh 2007a: 17).  
 
According to Jon Fraenkel, the result of the 1999 general election was achieved by 
“artificially manipulating the electoral systems to discriminate against extremist parties” 
(Fraenkel 2000b: 104). However, Satendra Prasad (1999:57) argued that the FLP-led 
coalition was a more class based political momentum similar to the one in 1987. The 
FLP, the FAP and the PANU combination concentrated its campaign on economic and 
social issues, including low rates of economic growth, declining investment rates and 
high employment. 
 
5.2 Indigenous Nationalist Revival 
 
The revival of the Indigenous nationalist movement in 2000 was driven by the anger of a 
segment of the Indigenous population against the Peoples’ Coalition Government. On 4 
April, 2000, the Indigenous nationalist Taukei Movement was revived in Lautoka by 
former Party of National Unity leader, Apisai Tora. At the meeting, the Taukei activists 
collected more than 100 signatures on a draft petition, which outlined grievances 
including opposition to the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA). Meanwhile, 
the Minister for Labour, Industrial Relations and Immigration Ratu Tevita Momoedonu 
shrugged off this revival as nothing more than “sour grapes” (Fijilive, 5 April 2000). 
Nevertheless, the revival came after reports that the Land Use Commission (LUC), 
championed by the Peoples’ Coalition Government, would be established to encourage 
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better utilisation of Indigenous land. Ralph Premdas (2002: 26) noted at this time that the 
protection of Fijian interests, in particular “Fijian land” became a pressing nationalist 
issue. 
 
According to the former Native Land Trust Board General Manager, Maika Qarikau, the 
proposed Land Use Commission was a waste of money.  Qarikau clarified that the NLTB 
was already fulfilling most of the Commission’s objectives and there were existing arms 
of the Government doing what the Commission intended to achieve (The Fiji Times, 3 
April 2000). However, barely a week after the launch of the Taukei Movement in 
Lautoka, the Rewa Province Taukei Movement was formed on 8 April at Nadoi village 
(The Fiji Times, 9 April 2000). The movement comprised of representatives of the tikina 
of Rewa and Burebasaga. Ro Alifereti Tuisawau confirmed that the movement would 
support the Native Land Trust Board's stand on land and totally supported Qarikau and 
his staff. Besides Rewa, Macuata landowners and Tui Wailevu, Ratu Kinijoji Maivalili of 
the Tikina Wailevu in Cakaudrove expressed disappointment that Prime Minister 
Mahendra Chaudhry had opted to disrespect their wishes (The Fiji Times, 4 April, 2000. 
Also refer to The Fiji Times, 9 April 2000). 
 
On the political front, government coalition partner, the VLV, reconsidered its support 
for the Fiji Labour Party as Acting Secretary-General of the party, Joe Vosanibola, 
confirmed that party officials had been pressured from members and followers of the 
party to withdraw from the government. Meanwhile, another government coalition 
partner, the Fijian Association Party Western Constituency, put its support behind the 
Taukei Movement and asked the Party Leader Adi Kuini Speed to step down at a branch 
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meeting in Lautoka on 8 April 2000. At that meeting, former Cabinet minister and 
founder of the Taukei Movement Apisai Tora was invited to participate. Fijian 
Association party West branch president, Ratu Viliame Dreunimisimisi, confirmed that 
the revived Taukei Movement was likely to gather support in its fight to win back the 
rights of Indigenous Fijians. 
 
A cabinet team was sent to the west to persuade the Indigenous Fijian chiefs not to 
support the Taukei Movement, which held a failed public demonstration in Lautoka on 20 
April 2000. Despite this failed attempt, the Taukei Movement successfully advanced a 
view of hatred and aggression which would later culminate into violence against the 
Peoples’ Coalition Government and Indo-Fijians in mainly rural Fiji (PACNEWS, 17 
April 2000). Fearing an upsurge of Indigenous nationalism similar to 1987, six Fijian 
ministers- Labour Minister, Ratu Tevita Momoedonu; Agriculture Minister, Poseci  
Bune; Sports Minister, Ponipate Lesavua; Home Affairs Minister, Jioji  Uluinakauvadra; 
Communications Minister, Meli Bogileka; and Lands Minister, Ratu Mosese Volavola-
started a three-day tour on 17 April 2000 and visited 10 villages (The Fiji Times, 18 April 
2000). Two chiefs-Tui Sabeto Ratu Kaliova Mataitoga and Marama Tui Ba Adi Sainimili 
Cagilaba-refused to meet the cabinet delegation and at the height of the extensive public 
relations campaign by the government to get the Indigenous chiefs on side, the Macuata 
Provincial Council endorsed the Taukei Movement in its fight to remove the government 
of Mahendra Chaudhry from power.  
 
Following a failed Taukei Movement protest march on 20 April 2000, political organisers 
promised a better performance at a nationalist protest march in Suva on 28 April 2000. 
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About 4,000 people marched through Suva in support of the SVT party and the Taukei 
Movement for the Prime Minister to step down. A group of SVT and Taukei Movement 
members later presented their petition to the Great Council of Chiefs, requesting a 
dissolution of the Chaudhry government, changes to the 1997 Constitution, abolition of 
the Land Use Commission, all Schedule A and B land to be returned to landowners and 
the mahogany deal to be reviewed (Fiji Village News, 28 April 2000). There were 
rumours that Indigenous nationalists had infiltrated the army and that segments of the 
military would assist in over-throwing the Peoples’ Coalition Government. However, the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Gaffar Ahmed, shrugged off these suggestions as the Taukei 
Movement intensified its anti-government campaign.  
 
5.3 19 May 2000 – Coup Three 
 
 
On 19 May, 2000, at 10:00 am about seven Indigenous nationalists, armed with automatic 
rifles, stormed into the Fiji Parliament and held forty MPs and Cabinet Ministers, 
including Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry hostage for 56 days. Immediately 
following the news of the illegal takeover, supporters of the coup went on a rampage, 
petrol bombing and looting about 200 Indo-Fijian and Chinese-owned shops in Suva’s 
Central Business District. At about 1:00 pm, coup leader George Speight, son of SVT MP 
Sam Speight, installed Ratu Timoci Silatolu as the Interim Prime Minister of Fiji and at 
1:30 pm, suspended the 1997 Constitution, the elected government, the Great Council of 
Chiefs and the President (The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May 2000; The Daily 
Telegraph, 20 May 2000). 
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After the Suva rampage, the President of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara issued a statement 
denouncing the illegal takeover and imposed a dusk to dawn curfew. Two battalions of 
soldiers were despatched to downtown Suva and police cleared the affected area and 
established roadblocks. The presence of soldiers on the street did not stop the coup 
sympathisers to continue their rampage across the capital city. In Suva, homes were 
targeted by Indigenous Fijian nationalists and many Indo-Fijian homes were attacked and 
at night. Tony Wall of The New Zealand Herald reported on 24 May 2000 that an Indo-
Fijian settlement near Suva “endured nightly reign of racial terror” (The New Zealand 
Herald, 24 May 2000).  
 
As the violence took place in the streets, the Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs 
(GCC), Sitiveni Rabuka, continued to hold discussions with the coup leader in an attempt 
to resolve the political crisis (Fijilive, 19 May 2000). On 20 May 2000, rumours surfaced 
that Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry was beaten by his captors and forced to sign a 
resignation letter. Also beaten was the PM’s son Rajendra Chaudhry along with other 
Indo-Fijian Ministers. At 5:00 am on 21 May 2000, ten junior Ministers were released 
and among them was Assistant Minister for Information Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi, who 
confirmed that the Prime Minister was attacked at gun point after his captors feared an 
imminent raid from sections of the military opposed to the coup (The Fiji Times, 23 May 
2000). 
 
An impasse between the coup leader and the hostage negotiators continued as family 
members of the MPs in captivity were allowed to bring food and clothing. In an 
interview, the coup leader George Speight highlighted that he was prepared to execute the 
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hostages if his demands were not met. Negotiations with the coup leader were stagnating 
and the President of Fiji issued a statement that the coup leader had plans to kill his 
captors (The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 May 2000). This statement was immediately 
refuted by George Speight. Ratu Mara in a Presidential decree banned foreign media 
from conducting further interviews with the Speight group. However, restrictions were 
eased on 23 May 2000 and journalists were once again able to interview Speight, who 
blamed the Indo-Fijians for the insecurities of Indigenous Fijians (Associated Press, 31 
May 2000).  
 
On 22 May 2000, the Taukei Movement withdrew support for George Speight and in the 
afternoon of that day, President Ratu Mara cast doubt on the future of Mahendra 
Chaudhry as the Prime Minister of Fiji, after revealing that he would put alternative 
government scenarios to the Great Council of Chiefs. On 23 May 2000, the Great Council 
of Chiefs convened an emergency meeting, where the hostage situation was discussed at 
length. Meanwhile, the chiefs from the Western Fiji declared in a press statement that 
they supported the constitutional government of the day (The Great Council of Chiefs 
Resolutions, 23 May 2000). 
 
As international pressure mounted, the Great Council of Chiefs’ Chairman, Sitiveni 
Rabuka, supported the 1997 Constitution and as a result was accused by the coup leader 
of negotiating with him in bad faith. It was crucial that the Great Council of Chiefs spoke 
with a single voice and denounced the illegal takeover. Instead, the chiefs from the 
eastern part of Fiji supported George Speight. On 23 May 2000, the chiefs deliberated on 
the political crisis and pledged unanimous support for the President Ratu Mara. Speight 
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expressed concern at the decision of the chiefs, insisting that the President and the 1997 
Constitution had to be removed (National Post, 31 May 2000).  
 
On 25 May 2000, a stalemate was setting in as Indigenous Fijians from nearby villages in 
Suva convened to offer their support to the coup leader. The Great Council of Chiefs 
agreed to dismiss the Chaudhry government and set up an interim administration for up to 
three years to look into ways of changing the 1997 Constitution. After getting almost all 
his demands, Speight continued his defiance. A delegation from the Great Council of 
Chiefs met with Speight on 26 May 2000 to end the political crisis. Despite the efforts of 
the chiefs to accommodate Speight’s demands, the political situation continued to 
deteriorate. On 27 May 2000, a group of Speight supporters stormed a military camp near 
the parliament and attempted to wrestle weapons away from the soldiers. During the 
skirmish, two soldiers and an Agence France-Presse (AFP) journalist were injured when 
Speight’s gunmen fired at them. Soon afterwards, the soldiers retreated and the mob 
looted and uprooted the army camp (PACNEWS, 27 May 2000). 
 
Political tensions remained high throughout Fiji and in the afternoon, the President of Fiji 
confirmed that he had relieved Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry and appointed Ratu 
Tevita Momoedonu on grounds that Chaudhry was incapable of carrying out his duties. 
The actions of the President did not satisfy George Speight whose supporters were 
planning further criminal activities. In the afternoon of 28 May 2000, Fiji TV analysed 
the forces behind the 2000 coup and focused on George Speight who was portrayed by 
the TV program as a person without any history of campaign on Indigenous issues (Fiji 
TV, 28 May 2000). One of the interviewees on the television program, Jone Dakuvula, 
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highlighted the role of the chiefs from the provinces of Tailevu and Naitasiri behind the 
coup. Dakuvula’s claims infuriated Speight supporters and as a result a group of 200 
Indigenous men attacked and ransacked the television station and shot and killed an 
Indigenous Fijian policeman.  
 
On 29 May 2000, the President summoned the commander of the Fiji Military Forces 
Commodore Frank Bainimarama to discuss the deteriorating security around Suva City 
amid rumours that Speight supporters planned another wave of mob violence. At the 
meeting, Commodore Bainimarama and his military advisors advised the President that 
they had intelligence on an imminent threat against him and as a result, the President 
stepped aside in the evening, allowing Commodore Frank Bainimarama to assume 
executive authority and declare martial law (BBC, 31 May 2000). Army check points 
were established throughout Suva and a 24-hour curfew was imposed on the city. On 30 
May 2000, negotiations started between representatives of the Fiji Military Forces and 
George Speight as the military tightened its grip on the city in an effort to restrict the 
movement of the coup sympathisers.  
 
On the negotiating table were issues around the Council of Advisers, the proposed 
amnesty and the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution. To appease the coup leader, the 
army agreed to an amnesty for George Speight and his henchmen and the 1997 
Constitution was abrogated by the military (Interim Military Government Decree No. 1). 
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, a former army commander and former Fijian ambassador to the 
United Kingdom, was designated as the interim Prime Minister. In the evening of 30 May 
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2000, Speight and his supporters were promised immunity from all coup-related 
prosecution. However, progress in negotiations came to a standstill on 31 May 2000 after 
George Speight changed his mind and refused to accept the military appointed Prime 
Minister because he was the son-in-law of President Ratu Mara.  
 
On 30 June 2000, the Financial Review reported that deposed Prime Minister Mahendra 
Chaudhry “was seen for the first time” along with 26 other politicians held hostage inside 
Fiji’s parliament (Financial Review, 30 June 2000). There were also reports that soldiers 
loyal to the Commodore Frank Bainimarama “had grown frustrated with the stand-off 
and were eager to retaliate against taunts from within the rebel camp” (The Age, 27 June 
2000). As a sign of goodwill, Speight on 25 June 2000, released women hostages 
including, Adi Koila Nailatikau daughter of President Ratu Mara, Marieta Rigamoto, 
Lavania Padarath and Akinisi Koroitamana (The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 June 2000). 
 
After 56 days, the remaining hostages were released and the coup leader George Speight 
and his bodyguard were arrested by the military on 26 July 2000 (Fiji Village News, 26 
July 2000). According to Roderic Alley, George Speight and his rebels humiliated the 
military, divided the Great Council of Chiefs and succeeded in having their own 
supporters, Ratu Josefa Iloilo and Ratu Jope Seniloli appointed respectively President and 
Vice President in the interim government (Alley 2001: 515). Not only positioning key 
supporters in government, the Speight group managed to install an interim Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase, who was sympathetic to the putsch of 2000.  
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The 2000 coup had a far reaching social impact on Fiji. Concerned Indo-Fijians left for a 
better future abroad and rural Indo-Fijian villages, including Muaniweni, Dawasamu, 
Wainibokasi and Dreketi, were targeted by Indigenous nationalists supporting Speight’s 
vision. Case studies on violence against Indo-Fijians by supporters of the George Speight 
group were conducted by the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF), the Columban 
Fathers and the Social Action for Human Rights (SAHARA) organisations in the months 
of June to August 2000 (SAHARA, August 2000). Further fieldwork was undertaken by 
the author in December of 2000 in Suva on Indo-Fijian families that fled rural areas after 
being attacked by Indigenous Fijians. Out of some twenty cases documented, I use three 
cases to highlight the situation of Indo-Fijians at the height of the inter-group tensions in 
the year 2000. 
 
5.4 Violence against Indo-Fijians 
 
Indo-Fijian farmers in the north and west of Fiji were particularly devastated when they 
were uprooted from homes by organised gangs of Indigenous Fijians, sympathetic to the 
2000 coup. In Vanua Levu, most Indo-Fijians I interviewed lived in constant fear and 
many left their homes to settle with their relatives in Suva or Western Viti Levu. The 
homes we saw were sealed of with shutters as if the people had no hope of returning. 
Most of the homes in the eastern parts of Fiji, namely in Batiri and Dreketi had their 
windows smashed. Walls of some half a dozen homes were destroyed and goods inside 
looted. One family provided shelter to the supporters of the George Speight group 
because they were threatened with bodily harm.  
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Three examples, in the form of personal narratives, from my field work are highlighted to 
provide the dimension of violence against Indo-Fijians in rural Fiji and the fear of 
violence in the community in the aftermath of the 2000 coup. 
 
A 53 year old Indo-Fijian woman from Dreketi narrated the following events.  
 
On 29 July 2000, I was sitting with my son under the tree just after lunch when four 
Indigenous men armed with cane knives came to our house. My son had just arrived from 
the shop and seeing the armed men, he attempted to secure the family van. Two of the 
armed men came towards me and ordered me not to move as the other two approached 
my son. One of the armed men hit my son with the edge of the cane knife and wrestled 
him to the ground, seizing the keys to the van. My husband, who was inside, rushed out 
to stop the men from hurting my son. However, he was held to the ground as two armed 
came inside the house and disconnected the telephone. Two men then took the van and 
brought some of their other friends from the nearby Fijian village. My son was hurt and I 
was not allowed to treat him. At 5:30 pm, the armed men ordered me to cook food. As a 
Muslim family, I was very humiliated since the men had brought pig and killed it in my 
compound. I was so distressed that I wanted some peace and quiet to pray but that was 
refused. The next morning the men left but my son was still hurt from the injuries. 
Fortunately, they had left the van behind and we left for the hospital for treatment. On the 
way, a group of Indigenous men had erected a roadblock and we were stopped and turned 
back despite my pleading with the men to allow passage. We had to return and I had to 
seek some medicine from my neighbours to treat my son because his wound was getting 
worse. 
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A 67 old Indo-Fijian man in Seaqaqa provided me with information on his personal 
experience. 
 
On 31 July 2000 at about 7:30 pm, we were sitting down in the living room and having a 
chat with members of the family about the deteriorating political situation in the country. 
Some ten Indigenous Fijian men wearing masks and armed with sticks suddenly barged 
in and broke all the windows. They threatened to burn down the house and then 
disconnected the water meter. Five men held my 33 year old son and punched and kicked 
him repeatedly yelling that it was time for all of us to leave. The rest of the family 
members got very frightened and hid inside a room but the men pursued us and one of 
them punched and kicked me and the other pulled a knife and threatened to decapitate my 
wife. Blood was oozing from my son’s face and my nose was broken. The men then 
ransacked the house, stole my wife’s jewellery and then escaped into the darkness.  
 
A 50 year old Indo-Fijian man in Nawai continued the tale of violence and fear of 
violence in the Indo-Fijian community. 
 
On 1 August 2000, at 12 noon, 30 Indigenous Fijian men armed with knives and some 
with guns came and took possession of our van. Seeing the men, we fled into the jungle. 
At 4 am the next day, we came back to the house and heard from other Indo-Fijian 
neighbours that the gang of men had stolen their live stocks. An Indigenous Fijian 
benefactor told all Indo-Fijians living in the area to gather in one place so that he could 
arrange a transport to a safe haven. While this arrangement was taking place, the armed 
men from the previous day returned and started attacking us. We then had to flee back 
into the jungle and run for our lives because the men had guns and were shooting at us. 
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About six men were after us, including the one with a gun. We ran to a school and sought 
refuge there. In the event my six family members were injured. There were some 200 
Indo-Fijian families sleeping at the school for a week. Some were so frightened that they 
were sleeping in the jungle fearing attack on the school. There were no police or military 
to provide any protection or assistance. 
 
These stories of violence were narrated in detail. At least three homes were burnt as Indo-
Fijian settlements in Dawasamu, Lawaki, Deep Water, Waidalice, Batiri and Seaqaqa 
came under direct attack from the supporters of George Speight. The interim government 
that was installed by the military chose to ignore the plight of Indo-Fijians and instead 
supported the ideas of the coup leaders. Even the Great Council of Chiefs, the body that 
exercises traditional authority over all of Indigenous Fijians, was not committed to 
ending the violence against Indo-Fijians, instead it requested that Britain take 
responsibility and remove Indo-Fijians from the country. 
 
Coup leader George Speight made a number of claims against the 1997 Constitution and 
against Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry. These claims were not only used as 
justification for the coup but also as justifications for violence against the Indo-Fijian 
community in general. These claims are discussed at length below. 
 
5.5 Justifications for the Violence 
 
 
Coup leader George Speight (2001: 147-153) asserted that the 1997 Constitution failed 
Indigenous Fijians. The review of the 1990 Constitution was instigated by former Prime 
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Minister Sitiveni Rabuka in 1993. In June 1997, Indigenous Fijian members of both 
Houses voted unanimously in favour of the new constitution. The Great Council of 
Chiefs on 7 June 1997 fully endorsed the constitutional amendments as a way forward for 
a multiracial Fiji. Some Indigenous Fijian provinces did not support the constitutional 
compromise, but its representatives in parliament voted in favour of change. In total 67 
members from Government and Opposition endorsed the 1997 Constitution Amendment 
Bill. It should be noted that at a SVT caucus meeting on 20 June 1997, former Prime 
Minister Sitiveni Rabuka allowed for a conscience vote by all SVT MPs on the changes 
to the constitution. Following a vote in the Parliament and the Senate, there were no 
public protests, only murmurs of dissent from Sakeasi Butadroka and Iliesa Duvuloco 
and his nationalist friends who constituted a small minority within the Indigenous 
population. It was clear from the very outset that under the new constitution anyone, 
regardless of their ethnicity, could become the Prime Minister. Subsequently, Mahendra 
Chaudhry became the first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister of Fiji following the general 
election in 1999. 
 
George Speight claimed that despite winning 38 per cent of Indigenous Fijian votes, the 
SVT was not part of the Chaudhry-led Cabinet. However, following the general elections 
of May 1999, Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry invited SVT to join the government. 
Unfortunately, the SVT leader, Sitiveni Rabuka, embittered by the defeat at the polls, 
suggested that the party be given the position of the Deputy Prime Minister and one other 
key ministry. This was clearly unacceptable when a majority of Indigenous Fijian votes 
went to the Fijian Association Party. The Prime Minister had to give priority to its 
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existing Indigenous Fijian coalition partners-the Fijian Association Party and the Party of 
National Unity-which was party to a memorandum of understanding dated 12 August 
1998. The 1999 election result showed that the Fijian Association Party and the Party of 
National Unity (PANU) received the highest percentage of Indigenous Fijian votes. It 
also was clear that the SVT had strongholds only in Suva, Tailevu, Kadavu and 
Cakaudrove but were dumped by Indigenous voters elsewhere. In order to achieve ethnic 
balance, Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry gave a majority of cabinet positions to 
Indigenous Fijians (11 out of 16) and successfully invited VLV to join the government. 
 
Next, Speight accused Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry of formulating policies that 
undermined Indigenous Fijian tradition. The Peoples’ Coalition government argued for 
an agreement on the expiration of Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA); the 
establishment of the Land Use Commission to empower Indigenous Fijians towards 
making commercial decisions; an arrangement with international consortium for a 
mahogany deal that provided sound return to Indigenous owners; changes to NLTB Act; 
and constitutional amendments to enable Indigenous Fijians to hold dual offices. For 
Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry, a possible solution was to formulate a new land 
legislation that benefited both the Indigenous Fijian landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants. 
At the Great Council of Chief (GCC) meeting on 26-28 April 2000, the issue was referred 
to the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), which held discussions. It was noted that the 
NLTB remained steadfast in its position to bring all agricultural leases under NLTA 
while the government pursued a new legislation. Despite the stalemate, it was not 
possible for the government to pass any successor legislation to ALTA without getting 
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the support of the Great Council of Chiefs. Under the 1997 Constitution any legislation 
on Indigenous Fijian land could not be passed unless supported by 9 out of the 14 Great 
Council of Chiefs nominees in the Senate. 
 
The justifications for the May 2000 coup do not hold up to scrutiny as the actions of the 
coup makers were rather aimed at exploiting racial biases and prejudices to engineer an 
Indigenous power clique. Moreover, an over-emphasis on the inter-group conflict 
(Lawson 2005: 206) was aimed at masking the destructive Indigenous in-group struggles 
for power between the chiefs of Bau and Lau. The coup would nevertheless set the stage 
for racially divisive elections in 2001 and 2006 and intensification of Indigenous in-group 
conflict resulting in yet another military coup. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Similar to the 1987 coups, the 2000 coup was a continuation of the Indigenous nationalist 
agenda as lack of inter-group contact fuelled racial hatred, escalating into racial violence. 
Despite the multiracial 1997 Constitution, racial prejudices remained and Indigenous 
nationalists were quickly angered by the Peoples’ Coalition Government leading to the 
re-invention of the nationalist Taukei Movement, which held public demonstrations. A 
section of the Indigenous nationalist community seized on the growing Indigenous 
frustration against government policies and abducted government ministers on 19 May 
2000. The 2000 coup was different from its 1987 predecessor because of structured 
physical violence against the Indo-Fijian community. Coup leader George Speight 
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provided the justifications for the violence but on a closer analysis none of his claims 
held up to scrutiny. As a result of the coup and the violence, inter-group conflict between 
the two communities escalated strengthening in-group solidarity and this is discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: The 2006 General Election-Establishing In-group Solidarity 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The 2006 election reflected inter-group fault lines which were sharpened by exclusive 
nationalist policies of the SDL party in Fiji. The Indo-Fijian dominated Fiji Labour Party 
challenged the Indigenous government’s policies in parliament, and debates on social and 
economic issues deteriorated into verbal racial attacks (Mausio 2003). The politics of Fiji 
between 2001 and 2006 were characterised by litigations over multiparty government and 
ethnic vilifications unprecedented in post-independence politics in Fiji. As a result, there 
was strengthening of in-group ties among both Indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians.  
 
Fiji went to the polls in August 2001 as George Speight cast a long shadow over the 
election campaign. Brij Lal notes that: “Fijian political parties competed with each other 
to court his supporters, promising to fulfil his agenda of enshrining Fijian political control 
in perpetuity” (Lal 2002: 87). According to Robert Stockwell (2005: 388), the election 
gave victory to a “Fijian ethno-nationalist party, which was dedicated to maintaining 
Indigenous control over government and entrenching Fijian paramountcy”. By 2003, 
differences between the army commander Commodore Frank Bainimarama and the 
government of Laisenia Qarase became public after it was alleged by the army that the 
government wanted to replace the commander with an appointee from overseas. Worse, 
the government intervened on behalf of the chiefs convicted for their role in the 2000 
coup. Former Vice President Ratu Jope Seniloli, former Minister for Lands and Mineral 
Resources Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu and the SDL appointed Senator Ratu Josefa Dimuri 
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were convicted of coup related offences but released on compulsory supervision 
following the intervention of the SDL government (Ramesh 2006). According to John 
Connell: 
  
The continued ramifications of the 2000 coup are evident in court cases, fear of a further 
coup, continued discussions over the fate of coup leader George Speight, and uncertainty 
over the role of Indo-Fijians in the evolving political system. This has been complicated 
by concern over corruption in the banking system, judiciary, government and police 
force. Several such problems are similarly bound up with issues of ethnicity (Connell 
2007: 86-87). 
 
According to the Fiji Sun, the Qarase government within six years after the May 2000 
coup implemented racially discriminatory legislations and refused to work with the 
opposition in finding a solution to the expiring sugar leases under the Agricultural 
Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA), which could only be amended by a two-thirds 
majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate (The Fiji Sun, 18 February 
2005). Robertson and Sutherland emphasised that nepotism, cronyism and colonial style 
command structures in Fiji disregard transparency, dialogue and accountability and 
propose an outcomes based policy framework for Indigenous development with specific 
performance indicators, timeframes and audit requirements (Robertson & Sutherland 
2001: 124). However, the Qarase government was not transparent and worse it had 
squandered thirty million dollars in 2001 to provide farm equipment in areas that had 
supported the May 2000 takeover. Moreover, the SDL established a commercial arm of 
the party and provided government contracts to its political contributors. Such corrupt 
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practices prompted heated debates in parliament as the SDL routinely diverted opposition 
queries by playing the race card. Steven Ratuva noted in October 2002 that in Fiji 
continued interethnic suspicion helped to widen the ethnic gap but the political situation 
was worsened by continuing power struggle over leadership (Ratuva 2002: 22). 
 
Fiji went to the polls from 6 to 13 May 2006 to elect a government under an electoral 
system, introduced by the Constitutional Amendment Act of 1997, which hoped to move 
the island nation from runaway communalism to inter-communal bargaining and 
coalitions. However, unlike any other general election in post-independence Fiji, the 
2006 elections was most divisive as various ethnic groups rallied behind their own 
communal parties. The Indo-Fijians were solidly behind the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) 
whereas the Indigenous Fijians voted in large numbers for the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua party (SDL). The New Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF) and the National 
Federation Party (NFP), which advocated policies that were in between those of the FLP 
and the SDL, failed to win a single seat. According to Steven Ratuva (2007: 44), the 
active participation of the military in the election campaign against the SDL party may 
have “driven Indo-Fijians into the FLP camp-as they felt confident that the military 
would provide them with security if the FLP won, and driven Indigenous Fijians towards 
SDL as they felt alienated and threatened by the military’s perceived alignment with the 
FLP”. 
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6.2 The 2006 Election: Major Political Parties and Voting 
 
The political campaign of the various parties reflected the ethnic and cultural polarisation 
which in turn reflected the final result of the 2006 general election. Moreover, in-group 
solidarity featured prominently during the election. Indo-Fijians were driven by the 
concern of continued state-based discrimination if the Indigenous nationalist won 
government. Indigenous Fijians went to the polls fearful of Indo-Fijian political 
ascendancy, which had the potential to reverse the affirmative action programs of the 
nationalist SDL Government from 2001 to 2006 (The Fiji Sun, 18 February 2005).  
 
There were a number of parties contesting the Fiji elections and among them were the 
SDL, FLP, NFP, NAPF, Girmit Heritage Party (GHP), Soqosoqo ni Vakevulewa ni 
Taukei Party (SVT), Party of Truth (POT), Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Vanua Tako 
Lavu Party (NVTLP), Coalition of Independent Nationals (COIN), and Coalition of 
Independent Conservatives (COIC). The two major parties, the SDL and the FLP, 
manifestos are stated below in detail and these reflect the communal in-group positioning 
aimed at cementing in-group solidarity among voters. 
 
One of the major Indigenous Fijian nationalist political parties, the Soqosoqo ni Duavata 
ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party, was formed in 2001 following the High Court judgment 
that restored the 1997 Constitution and the cabinet that was deposed by the George 
Speight led coup of 19 May 2000. The SDL was led by Suva businessman Laisenia 
Qarase, who successfully formed the government following the 2001 general elections 
and implemented social justice programmes for Indigenous Fijians under the affirmative 
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action framework. The party was also instrumental in introducing the Racial Tolerance 
and Unity Bill (RTU) in June 2005, which created an atmosphere of unease between the 
government and the military. The SDL participated in the 2006 election with the theme 
“Secure our Future.” The underlying message was that non-Indigenous Fijians would be 
best served by Indigenous Fijian political leaders and that security of the nation, and in 
particular of the Indo-Fijians, was premised upon the recognition of Indigenous political 
paramountcy. This strategy was ill-conceived because the actions of the supporters of the 
George Speight group were still fresh in the minds of Indo-Fijians who saw the SDL 
nationalist policies as state-led appeasement of Indigenous Fijians involved in racial 
violence against Indo-Fijians in 2000  
 
According to the SDL manifesto, there was a five year plan for the sugar industry, which 
was compromised following a wave of non-renewal of sugar leases by Indigenous 
landowners who supported the 2000 coup. The government argued for completion of all 
reforms in the sugar industry for the production of quality sugar cane and more efficient 
milling and farming; improved income for farmers through higher productivity and 
expanded crops; Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) to become producer of energy (ethanol) as 
well as sugar, to lift its income; alternative livelihood project for farmers, villagers and 
others in the sugar cane areas; continuation of assistance schemes for incoming and 
outgoing farmers in sugar cane regions; and flood protection through land drainage, river 
dredging and retention dams (Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua Party Election 
Manifesto, 2006). 
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The more contentious affirmative action program was strengthened in the SDL election 
manifesto. Affirmative action was not meant to be permanent but the government argued 
that preferential treatment of Indigenous Fijians would continue until discrimination was 
removed, equality of opportunity achieved, and the burden of poverty for the 
disadvantaged lessened. The SDL believed that it would take at least 20 years to close the 
gap between Indigenous Fijians and the rest of the population (Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua Party Election Manifesto, 2006). 
 
Affordable housing was a high priority for the SDL. The party advocated a new Housing 
Authority target of financing three thousand low-cost homes annually in different parts of 
the country; increased funding for squatter resettlement at least $5 million a year to assist 
approximately a thousand families; a complete review of squatter policies; and 
continuation of Rural Housing Scheme. Closely associated with housing was a poverty 
action plan for the next five years. The SDL pledged to continue efforts to reduce 
poverty; provide support for income ventures for youths and ex-prisoners; improve the 
economy and the law and order situation by initiating major projects for reform and 
modernisation, including acquisition of additional specialist support for law enforcement. 
In education, the party advocated a possible subsidy for the cost of text books, work 
books, and reducing school bus fees; partnership with European Union to improve rural 
education; development of teacher and leadership training; enhancing curriculum 
development to reflect needs of multicultural nation; and celebration of national 
education week. For the health sector, the government proposed new hospital for Ba and 
Nausori; completion of extension at Labasa hospital; extension of Korovou hospital; new 
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health centres and nursing stations; renewed effort to lift customer service standards and 
reduce delays; more active approach in primary and preventive health care; funding to 
combat AIDS/HIV; and encouraging more private sector investment in health (Soqosoqo 
ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua Party Election Manifesto, 2006). 
 
The other major party contesting the 2006 general election was the Indo-Fijian dominated 
Fiji Labour Party, which was formed in 1985 by trade unionists concerned with the 
Indigenous government’s structural adjustments, wage freezes and corruption. The party 
won the April 1987 election by forming cross-cultural class-based coalitions but was 
ousted in a military coup on 14 May 1987 by military strong man Sitiveni Rabuka. After 
the promulgation of the new constitution in 1997, the party was re-energised and it won 
an absolute majority in the May 1999 elections. A year later, the FLP government was 
deposed by Indigenous nationalists. In 2006, the FLP was vocal in protesting against the 
RTU and corruption in the SDL government (The Fiji Times, 15 April 2005). Before the 
election, the FLP alleged that the SDL had provided fibre glass boats and cash to secure 
Indigenous votes and went into the election with the theme “Change the Future”. The 
FLP wanted more cross-cultural collaboration and in its manifesto recognised the special 
cultural position of Indigenous Fijians and their unique developmental needs (Fiji Labour 
Party 2006 Election Manifesto). 
 
In its election manifesto, the Fiji Labour Party promised to tackle poverty head on by 
creating a socially just and prosperous society through jobs, social welfare and education. 
Labour promised to introduce old age pension for those over 60, introduce medicare-a 
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national health insurance scheme to enable poor to access quality health; review the state 
welfare allowance payment criteria and increase the rates of allowance; provide state 
assisted housing to the needy; establish price surveillance on essential consumer items; 
and create income earning opportunities by developing cottage industries in the rural and 
per-urban areas through micro-finance schemes (Fiji Labour Party 2006 Election 
Manifesto). 
 
Labour believed that Fiji citizens deserved high quality health care. In response, the party 
promised to introduce a national medicare scheme through the Fiji National Provident 
Fund (FNPF); put hospital management under public-private partnership arrangement; 
remedy doctor shortages by working in consultation with donor countries like Australia, 
New Zealand, India and the United States; prevent lifestyle diseases by raising public 
awareness on health living practices; improve patient data collection by introducing 
computerised patient record systems; and promote annual health checks for all Fiji 
citizens (Fiji Labour Party 2006 Election Manifesto). 
 
For the education sector, Labour pledged to restore and raise the per capita education 
grant; introduce an annual back to school allowance of $70 per child in primary school 
and $120 per child in secondary schools; provide fee- free education to all Form 7 
students; reduce the cost of text books by implementing a text book hire scheme; reduce 
school bus fares; restore student loan schemes; focus on helping Indigenous Fijian 
students via a special unit in the Ministry of Education (Fiji Labour Party 2006 Election 
Manifesto). 
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Indigenous nationalist abrogation of sugar leases held by Indo-Fijians had a profound 
impact on the Indo-Fijian community from 2000 to 2006. The Fiji Labour Party through 
its sugar union arm the National Farmers Union (NFU) was instrumental in resettling 
Indo-Fijian farmers and continued to agitate for greater investment into the sector from 
the government. As a result, the sugar industry continued to receive special attention by 
the FLP, which planned to maintain the income of the farmers through a productivity 
based incentive scheme against cane price reductions; subsidise the cost of farm inputs 
such as fertilisers, chemicals and farm machinery; initiate crop rehabilitation and 
development programmes; pay resettlement grants to farmers whose leases are not 
renewed; ensure quality cane payment system; abolish sugar export tax; undertake a 
comprehensive study of the current harvesting and transportation system; reform Sugar 
Cane Growers Council; re-examine the current industry restructure plans; and use the 
Alternative Livelihood Programme to develop new industries in rural areas. In the 
agricultural sector, Labour sought to invest in infrastructure such as irrigation and 
drainage systems; promote agricultural exports across a wide range of products; and 
establish industry bodies with strong farmer participation to expand exports of taro, 
yagona, tropical fruits and vegetables. The FLP, in its party manifesto, argued that 
problems of the Indigenous community have to be addressed through an integrated 
approach in each of the following socio-economic sectors: education, tourism, rural 
development, economy and natural resources. The FLP promised to bring Indigenous 
Fijians into the mainstream of commerce through sustainable development of their 
resources (Fiji Labour Party 2006 Election Manifesto). 
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The history of the voting week is particularly important to the history of the 2006 general 
election because it demonstrated failures on the part of the Indigenous Fijian government 
and the Fiji Elections Office to establish proper electoral processes and governance, 
raising concerns among Indo-Fijians that the election was manipulated (Ramesh 2007a). 
 
Fiji citizens went to the poll on 6 May 2006. There were 2000 election officials posted in 
the Western Division with a little over 325 officials sent to Bua in eastern Fiji. The 
Supervisor of Elections, Semesa Karavaki, on 5 May 2006 warned voters to refrain from 
engaging in any unlawful activities during the election process (The Daily Post, 6 May 
2006). Karavaki further assured the nation that the Elections Office had adequately 
resourced all polling stations in anticipation of a problem free election day. Despite the 
Supervisor of Elections assurances, the election process turned out to be a challenge (The 
Daily Post, 7 May 2000). A number of voters waited from 7am in the morning around 
various polling stations as elections officials struggled to get organised. At the Sabeto 
Primary School in Nadi, the elections officials did not arrive until 10:30 am and at 
Kalabu Fijian School near Suva, voters had to wait until 1 pm before getting an 
opportunity to cast their votes. According to the Sunday Times, “in 32 polling stations in 
Suva and Lautoka, polling was delayed by as much as six hours due to a shortage of 
ballot papers and when the papers finally arrived, some were still missing, causing 
confusion and frustration among voters” (The Sunday Times, 7 May 2006).  
 
The Supervisor of Elections, Semesa Karavaki, was interviewed on Fiji One television on 
7 May 2006 on the problems at the polling booths. Karavaki assured the nation that there 
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would be no more problems from 8 May 2006. Besides concerned local voters, the 
former United States Ambassador to Fiji, Larry Dinger, raised concern over missing voter 
names from electoral rolls at some polling stations. Ambassador Dinger reported that “he 
was concerned about voters who have been registered but their names were not on the 
voting rolls” (The Daily Post, 9 May 2006). In response, the Returning Officer Western, 
Savenaca Kaunisela, assured that all eligible voters could cast their votes even though 
their names did not appear on the electoral rolls. However, more voters were forced to 
return without casting their ballot on 8 May 2006. At Dilkusha polling station in Suva 
presiding electoral officer, Peniasi Naqau, had to turn away some 15 per cent of the 
voters whose names could not be found on the electoral roll (The Fiji Times, 9 May 
2006). 
 
The FLP and the United Peoples’ Party (UPP) accused the Elections Office of fraud after 
the Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhry alleged that additional ballot papers were printed 
for certain constituencies, including the constituency in which he was contesting: the Ba 
Open seat. Chaudhry alleged that more than 9,000 ballot papers were produced in excess 
and it was done deliberately to undermine his chance for re-election. Meanwhile, Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase acknowledged that the Elections Office was inadequately 
resourced and that he would seriously look at the issue after the election. The FLP further 
alleged that the Supervisor of Elections employed more Indigenous Fijian polling agents 
to scuttle any meaningful oversight from Indo-Fijians. The FLP’s claims were given 
some context when it was revealed on 10 May 2006 that some ballot boxes, transported 
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from Suva to Nadi, were without proper police supervision in direct contravention of 
Fiji’s 1996 Electoral Act (Fiji Sun, 10 May 2006).  
 
On the fifth day of polling, five disgruntled voters staged a protest outside a polling 
station in Ba. Five supporters of the FLP marched along a public road carrying party 
banners, calling for the immediate resignation of the Supervisor of Elections. All of the 
protestors were later charged with unlawful assembly (The Daily Post 12 May 2006). The 
Fiji Sun editorial the next day remarked that there was something deeply distasteful about 
an organised public protest during an election and accused the FLP of maligning the 
Elections Office for political mileage. On the final day of voting on 13 May, it became 
evident from reports from various polling stations across Fiji that Indigenous Fijians had 
come out in greater numbers to vote for the SDL. According to The Fiji Times, 
Indigenous Fijian voters in rural areas turned up to vote in unprecedented numbers, 
compared to previous general election in 2001 (The Fiji Times, 13 May 2006). 
 
By the close of polling, Elections Office estimated that some 60 per cent of voters had 
cast their votes, but this figure was a preliminary one and the final result indicated that 
Fiji citizens responded positively to the number of advertisements on television, radio 
and newspapers requesting voters to exercise their democratic right. A three second 
advertisement on Fiji One television advised voters on how to vote in what often was 
seen as an overly “complicated” voting system. Each individual voter in Fiji had two 
votes-one for the communal and the other for open constituency and a valid ballot 
required voters to either vote “above the line” or “below” but not both as mandated by the 
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Electoral Act of 1996. All political parties at their party sheds near polling stations 
advised voters to vote above the line, thus locking the voter in the party’s preference 
arrangement. 
 
Table 2: Comparative Voter Turnout in Fiji Elections 1999-2006 
Percent of Actual Voters
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(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
 
According to the Fiji Elections Office, voter turnout for the 2006 election nearly matched 
that of 1999 when the FLP won an absolute majority (Fiji Elections Office, 2006). The 
other reason for the high turnout was the fear among Indigenous Fijians that there was a 
possibility that the SDL party could be defeated following the registration of a large 
number of Indigenous Fijian parties, some of which were in partnership with the FLP. 
The other factor that influenced voter turnout was the way in which preferences were 
distributed. There was tendency towards larger political parties to share preferences with 
the smaller ones and vice versa. However, Indigenous nationalist parties ensured that 
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their preferences were distributed within the Indigenous parties (Fiji Elections Office, 
2006).  
 
6.3 The Election Result 
 
On 14 May 2006, various party officers started work on verifying postal ballot. The task 
was supposed to start at 10:00am at various counting stations but long delays were 
encountered. At Natabua polling station in Lautoka, postal ballot count did not start until 
8 pm in the evening. Police and the military were closely monitoring the situation in the 
country and military spokesperson, Capitan Neumi Leweni, confirmed that soldiers were 
on a stand-by to help police during an unexpected political emergency (The Fiji Times, 
14 May 2006). The count of the votes started slowly on 15 May 2006 and was concluded 
on 18 May 2006. Communal and cultural allegiance dominated the result with Indigenous 
Fijians voting in favour of the SDL while Indo-Fijians chose the FLP. 
 
The final election results were as follows: 
Table 3: 2006 Fiji General Election Result 
PARTY GENERAL FIJIAN INDIAN OPEN TOTAL % 
SDL 0 23 0 13 36 51% 
FLP 0 0 19 12 31 44% 
UPP 2 0 0 0 2 2.5% 
INDEPENDENT 2 0 0 0 2 2.5% 
TOTAL 4 23 19 25 71 100% 
(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
 
Compared with the 2001 general elections, the FLP improved its percentage of total seats 
from 39 per cent to 44 percent. The SDL also improved its overall standing from the 
previous election from 45 per cent to 51 per cent. However, it should be noted that the 
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increase in the SDL vote share was partly due to the party absorbing the Conservative 
Alliance Matanitu Vanua party (CAMV), which supported George Speight and was 
reportedly behind the controversial Racial Tolerance and Unity Bill that granted 
immunity to the 2000 coup leaders. Support for the CAMV was particularly strong in 
Vanua Levu and in the villages of Naitasiri and Tailevu in Cental and Eastern Fiji. 
 
According to Table 4, the FLP dominated Indo-Fijian communal constituencies polling 
on average 81 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes. The closest rival, the National Federation 
Party (NFP), polled an average of 15.1 per cent. Compared with 1999, 2001 and 2006, 
NFP’s share of Indo-Fijian votes continued to decline, despite fielding well known 
candidates in the Ba West and the Nadi Urban constituencies. The FLP went into the 
campaign united in its vision for promoting multicultural Fiji and an egalitarian society. 
Under the leadership of Mahendra Chaudhry, the party rejected the reconciliation efforts 
of the SDL and wanted better outcomes for Fiji’s sugar farmers following liberalisation 
of sugar prices. The party also emphasised that in the five years of SDL government, 
corruption was rife in the public service, special interest groups such as the Methodist 
Church of Fiji had influenced public policy and the nation was spending beyond its 
means. During the campaign, the FLP emphasised that the SDL had increased the Value 
Added Tax (VAT) from 12.5 per cent to 15 per cent thereby making the social situation 
harder for the under-privileged. The NFP was critical of the FLP leadership but failed to 
provide any concrete vision for the future of the country. Worse the NFP decided to mix 
its preferences by assigning some preferences to the FLP while others to the SDL, raising 
concerns among Indo-Fijian voters on the party’s political position. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Indo-Fijian Communal Seats-2006 vs 2001 
 
Communal Constituencies 2001 2001 2006 2006 06 vs 01 06 vs 01 
 FLP NFP FLP NFP FLP NFP 
Viti Levu East Maritime Indian 66.5% 24.3% 78.4% 15.6% 11.9% -8.7% 
Tavua Indian 76.2% 20.0% 79.5% 18.5% 3.3% -1.5% 
Ba East Indian 71.5% 28.6% 72.2% 27.3% 0.7% -1.3% 
Ba West Indian 70.6% 27.6% 87.3% 10.5% 16.8% -17.1% 
Lautoka Rural 71.1% 28.7% 77.2% 18.6% 6.1% -10.2% 
Lautoka City Indian 72.5% 23.1% 79.9% 16.7% 7.4% -6.5% 
Vuda Indian  79.8% 17.5% 85.1% 8.9% 5.4% -8.6% 
Nadi Urban Indian 68.6% 29.5% 76.0% 20.2% 7.5% -9.3% 
Nadi Rural Indian 68.8% 29.5% 71.9% 26.6% 3.1% -2.9% 
Nadroga Indian 71.3% 24.2% 81.0% 24.2% 9.8% 0.0% 
Viti Levu South/Kadavu Indian 73.5% 23.0% 82.0% 12.9% 8.4% -10.1% 
Suva City Indian 74.7% 21.8% 77.3% 16.9% 2.7% -4.9% 
Vanua Levu West Indian 65.2% 26.6% 73.8% 10.7% 8.6% -15.9% 
Laucala Indian 87.3% 10.8% 89.4% 5.6% 2.2% -5.2% 
Nasinu Indian 84.5% 14.0% 90.9% 5.1% 6.4% -8.9% 
Tailevu/Rewa Indian 75.5% 22.9% 86.9% 10.4% 11.4% -12.5% 
Labasa Indian 73.8% 19.2% 84.1% 14.0% 10.3% -5.2% 
Labasa Rural Indian 83.1% 12.7% 83.2% 14.7% 0.1% 2.0% 
Macuata East Cakaudrove 
Indian 75.5% 20.4% 83.3% 9.9% 7.8% -10.5% 
Indian Communal Average 74.2% 22.3% 81.0% 15.1% 6.8% -7.2% 
(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
 
A closer analysis  of the Indo-Fijian communal seats indicates that NFP’s support 
remained steady only in Nadroga and that the FLP increased its support among Indo-
Fijians in all communal seats with the highest swing recorded in the Ba West Indian seat. 
An average overall gain for the FLP was 6.8 per cent with the NFP reporting a net decline 
of 7.2 per cent over the 2001 election result. The SDL support in the Indo-Fijian 
communal seat was 2.1 per cent with the highest proportion of votes received for the SDL 
was 5.3 per cent for the Nadroga Indian communal seat. Nadroga has a stronger inter-
cultural contact and many Indo-Fijians in the province are well versed in the Indigenous 
dialect and culture. As a result, the SDL had a better electoral outcome in the Nadroga 
seat. 
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In the 2001 general elections, the CAMV and the SVT provided strong competition to the 
SDL in a number of Indigenous communal seats. However, with the amalgamation of 
CAMV with SDL and the disappearance of the SVT from the Indigenous Fijian 
communal scene, the SDL increased its support among the Indigenous Fijians from 54.9 
per cent in 2001 to 80.3 per cent in 2006.  
 
Table 5: Comparison of SDL’s share of Indigenous Fijian Votes-2006 vs 2001 
Fijian Communal Seats   
SDL 2001 2006 
% 
Increase 
Bua Fijian* 38.9% 80.7% 41.7% 
Kadavu Fijian 55.4% 74.4% 19.1% 
Lau Fijian 91.5% 93.3% 1.9% 
Lomaiviti Fijian 72.3% 82.3% 10.0% 
Macuata Fijian* 38.7% 86.8% 48.2% 
Nadroga/Navosa Fijian 53.2% 71.6% 18.3% 
Naitasiri Fijian 75.6% 84.1% 8.5% 
Namosi Fijian 85.5% 89.1% 3.6% 
Ra Fijian 51.2% 76.3% 25.1% 
Rewa Fijian 51.4% 56.4% 5.0% 
Serua Fijian 62.6% 77.5% 14.9% 
Ba East Fijian 58.7% 60.4% 1.8% 
Ba West Fijian 60.1% 80.1% 19.9% 
Tailevu North Fijian* 36.0% 81.3% 45.3% 
Tailevu South Fijian 50.2% 80.8% 30.6% 
Cakaudrove East Fijian* 14.1% 88.9% 74.8% 
Cakaudrove West Fijian* 0.0% 90.1% 90.1% 
North East Urban Fijian 53.8% 84.6% 30.8% 
North West Urban Fijian 68.4% 79.0% 10.6% 
South West Fijian 61.8% 86.4% 24.6% 
Suva City Urban Fijian 55.8% 73.0% 17.3% 
Tamavua/Laucala Fijian 61.2% 84.9% 23.8% 
Nasinu Urban Fijian 65.7% 84.9% 19.2% 
Fijian Communal Average 54.9% 80.3% 25.4% 
* Seats won in 2001 by Conservative Alliance Matanitu 
(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
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According to Table 5, the SDL increased its share of Indigenous Fijian votes across all 
Indigenous communal constituencies with the highest swing recorded in the Cakaudrove 
West Fijian seat, which was held by CAMV candidate, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure in the 
2001 general election. Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavu Party (NVTLP) and independent 
Indigenous candidates failed to win any seats. In fact, the NVLTP’s share of the 
Indigenous Fijian vote declined from 1.4 per cent in 2001 to 1.1 per cent in 2006. The 
FLP’s partner, the Party of National Unity (PANU), also registered a decline from 2.9 per 
cent in 2001 to 2 per cent in 2006 (see Table 6). Samisoni Pareti and Jon Fraenkel (2007: 
92) noted that “the predicted splitting of Indigenous Fijian votes arising from the 
emergence of many Indigenous parties did not happen” and communal blocs were largely 
preserved, highlighting Fiji’s ethnic division.  
 
Moreover, the SVT did not receive a single Indigenous vote because it did not field any 
Indigenous contestants in any Indigenous communal seats in 2006. However, in 2001, the 
SVT polled a total of 8.6 per cent of the Indigenous Fijian votes. Independent candidates 
standing in Indigenous communal seats increased their share of votes from 2.5 per cent in 
2001 to 6.4 per cent in 2006, while the NAPF managed to get only 2.5 per cent of 
Indigenous votes. 
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Table 6: Minor Indigenous Fijian Parties Performance-2006 vs 2001 
 
Minor Parties Fijian Votes  01 vs 06
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(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
 
The support for the FLP in the Indigenous Fijian communal seat was on average 7.5 per 
cent with the highest percentage of FLP votes recorded for Nadroga Navosa Fijian 
communal seat at 17 per cent. The 25 open seats or non-communal general seats were 
supposed to encourage cross-cultural collaboration and inter-group contact under the new 
electoral arrangement introduced after 1997. However, evidence from the three post-1997 
elections indicates that ethnic and culturally exclusive voting patterns continued unabated 
(see Table 7). Despite this trend, there was evidence following the 2006 election that 
open seats determined by preferences had inter-group vote flows. It is, therefore, 
important to examine the details surrounding the open seats because on the face of it, 
these seats were pivotal in fostering inter-ethnic accommodation (Horowitz 2007). 
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Out of the 25 open constituencies, 13 were dominated by Indigenous Fijians whereas the 
remaining 12 by Indo-Fijians and following the decline in sugar farming since 2000, a 
large number of Indo-Fijians have moved from Vanua Levu to Suva, providing electoral 
advantage in mainly open urban seats to the FLP. Worse perhaps, in the absence of an 
updated census, the electoral boundaries determined under the Electoral Act did not 
reflect the changes in demographics since 1996 and this was one of the concerns of the 
FLP as well as the Fiji military. The SVT had only one candidate, Arvind Deo Singh, 
contesting the Nadi Open seat, which was won by the NFP in 2001 general elections. As 
stated earlier, the NFP chose to mix and match its preference allocations and in most 
open seats, like Nadi, it chose independents over the SDL and the FLP while in others its 
preferences went to the Indigenous Fijian nationalist parties (Fiji Village News, 21 April 
2006). The result was that both the SDL and the FLP criticised the NFP for producing a 
“mixed bag” of preference allocations and the voters too saw the NFP as a “confused” 
party uncertain about its political affiliation. 
 
In total, the SDL received 44.9 per cent of the total votes in open seats whereas FLP got 
42.6 per cent, reflecting ethnic and cultural patterns of voting evidenced in communal 
seats. 9 of the 25 open seats were determined by preferences and two of these, Suva City 
and Laucala Open, were won by SDL with a margin less than 2 per cent. Preferences 
played a significant role in these seats, indicating inter-group vote flows. It is argued that 
preference deals by political parties restrict individual preferences in the sense that a 
voter by voting “above the line” surrenders preference allocation to the party bureaucracy 
and as such “above the line” voting does not encourage democratic choice. In Fiji, all 
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political parties encouraged “above the line” voting and carried out detailed “how to 
vote” explanation in their flyers and pamphlets. 
 
Table 7: Performance of FLP and SDL in Open Seats in the 2006 Election 
 
Open Constituency SDL FLP 
Fijian 
(Pop) 
Indian 
(Pop) 
Tailevu North/Ovalau 51.2% 12.3% 90.6% 6.3% 
Tailevu South/Lomaviti 61.4% 33.9% 68.9% 30.4% 
Nausori/Naitasiri 52.9% 47.1% 52.2% 44.6% 
Nasinu/Rewa 46.4% 53.6% 46.0% 51.8% 
Cunningham 51.2% 39.0% 57.2% 36.8% 
Laucala 50.0% 50.0% 48.9% 44.4% 
Samabula/Tamavua 46.1% 53.9% 49.7% 42.5% 
Suva City 51.0% 49.0% 53.9% 31.6% 
Lami 55.8% 16.5% 72.3% 16.3% 
Lomaivuna/Namosi/Kadavu 73.0% 18.4% 83.5% 15.4% 
Ra 63.5% 30.4% 68.4% 31.0% 
Tavua 30.3% 53.9% 42.5% 55.1% 
Ba 16.9% 63.3% 25.6% 73.3% 
Magodro 24.2% 58.0% 28.3% 71.3% 
Lautoka City 36.0% 52.3% 42.4% 52.2% 
Vuda 28.3% 62.2% 32.3% 65.5% 
Nadi 33.5% 52.1% 41.0% 55.3% 
Yasawa/Nawaka 26.7% 50.3% 38.4% 61.4% 
Nadroga 46.5% 53.5% 54.4% 43.9% 
Serua/Navosa 57.0% 43.0% 66.9% 30.7% 
Bua/Macuata 54.4% 30.2% 63.6% 34.0% 
Labasa 2.0% 62.2% 27.5% 70.3% 
Macuata East 25.0% 62.5% 28.3% 70.9% 
Cakaudrove West 59.4% 16.7% 72.7% 16.5% 
Lau/Taveuni/Rotuma 78.5% 0.0% 79.5% 9.1% 
Average on Open Seats 44.9% 42.6% 53.4% 42.4% 
(Source: Fiji Elections Office) 
 
 
The SDL won 13 open seats (52 per cent) and the FLP won 12 seats (48 per cent). FLP 
quickly challenged some of the results including the Laucala open seat won by the SDL 
by 0.1 per cent of the votes. By 18 May 2006, Laisenia Qarase was re-elected as the 
 97 
 
Prime Minister of Fiji with the support of two independent candidates: George Konrote 
of the Rotuma Communal constituency and Robin Irwin of North Eastern General 
constituency. On the same day, Qarase invited the FLP to join his cabinet in a multiparty 
government. 
 
6.4 Power Sharing 
 
Multiparty governance as stipulated in Fiji’s 1997 Constitution has been in limbo since 
the general elections of 2001. The leader of SDL, Laisenia Qarase repeatedly stated that a 
“forced” marriage of parties under section 99 of the 1997 Constitution was 
“unworkable”. Following the 2001 general election, the FLP took the matter to the 
Supreme Court of Fiji, which upheld the constitutional provision of multiparty 
governance, reaffirming that a political party with 10 per cent or more of national seats in 
a general election must be invited to join cabinet without any conditions. Following the 
2003 judgment, Qarase offered minor ministerial portfolios to the FLP and as a result the 
FLP declined the offer and chose to stay as an opposition party (The Canberra Times, 19 
September 2003). 
 
After the 2006 general elections, Laisenia Qarase demonstrated better national leadership 
by offering the FLP significant cabinet portfolios in Agriculture, Energy, Environment, 
Local Government, Commerce, Health and Mineral Resources. While initially protesting 
the offer, Chaudhry accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to join the multiparty 
cabinet (Fijilive, 19 May 2006). 
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Shane Martin (2005) of Trinity College in Dublin supports a strong committee system as 
a rational solution to principal-to-agent delegation inherent in a multiparty government. 
Shane’s argument highlights the previously under-explored role of legislative institutions 
in facilitating coalition governments comprising of parties with divergent policy 
preferences. Arco Timmermans (2006) provides two options to the multiparty 
participants: parties in a multiparty government make commitments that are as detailed 
and binding as possible or to forego clear commitments and keep policy options open.  
 
Fiji’s Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, largely saw elections within a winner-loser power 
matrix and as such he acknowledged on Fiji Hindi radio station Navtarang on 17 May 
2006 that he hoped that the FLP reject his offer and stay in opposition. However, nine 
FLP members joined the SDL led multiparty cabinet and both the Prime Minister 
Laisenia Qarase and the FLP leader Mahendra Chaudhry started work on cross-party 
consensus building. On 17 July 2006, the multiparty cabinet agreed to establish four sub-
committees to deal with differences in policy and strategy between rival parties (Fijilive, 
18 July 2006). The consensus on the ground rules for multiparty cabinet was seen as a 
first step towards a larger goal of building consensus democracy and alleviating racial 
conflict. However, cooperation between the two major parties started to wither as Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase brought the FLP cabinet members under the policy direction of 
the SDL. The leader of the FLP reacted to this development by issuing a directive to the 
FLP cabinet members to be guided only by the FLP party policy, thereby triggering a 
crisis in multiparty cabinet. Under the tension filled bi-party contest, there was no 
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contestatory pluralism of opposing voices in the cabinet, reflecting larger cultural and 
ethnic divisions due to a lack of inter-group contact. 
 
6.5 The Political Role of the Military 
 
In Fiji, the military directly intervened in politics in May 1987 and ousted a multiracial 
government from power and since then remained in the forefront of Fiji politics, despite 
general elections in 1992, 1994, 1999, 2001 and 2006 (Saffu 1990: 159-170 & Brett 
2008: 71-122). The 1990 Constitution made provision for continued political intervention 
but the 1997 Constitution was silent on this issue. However, the military in Fiji 
emphasised that it had constitutional authority to intervene in the name of national 
security. 
 
In 2006, tensions between the Government of Fiji and the Republic of the Fiji Military 
Forces (RFMF) flared up when the commander of the RFMF, Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama, criticised Fiji’s Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase, over the introduction of 
the re-worked Racial Tolerance and Unity bill. During the Fiji Independence Day 
celebrations on 9 October 2006, the commander raised concerns about the quality of 
Fiji’s leadership: 
 
Commodore Bainimarama expressed his frustration at the government and said that he 
would do all in his means to ensure that his voice is heard in government. “Someone has 
to stand up to tell the government not to take us in that direction.” The commander 
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admitted that his outbursts against the Government were due to the standard of leadership 
in the country and on the past corrupt policies” (The Fiji Sun 10 October 2006). 
 
The relationship between the Fiji government and the army further deteriorated after the 
government appointed former Lieutenant Colonel Baledrokadroka to the post of the 
Commissioner of Prisons. Baledrokadroka was facing a military tribunal over his alleged 
attempt to depose Commodore Bainimarama in January 2006. Not only had the Fiji 
Military Forces challenged the government over poor policy choices, it claimed that the 
administration was corrupt. According to a 2005 US Department of State Country 
Report: 
 
Corruption within government, including the civil service, was a problem. The media 
continued to raise numerous allegations of non-accountability, bribery, abuse of office, 
fraud, misuse of public property, financial mismanagement, failure to complete statutory 
audits, and conflicts of interest regarding officials and ministries. In some ministries 
transparency was virtually nonexistent. (US Department of State, Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 2005-Fiji, March 2006). 
 
One of the reasons cited by the military for the military intervention in 2006 was the use 
of ethnicity by the SDL government to politically marginalise and discriminate against 
Indo-Fijians. Both the FLP and the SDL went into the 2006 elections with different 
political agendas. The SDL put forward the theme of “security”, which was driven by the 
ideology of paramountcy of Indigenous political interest whereas the FLP wanted to 
“change the future” so that Fiji could become a tolerant society that embraced diversity 
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and multiculturalism. Following the election, a multiparty government was instituted but 
without multiparty cabinet rules, ethnic and cultural competitions for political power and 
influence derailed cross-cultural collaboration and the multiparty cabinet. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
The history of 2006 election highlighted that despite a multiracial constitution, Fiji 
remained deeply divided along ethnic lines. These divisions were widened by the coup of 
2000 and in particular by the physical violence suffered by the Indo-Fijians and the 
subsequent consolidation of an Indigenous ethno-nationalist state, which continued with 
pro-Indigenous policies in an attempt to unite Indigenous Fijians. However, efforts by the 
government to leverage inter-group conflict to promote Indigenous in-group solidarity 
failed because the 2000 coup caused divisions between the Indigenous government and 
the military, which started to question the utility of pro-Indigenous policies. Indo-Fijians 
concerned by the potential for violence and continued discrimination rallied behind their 
own communal bloc resulting in a highly divisive election outcome. 
 
Realising deep divisions within Fiji, Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase had invited the Fiji 
Labour Party to join his multiparty cabinet. However, as discussed, the multiparty cabinet 
imploded under in-group communal pressure. The Indigenous government once again 
attempted without success to reintroduce a bill to grant amnesty to Indigenous 
nationalists involved in the 2000 coup. The actions of the government were seen by the 
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military as an affront to national security and a series of steps were taken by the 
commander Frank Bainimarama to oust the government from office in December 2006. 
 
In the next chapter, I will analyse the attributes of violence in Fiji ethno-politics using 
Allport’s inter-group theory. There were three forms of violence against Indo-Fijians: 
indirect violence in the form of discrimination, direct violence and extropunitive 
violence. 
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Part 3: Application of Inter-group Theory in 
Fiji 
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Chapter 7: Attributes of Inter-group Violence in Fiji 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In an application of inter-group theory in Fiji, conflict equates to violence, notably 
indirect violence in the form of structural and institutional discrimination, and direct 
physical violence and the threat of it. Given the historical context of these moments of 
violence in Fiji, we can also see the space for in-group solidarity as a form of 
extropunitive violence. The historical location articulated in Part 1 of this thesis provides 
the notion that inter-group conflict in Fiji equates to violence, which is a key element of 
Allport’s theory. Furthermore, the analysis of conflict as manifestations of violence 
enables an application of Gordon Allport’s inter-group theory that focused on inter-group 
discrimination, violence and in-group solidarity in post World War II United States of 
America (Allport 1954: 132).  
 
Allport’s analysis of prejudice was focused on discrimination and violence by the 
dominant group against African Americans. In the context of American history, Allport 
argued that since the arrival of the slave ships from Africa, African Americans have 
suffered discrimination which was based on stereotyped beliefs. According to Allport 
(1954: 196), African Americans were seen by the dominant white community as 
culturally inferior, lazy, boisterous, fanatical, ignorant, crime-prone and occupationally 
unstable. For Allport (1954: 14-15) these beliefs lead to institutionalisation of 
discrimination against the out-group in the form of exclusion from certain types of 
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employment, political rights, educational opportunities and social privileges. 
Discrimination then leads to organised violence which Allport locates in the history of 
lynching and pogroms against African Americans in the Southern United States. As a 
consequence of discrimination and violence, Allport theorised that there was greater in-
group solidarity among African Americans. 
 
While the historical context of discrimination, violence and in-group solidarity in the 
United States is specific to the African American community, aspects of Allport’s 
analytical framework are portable and may be applied to Fiji which has a history of inter-
group conflict. As discussed in Part 1, the inter-group conflict led to a military coup in 
1987 and implementation of institutional and structural violence in the form of 
discrimination against Indo-Fijians. Discrimination then transformed into fear of violence 
and physical violence against the Indo-Fijian community during the 2000 coup. The 
political order that was established following the events of 2000 led to extropunitive 
violence as Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijian communities rallied for greater in-group 
solidarity, thus escalating the inter-group conflict. In keeping with Allport’s history as a 
method, discrimination and violence against Indo-Fijians as well as inter-group and in-
group solidarity will be examined in an historical context as critical historical moments in 
the following analysis. 
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7.2 Institutional and Structural Violence 
 
Earlier in the thesis in Chapter 4, I established an historical context for discrimination 
against Indo-Fijians. This discrimination was structured and institutionalised for it 
allowed the Indigenous nationalists to politically marginalise and subordinate the Indo-
Fijian community. According to Ravuvu (1991: 87) such discrimination was premised 
upon years of categorical prejudgment of the Indigenous Fijian leaders that Indo-Fijians 
had a secret ambition to dominate Indigenous Fijians politically and use their influence to 
alienate Fijian land. Furthermore, the Indigenous nationalists argued that the Indo-Fijians 
were an economically dominant group and had established an ethnic economic bloc that 
created barriers for Indigenous Fijians to enter commerce through exclusionary practices 
(Sriskandarajah 2003: 317). A majority of Indigenous Fijians were convinced that 
institutionalisation of discrimination was necessary if Indo-Fijians were to be managed in 
Fiji. As a result of these prejudgments, there was a lot of support for the Indigenous 
nationalist view and in particular for the action of the leader of the Fiji Military Forces in 
1987 against the multiracial coalition government. One of the most important features of 
discrimination against Indo-Fijians in Fiji from 1987 was these justifications of the 
Indigenous nationalist viewpoint (Sriskandarajah 2003: 319-320). These justifications 
form an important pillar for the analysis of discrimination as it provides an insight into 
the thought processes of the Indigenous group at the time. 
 
Allport (1954: 51-52) noted that discrimination comes about when individuals and groups 
are denied equality of treatment and it occurs “when we take steps to exclude members of 
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an out-group through restrictive conventions” which include unequal recognition, 
inequality of personal security, inequality of freedom, inequality in the enjoyment of free 
communication, inequality in the enjoyment of rights to nationality, inequality in the right 
to participate in government, and inequality in access to public office. On 14 May 1987, 
Indigenous nationalists within Fiji’s military ousted a multiracial government and 
removed Indo-Fijian government ministers from power (Lal 1988). Not only, Indo-
Fijians were removed from political power, they were systematically pushed out of the 
Fiji public service and the Indigenous nationalists successfully constitutionalised 
discrimination via the 1990 Constitution. Therefore, the consequences of the 1987 
military coup were institutionalisation of discrimination against Indo-Fijians.  
 
Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova in 1988 compiled a biography of the coup leader Sitiveni 
Rabuka titled No Other Way. In it, Rabuka argued that his action to remove Indo-Fijians 
from political power was necessary to protect the Indigenous population from the 
economically dominant Indo-Fijians. Moreover, for Rabuka, it was equally important to 
discriminate against Indo-Fijians so that Indigenous Fijians can catch up with the 
community economically. Discrimination for economic purposes is highlighted by 
Allport, who argued that discriminatory policies by the dominant group are reflected in 
the restrictive conventions that are established to deny the out-group “equal opportunity” 
(Allport 1954: 52). Allport further qualified that these restrictive discriminatory 
conventions are not based on facts but are mainly fictional and play on the “ignorance of 
the dominant group” (Allport 1954: 513). The biography of the coup leader by Eddie 
Dean and Stan Ritova (1988: 11) underscores the point raised by Allport. Rabuka saw the 
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god given land of Fiji under threat from an immigrant race that had the potential to take 
over political power and complete its control over the country. Rabuka saw this prospect 
as an inevitable flow on from the election of the coalition government on 11 April 1987 
which, even though it claimed to be multiracial, was dominated by Indo-Fijians. The 
removal of the coalition government via a military coup was essential for the survival of 
the Indigenous Fijian race. 
 
Closely associated with the survival of the Fijian race argument was a prevalent 
misconception among Indigenous nationalists that it was only a matter of time before 
Indo-Fijian government ministers in the coalition government attacked the very heart of 
Indigenous identity: the Fijian land. Besides Rabuka, Deryck Scarr sympathising with the 
Indigenous nationalist viewpoint argued that: 
 
before an ethnic chief justice , as before any other, an acquiring authority may acquire 
any lands for any purpose according to the Crown Acquisition of Lands Act and 
specifically acquire it for any dwellings under the Local Government Act, provided the 
court is satisfied that the taking of possession of acquisition is necessary or expedient in 
the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or any of 
the property in such a manner as to promote public benefit ( Scarr 1990: 237). 
 
If we apply Allport’s theory (Allport 1954: 335) to Fiji, the views expressed by the coup 
leader Sitiveni Rabuka and Deryck Scarr on Indigenous nationalist justifications could be 
conceptualised as “rationalisations for discrimination” which were fictional, in the sense 
that there was no historical evidence to infer that Indo-Fijians threatened Indigenous 
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Fijian land or had ambitions to politically dominate the community. According to Ralph 
Premdas and Jeffrey Steeves (1991: 164), “the new coalition government had done 
absolutely nothing to threaten any aspect of Indigenous Fijian land, which in any case, 
was constitutionally safeguarded and entrenched in the Senate”. However, Indigenous 
community conventions on political power based on political hegemony (Lawson 1991: 
183) dictated otherwise as Indigenous voices of moderation were marginalised and 
conventions on discrimination became a widely accepted value concept (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 15 October 1987). 
 
The Indigenous nationalist rationalisation for discrimination was sufficient to scuttle 
Indigenous in-group moral outrage against the coup. The deposed Prime Minister of Fiji, 
Timoci Bavadra, Tupeni Baba and other Indigenous pro-democracy activists Simione 
Durutalo and Jone Dakuvula found it increasingly difficult to argue against the arguments 
in favour of discrimination against Indo-Fijians (Bain & Baba eds 1990). The coups of 
1987 had successfully established a community pattern where Indigenous Fijians largely 
accepted the rationale behind the military takeover and discrimination against Indo-
Fijians. By applying Allport’s theory to Fiji, we can argue that the 1987 coup had created 
an “atmosphere saturated with collective in-group belief that a member cannot escape its 
effects” (Allport 1954: 236). While Allport was referencing organised white racism 
against African Americans, the same argument can be applied in Fiji. According to the 
Indigenous Fijian nationalists, Indo-Fijians could not be trusted and institutional 
safeguards had to be instituted so that Indo-Fijians were permanently removed from any 
form of political influence. In this context, discrimination against the community was 
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both just and necessary. The ultimate result of these beliefs and conventions was the 
promulgation of a racially-weighted constitution in 1990. 
 
Indo-Fijian submission to the Constitution Inquiry and Advisory Committee (CIAC) 
noted discrimination in the allocation of parliamentary seats. A joint submission by Indo-
Fijian Fiji Labour Party and the National Federation Party argued that the allocation of 
seats and the electoral system for all purposes eliminate completely any influence of the 
Indo-Fijian community or their leaders in politics or government policy (NFP/FLP 
submission to the CIAC, 1989). Constitutional expert Yash Ghai validated the Indo-
Fijian concerns when he stated that the “primary characteristics of the constitution are 
racism, authoritarianism and feudalism” (Ghai & Pao 1991: 17). 
 
Following the 1987 coups, Indo-Fijians were removed from the political arena and from 
senior positions in the public service. Indigenous Fijian nationalists justified their actions 
on grounds that Indo-Fijians wanted to dominate the Indigenous community politically 
and had plans to alienate Indigenous land. Using Allport’s theory on the role of 
discrimination in inter-group conflict, I have argued that Indigenous nationalists 
established a community convention on discrimination and this led to the collective belief 
that Indo-Fijians could not be trusted and as a result should not be given an opportunity to 
be part of any government. According to ‘Atu Bain and Tupeni Baba (1990) and Jone 
Dakuvula (1992), moderates within the Indigenous community found it extremely 
difficult to argue against the nationalist viewpoint, and an elaborate community pattern in 
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support of discrimination against Indo-Fijians emerged. Furthermore, discrimination was 
constitutionalised with the promulgation of the 1990 Constitution.  
 
I argue that while Allport’s theory was specifically referencing the social context of white 
discrimination against African Americans in the United States, the same logic and 
community conventions applied to the Fiji context. Allport identified that dominant 
groups formed prejudgments of the out-group and developed community conventions to 
exclude the out-groups from positions of authority and power (Allport 1954: 235). These 
conventions as defined by Allport had two objectives: to provide a rationale for 
discrimination and to circumvent moderate voices against exclusion of the out-group 
(Allport 1954: 365).  
 
As I have demonstrated using Allport’s theory, in Fiji, institutional and structural 
violence (Allport 1954: 49) in the form of discrimination operated against Indo-Fijians 
following the 1987 coup and Indigenous voices of moderation were silenced through 
community conventions around the paramountcy of Indigenous political interest. In the 
next section, I utilise Allport to analyse the historical context of fear of violence and 
direct violence during the 2000 coup when members of the Indigenous nationalist 
community were mobilised against rural Indo-Fijians. 
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7.3 Direct Physical Violence and fear of Violence 
 
The manifestation of violence against rural Indo-Fijians during the height of the 2000 
coup was a result of the discrimination which was instituted against the community 
following the 1987 coup. According to Allport’s (1954) theory on discrimination, the 
negative or oversimplified views become justification for discrimination of the out-group, 
as discussed in the Fiji context in the previous section. In the case of Indo-Fijians, it was 
argued by Indigenous Fijian nationalists that Indo-Fijians had secret ambitions to alienate 
Indigenous land and had plans to dominate the community politically. As a result, a 
discriminatory 1990 Constitution was implemented by the Indigenous nationalists in 
1990 to safeguard against potential Indo-Fijian encroachment in the Indigenous Fijian 
way of life. However, the in-group solidarity among Indigenous Fijians became 
unsustainable as coup leader, Sitiveni Rabuka, was forced to seek the assistance from 
Indo-Fijian National Federation Party to salvage his own and his party’s political fortune 
but the structures of discrimination and exclusion remained, despite the promulgation of a 
multiracial constitution in 1997 (Naidu 2008: 161). Even more troubling was that 
Indigenous nationalist views on Indo-Fijians became even more hardline following the 
election of Indo-Fijian Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry. Indigenous nationalists 
reinvented the arguments used to justify the 1987 coups. More specifically, they argued 
that Indigenous land and identity faced imminent danger from the immigrant Indo-Fijian 
community and nationalist emissaries held disinformation campaigns in Indigenous 
Fijian villages throughout Fiji (PACNEWS, 20 April 2000). The difference between the 
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Indigenous nationalist campaign against Indo-Fijians in 1987 and in 2000 was advocacy 
for and the use of physical violence.  
 
We can relate Fiji’s historical experience to the theoretical ideas of Gordon Allport 
(1954: 57) who argued that once the dominant group accepted the rationale for 
discrimination and became part of the popular community belief; it would be just a matter 
of time before discrimination manifested itself into organised violence. Allport (1954: 
154) argued that violence would be caused by a “triggering event” and in the case of Fiji, 
it was the 2000 coup. The historical location of the 2000 coup discussed in Chapter 5 
provides the context for this section where Allport’s theory on inter-group violence 
established in Chapter 1 is used to analyse the use of Indigenous nationalist direct 
violence against Indo-Fijians in 2000. 
 
As I have highlighted in Chapter 5, there was an organised campaign of violence against 
the Indo-Fijians, especially those in rural areas. Most of the Indo-Fijian settlements in 
rural Fiji are in close proximity to Indigenous Fijian villages and in places like Tailevu, 
Naitasiri, Dreketi, Batiri, Muaniweni and Korovou, Indo-Fijians farmers were surrounded 
by Indigenous villages and faced the brunt of Indigenous nationalist anger against the 
out-group (The Times of India, 13 August 2000). According to Allport (1954: 20), the 
categorisation of out-groups “forms the basis for normal prejudgment” which is 
translated to community anger as a result of a triggering event. For Allport (1954: 363), 
anger is a “transitory emotional stage and it leads to impulses to attack the source of the 
frustration”. In the case of Fiji, the source was Indo-Fijians and more importantly, the 
location of Indo-Fijians in rural Fiji made them easy targets. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
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the initial target of Indigenous nationalist anger was the Indo-Fijian Prime Minister and 
his cabinet but by May 2000, this anger was projected on to all of the Indo-Fijian 
community (Trnka 2008b: 46).  
 
Allport (1954:15) argues that anger against an out-group is one of the conditions that lead 
to acts of violence. As an example, Allport highlights a situation where an unwanted 
African American family may be forcibly ejected from a predominantly white 
neighbourhood or so severely threatened that the family leaves in fear. A similar 
predicament befell the Indo-Fijian community during the 2000 coup. Susanna Trnka 
(2002, 2008b) examined in detail the ethnography of violence against Indo-Fijians during 
the height of the 2000 crisis. She confirmed that the violence against Indo-Fijians was not 
only sporadic but specifically targeted to instil fear in the community.  
 
Allport’s research on inter-group violence in the United States provides an extensive list 
of conditions for physical attack on an out-group by the dominant group, including the 
role played by long periods of categorical judgment (Allport 1954:57-58). These 
judgments are used by activists within the dominant group to justify direct violence 
against members of the out-group. Following an examination of Fiji’s historical context 
in Chapters 3 & 4, I have analysed that since the colonial times, Indo-Fijians were 
stereotyped as deceptive, untrustworthy and harbouring secret ambition to destroy 
Indigenous culture. These beliefs crystallised during the coups of 1987 when Indigenous 
Fijian nationalists imposed restrictive discriminatory conventions on Indo-Fijians, who 
were removed from political power and from holding influential positions in the public 
 115 
 
service. Moreover, the discrimination that flowed from the coups was constitutionalised 
in 1990. Despite a new multiracial constitution in 1997, negative Indigenous nationalist 
prejudgment against Indo-Fijians continued and the Indigenous government that was in 
power from 1992 to 1999 did nothing to address these prejudgments, including the 
structures and institutions of discrimination established following the 1987 coup.  
 
Allport (1954: 58) further argued that another important condition for physical violence 
against the out-group is “perceived outside strain” on the members of the in-group, 
particularly economic privation, sense of low status and irritation due to political 
developments. In application of Allport’s theory on inter-group violence to Fiji, the 
historical events in the country highlight that there was a long standing complaint from 
Indigenous nationalists that Indo-Fijians had dominated the community economically and 
that there was notable disparity in income and wealth between Indo-Fijians and 
Indigenous Fijians. As an example, Indigenous nationalists highlighted the low rent that 
was paid by most Indo-Fijian farmers for leasing Indigenous Fijian land as discussed in 
Chapter 4. Finally, Allport (1954:58) argued that a precipitating event has a potential to 
unleash destructive and violent social forces against the out-group. The 2000 coup was 
such an event that led to the mobilisation of Indigenous nationalists against Indo-Fijians 
(The Independent, 1 August 2000). 
 
According to the ethnography of violence by Susanna Trnka (2002: 328) “rural violence 
occurred in certain areas of Fiji. It was most prevalent in the Speight stronghold of 
Naitasiri Province, particularly in the areas of Vunidawa and Muaniweni”. Trnka’s 
research suggests that most of the perpetrators of violence were young disaffected 
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Indigenous Fijian youth from local Indigenous Fijian villages and their targets were the 
residents of nearby Indo-Fijian settlements and villages. Furthermore, large numbers of 
Hindu, Muslim and Christian Indo-Fijians fled from these areas, settling in Fiji’s first 
refugee camp at the Girmit Centre in Lautoka in the western part of Fiji (Trnka 2002: 
329)  
 
Trnka (2002: 334) argued that some Indo-Fijian victims of violence knew their assailants. 
Accounts of violence were told for a number of reasons. Between May and August of 
2000, Trnka observed that this was the period where the violence was of such an 
explosive nature that people spoke of it almost constantly to make sense of what was 
happening in their daily lives. In the context of widespread community violence, 
narratives of brutality acted as records of the events that were rapidly changing the lives 
of Indo-Fijians, especially those living in rural Fiji. Trnka further stated that narratives of 
violence “not only helped people make sense of and come to terms with what was 
happening to them and their communities, but they served as warnings to those who were 
perceived as potential victims. Telling such stories forced listeners to engage with the 
possibility of events that previously might have been difficult to imagine” (Trnka 2002: 
346) 
 
Besides actual direct physical violence, the Indo-Fijian community was also were gripped 
by the fear of violence, following the 2000 coup. Trnka in her book State of Suffering 
identified a historical moment on a school day immediately after the 2000 coup when 
Indo-Fijian parents, fearing for the safety of their children, rushed to the school only to 
find that the principal and the teachers of the school had abandoned the premises in fear 
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of ethnic violence, leaving the school kids scared and confused. Trnka further observed 
that “ethnically motivated attacks were in the forefront of many Indo-Fijians. For the first 
few days following the 2000 coup, many Indo-Fijians in Suva and Nausori did not leave 
their homes but remained indoors, closely observing the news on television and radio” 
(Trnka 2008b: 65). 
 
Not only Susanna Trnka but Markus Pangerl (2007) analysed fear violence against Indo-
Fijians during the 2000 coup and discovered that both Indo-Fijian women and men feared 
continued violence from Indigenous nationalists. The fear of violence in Pangerl’s 
research was accentuated not only in rural Fiji where the violence took place but in urban 
and peri-urban areas where Indo-Fijian women feared sexual violence and “narratives by 
Indo-Fijian men reflected the distress they experienced in emphasising the need to 
guarantee the safety of their wives and daughters” (Pangerl 2007:259). 
 
Henry Srebrnik (2008:85) observed that direct acts of violence against Indo-Fijians “went 
unpunished as looting, arson, destruction of Indo-Fijian schools and places of worship” 
and were widespread during the 2000 coup. Former Indigenous Fijian Vice President of 
Fiji, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (2006: 294) noted that violence was possible because the 
social discourse between the two communities by Indigenous Fijians has been 
conceptualised primarily as a struggle for political, social and economic hegemony 
between “us” and “them”. Long periods of categorical prejudgment coupled with the 
coup of 2000 played a large part in mobilising emotions that caused angry and violent 
reactions from Indigenous nationalists. Indo-Fijians feared ethnic violence and were 
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physically attacked as highlighted by the research of Trnka (2002, 2008b), Pangerl (2007) 
and Srebrnik (2008). 
 
 In theorising inter-group violence, Allport (1954: 58) has argued that the continuation of 
violence against an out-group is socially facilitated by the in-group whose members 
develop high personal impulses and less private inhibitions. For Allport, violence also is 
an outgrowth of milder states of mind and in his study of anti-Semitism in Germany; he 
argued that violence against the Jewish community can be located in history: “verbal 
attacks in the time of Bismark against the Jewish community were relatively mild. Under 
Nazi Germany, verbal attacks deteriorated to direct physical violence against the Jewish 
community, and Jews were loudly and officially blamed for every conceivable crime 
from sex perversion to world conspiracy” (Allport 1954: 57). 
 
In this section, I analysed the indirect fear of violence and direct physical violence 
unleashed against the Indo-Fijians by Indigenous nationalists following the coup of 2000. 
I utilised Allport theoretical ideas on inter-group theory to analyse the concept of anger as 
playing a predominant role in mobilising destructive emotions among the Indigenous 
population. I also mentioned other conditions for violence highlighted by Allport in his 
analysis of violence against African Americans during the 1950s United States and 
violence against the Jewish community in Nazi Germany. I argued that Allport’s theory 
on inter-group preconditions for violence, based on long periods of categorical judgment 
by the dominant group of the out-group, concerns about economic disparity, and 
community views on political domination, were relevant to Fiji because it was located in 
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the country’s history as discussed in Chapter 5. Fear of violence and direct physical 
violence against Indo-Fijians during the 2000 coup highlighted the operation of Allport’s 
theory. Moreover, I emphasised that the 2000 coup was the triggering event that led to 
large scale mobilisation against Indo-Fijians, particularly in rural Fiji. As analysed in the 
previous section, structural and institutional discrimination played a leading part in 
shaping Indigenous Fijian nationalist attitude towards Indo-Fijians and Indo-Fijian 
attitudes towards Indigenous Fijians. Following inter-group violence in 2000, both 
communities became inward focused, emphasising greater in-group solidarity or 
extropunitive violence. This characteristic of violence is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.4 Extropunitive Violence 
 
Collin Allport’s theory on inter-group theory includes a notion of extropunitive violence. 
Extropunitive behaviour is characterised by hate, discrimination and political 
marginalisation of the out-group  by the dominant in-group. For the in-group, group 
solidarity is established against the out-group and there is majority in-group consensus on 
maintaining and strengthening the structures of hate, discrimination and political 
marginalisation against the out-group. The collective extropunitive behaviour against the 
out-group over-time transforms into extropunitive violence as the dominant in-group 
positions itself culturally against the out-group through ideological justification for 
discrimination, marginalisation and violence. The violence maybe indirect, structural or 
direct and legitimises pushing out the out-group from the organisation, community or 
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country. For the out-group, group solidarity is established as a response to extropunitive 
violence by the dominant in-group (Allport 1954: 148). 
 
Allport’s research into in-group extropunitive attributes3 was influenced by the analysis 
of Saul Rosenzweig (1944: 379-388) who discussed extropunitive violence as a response 
where an “individual or a group aggressively attributes frustration to external things or 
beings”. For Allport (1954: 148), persecuted out-groups, in their response to 
extropunitive violence, may become “clannish” and develop special solidarity including 
ego defences. In his analysis of extropunitive violence, Allport argued that groups which 
suffer from frustration induced by discrimination, disparagement and violence develop 
behavioural characteristics such as “obsessive concern and suspicion of the out-group, 
strengthen in-group ties, and develop prejudice against other groups” (Allport 1954: 160). 
Furthermore, Allport (1954: 383) established that extropunitiveness can become a trait of 
personality, having two types of impact: “physical relief from pent-up tension and 
frustration and restoration of one’s self esteem”.  
 
According to Allport (1954: 160), extropunitive violence leads to intropunitive violence 
where the dominant in-group become inward focused. Intropunitive violence is focused 
towards in-group dynamics created by hate, discrimination and political marginalisation 
of the out-group. Distinct from in-group solidarity, tensions and violence exist between 
members of the dominant in-group in response to justifying hate, discrimination, 
                                                  
3 For further discussions on extropunitive violence see: Triandis, Leigh Minturn & W. Lambert. 1961. 
‘Sources of Frustration and Targets of Aggression: A cross Cultural Study.’ Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology 62 (3): 640-648; and Mann, J. W. 1990. ‘Extrapunitive Attributions.’ The Journal of 
Social Psychology 130 (4): 453-457. Note: Collin Allport (1954) uses the term extropunitive while other 
inter-group theorists, for example, J.W. Mann, uses the term extrapunitive. Both terms have the same 
meaning. 
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marginalisation and violence against the out-group. Thus, intropunitive violence is 
violence by members of the dominant in-group against their own group.  
 
Following the events of the year 2000, Indo-Fijians participated in the election of 2001 
emotionally fragmented and feared further violence. Many did not turn up to vote even 
though Fiji had compulsory voting. An Indigenous nationalist government of Laisenia 
Qarase came to power and immediately after the election implemented discriminatory 
provisions to uplift the economic standards of Indigenous Fijians. The policy of the 
government reminded Indo-Fijians of the discrimination and political marginalisation that 
were instituted against them between 1987 and 1999. Moreover, the Indigenous 
government chose to down play the level of violence perpetrated by Indigenous 
nationalists against rural Indo-Fijians in 2000 and failed to assist or compensate any of 
the Indo-Fijian victims4. The actions of the government led to Indo-Fijian in-group 
solidarity and this was reflected in the 2006 election result, which was discussed in 
Chapter 6. Indigenous Fijians also became very in-group focused as they lent their 
support behind the government’s affirmative action programs. In this section, I will 
utilise Allport’s theory to analyse extropunitive violence against Indo-Fijians from 2000 
to 2006 and as another location in history. 
 
Indo-Fijians, following widespread physical violence against them in 2000, looked for 
support and comfort within their own in-group and this was reflected in the 2001 and 
2006 general elections. Moreover, the reintroduction of discrimination against Indo-
                                                  
4 Reverend Aquila Yabaki, Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF) (2002). ‘Statement at the launching of the 
Macro Study: Economic Development, Democracy and Ethnic Conflict in the Fiji Islands’. Fiji Teachers 
Union Hall, 11 February 2002. 
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Fijians became the hallmark of the Indigenous nationalist government that came to power 
following general elections in 2001 (Naidu 2008). For example, in 2001, the Indigenous 
nationalist government enacted the Social Justice Act on 21 December 2001 and since its 
promulgation, Indo-Fijian leaders condemned the measures in the Act as discriminatory 
and in contravention of the constitution. Despite the criticisms, the government in 2003 
published a report on the affirmative programs for Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans 
wherein it stated that: 
 
It is also a reality, given the ethnic divisions in Fiji's society, that affirmative action 
involves issues of race. These cannot and should not be overlooked. Fiji will only resolve 
its racial differences by dealing with them honestly and openly and removing the 
inequities and inequalities, which cause social and political tensions. This does not mean 
that the policies enacted to achieve this are racist. They should be seen in the wider 
context of development to improve the standards of living of all disadvantaged groups 
(Progress Report on implementation of affirmative action programmes under the Social 
Justice Act 2002-2003, Government of Fiji, 2004). 
 
The Indigenous government failed to understand that Indo-Fijians were also seeking 
justice and that emphasis on the needs of Indigenous Fijians created an atmosphere of 
inter-group hostility. Indo-Fijians argued that while on the one hand the government was 
addressing social justice issues for Indigenous Fijians, it was on the other hand 
deliberately perpetrating social injustice against them. Furthermore, in July 2002, the 
NGO Coalition of Human Rights-Aids Task Force, Citizen Constitutional Forum, Fem 
Link Pacific, Fiji Citizens Freedom Movement, Ecumenical Centre for Research and 
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Education and Advocacy (ECREA), Fiji Disabled Society, Fiji Human Rights Group, Fiji 
Trades Union Congress (FTUC), Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre, Fiji Women’s Rights 
Movement, Fiji Young Lawyers Association (FYC), Greenpeace Pacific, National 
Council of Women and Women’s Action for Change (WAC)-protested that the 
government’s strategy was ill-conceived and highlighted discrimination in the way in 
which government scholarships were allocated to Indo-Fijians. According to the NGO 
Coalition of Human Rights: 
 
There is a scholarship scheme for Indo-Fijians and other minorities, but the income cut-
off for Indo-Fijian parents is $6,000 while for other minorities it is $10,000. This 
scholarship program is administered separately from that for Indigenous Fijians and 
Rotumans. The Indigenous Fijian Scholarship Scheme under the Ministry of Fijian 
Affairs does not have an income limit for eligibility (NGO Coalition of Human Rights, 
July 2002). 
 
Statistical data on rural income showed that Indo-Fijians had higher income than 
Indigenous rural dwellers in 1997. However, since 1997, the income disparity between 
the two communities had largely diminished because a large number of Indo-Fijians 
migrated to squatter settlements as a result of non-renewal of sugar leases and violence 
after 2000 (Chand 2008: 83-98). The Squatter Resettlement Unit (SRU) estimated in 
2005 that there was an unprecedented growth in squatters from 1996 to 2003, somewhere 
in the vicinity of 73 per cent. Whilst rural to urban migration, unemployment and poverty 
were mentioned as leading contributors, the expiry of leases was seen as a major driver. 
According to the Fiji Times (8 February 2005), “it was estimated by the SRU that by 
2006, the Suva/Nausori corridor would have 15,000 mostly Indo-Fijian squatter 
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households or 90,000 people, which would place a lot of strain on infrastructure like 
water, sewerage, electricity, roads and social services”. 
 
In its conclusion and recommendation, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) stated in 2003 that “the state party ensure that the 
specific protection and enhancement of Indigenous Fijians' rights comply with 
international standards relating to the prohibition of racial discrimination” (Conclusions 
and recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Fiji, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/3, 2003). The Government of Fiji pointed to the 
affirmative action programs under the Social Justice Act as confirming to international 
conventions and treaties and that it had made provision of $2.5 million in 2002 for 
scholarships and some 764 of these went to the Indo-Fijian community (Progress report 
on implementation of affirmative action programmes under the Social Justice act 2002-
2003, Government of Fiji, 2004). However, Margot Solomon (2003: 85), following an 
extensive analysis of the Fiji government’s affirmative action program, concluded that 
the Social Justice Act was a “failure to allow all people the exercise of their rights in a 
manner that reflects the first precept of the human rights canon-that of the inherent 
dignity, and of equal and inalienable rights of all members”.  
 
In the case of Indo-Fijians in post-2000 Fiji, the continuation of discrimination under the 
guise of social justice had clearly frustrated the community. Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai 
(2007: 227-257) argued that the existence of the Indo-Fijian community provides a 
scapegoat and an excuse to continue with discriminatory practices. As a result, the Indo-
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Fijian community strengthened its in-group ties in anticipation that inclusion of Indo-
Fijian social issues as one of the government policy parameter was not possible under an 
Indigenous nationalist regime.  
 
The extropunitive violence against Indo-Fijians by Indigenous Fijian nationalists was 
achieved through hate, discrimination and political marginalisation. The Indigenous 
nationalists created political conditions that forced Indo-Fijians to migrate overseas. The 
strategy against Indo-Fijians was aimed at fostering greater Indigenous in-group 
solidarity, and the Indigenous nationalist justification for extropunitive violence against 
Indo-Fijians is highlighted by John Davies. According to Davies: 
 
The fundamental goal of the interim government was to achieve stability by balancing 
Fijian fears of losing control of their country with the need to diffuse the more extreme 
political force emanating from the very real nationalistic fervour unleashed by Speight. 
To achieve this, Interim PM Laisenia Qarase sought to introduce much more aggressive 
affirmative action programmes for Fijians, designed to bridge the representation gap in 
business and education, and a plan to again rewrite the constitution (Davies 2005: 57) 
 
While John Davies presented the Indigenous nationalist views in support of extropunitive 
violence against the Indo-Fijian community, members of the Fiji military unleashed 
intropunitive violence against their own Indigenous community by overthrowing the 
Indigenous nationalist government in December 2006.  Tensions between the government 
and the military over pro-Indigenous government policies started in 2003 and division 
between the military and the nationalists led to intra-group violence. 
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As discussed in Chapter 6, the military accused the Indigenous government and 
Indigenous nationalists of threatening national security and perpetuating ethnic divisions. 
During 2006, the Fiji military actively campaigned against the government, causing some 
Indigenous nationalists to observe that the military was now the enemy of Indigenous 
Fijians. Steven Ratuva (2007:44) noted that the involvement of military in the 2006 
general election against the Indigenous government created an atmosphere of political 
uncertainty.  
 
Utilising Allport’s theory on extropunitive violence as hate, discrimination and political 
marginisation, I have analysed how Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians developed in-
group solidarity for entirely different reasons. Indo-Fijians were highly critical of the 
Indigenous government’s affirmative action programmes for Indigenous Fijians under the 
Social Justice Act of 2003 and the claims of the community were supported by the 
coalition of human rights groups. Moreover, Indo-Fijians were of the opinion that 
discrimination against them was similar to the restrictive conventions imposed on the 
community following the coup of 1987. In contrast to Indo-Fijians, Indigenous Fijians 
supported the policies of the Indigenous government between 2001 and 2006 and argued 
that affirmative action was necessary to bridge the inequality in wealth between the two 
communities. As a result, Indigenous Fijians promoted greater in-group solidarity and 
created political conditions that forced Indo-Fijians out of the country. However, I also 
argued that besides extropunitive violence, members of the Indigenous community, in 
particular the military, unleased intropunitive violence against their own Indigenous 
community by overthrowing the government in the December 2006 Coup.  
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By using Allport’s theory on in-group dynamics, I argued that hate, discrimination and 
political marginalisation by Indigenous nationalists led to extropunitive violence against 
Indo-Fijians. However, a section of the Indigenous Fijian community, the military, 
challenged extropunitive violence against Indo-Fijians and unleased intropunitive 
violence against their own Indigenous community by ousting a nationalist government 
from power in a military coup in December 2006. Despite the coup, inter-group 
differences remained deeply ingrained in both communities and using Allport’s theory on 
inter-group conflict resolution in the next chapter, I will argue for proposals for inter-
group conciliation. 
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Chapter 8: A proposal for Inter-group Conflict Resolution 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will emphasise the need for a three-pronged approach to building inter-
group cooperation and includes addressing discrimination, violence and in-group 
solidarity, described in the previous chapter. By using Allport’s ideas about national 
identity, a truth and reconciliation commission and legislative reforms, I argue the need 
for  the establishment of a single national identity devoid of any racial or ethnic 
identification in Fiji; national reconciliation among all ethnic groups to take into account 
in particular historical events; and legislative reforms, in the form of strengthening 
committee systems of governance, and permitting political parties with opposing policies 
to utilise parliamentary frameworks to build consensus democracy.  
 
Gordon Allport identified that inter-group conflict can be mitigated if there was a 
“national character”. According to Allport (1954: 116), national character or national 
identity implies that “members of a nation, despite ethnic, racial, religious, or individual 
differences among them, do resemble one another in certain fundamental patterns of 
belief or conduct”. Before the national character can take shape, Allport suggested 
individual and group therapy as a means to changing ethnic attitudes. Allport (1954:495) 
hypothesised that during the course of therapy, “racial attitudes may assume a salient role 
and may conceivably be dissolved or restructured along with the patient’s other fixed 
way of looking at life”. Allport (1954: 281) further theorised that “prejudice may be 
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reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of 
common goals through institutional supports”, such as legislative change that is inclusive 
of the out-groups.  
 
8.2 National Identity 
 
National identity is identified by Allport (1954: 99) as an important element in 
developing a common bond among diverse communities. In Fiji, identity is deeply 
embedded in communal politics and as a result vigorously contested. In 1997, Fiji’s new 
multiracial constitution established a new national category for identifying all Fiji 
citizens: Fiji Islanders. However, ethnic groups rejected this definition as “Indian”, and 
“Fijian” remained in common use, despite the intent of the constitution. Within the 
Indigenous Fijian community, Indigenous leaders, such as former Senator Adi Litia 
Cakobau and the former Minister for National Planning Jone Navakamocea, re-
emphasised that they as a community have ownership of the name “Fijian” and strongly 
rebuked Indo-Fijian leaders and academics for using the term “Indo-Fijian” (Fijilive, 2 
July 2004; BBC 7 July 2004; The Fiji Times, 5 August 2006)  
 
Anthropologist Robert Norton noted that: 
 
Identities are in some degree oppositional, asserting the virtue and power of 'tradition' by 
way of invidious contrast to foreign cultural influences. In varying degree all illustrate the 
activity of objectifying culture, of emphasizing selected attributes of culture as a way of 
affirming group distinctiveness. And in all, 'tradition' is in varying degrees discrepant 
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with the culture of pre-European times: there is an element of invention (Norton 1993: 
745). 
 
The “created” identities in Fiji have been to some extent given cultural meaning by 
various governments and this had continued largely unchallenged until the December 
2006 coup. Indigenous nationalists objected to the use of “Fijian” as a common name 
because they claimed ownership of the word as well as its meaning. As a result, debates 
on a common name indicated that Indigenous Fijians did not wish to extend the meaning 
of the word “Fijian” to encompass all Fiji citizens, regardless of their ethnicity (The 
Hindustan Times, 5 August 2006). 
 
To some extent, the dynamics of identity in Fiji have been profoundly shaped by colonial 
history (Lal 1992a). Upon assuming sovereignty in Fiji, the British attempted to preserve 
Indigenous Fijian culture. As the colony developed, there was a need for labour on sugar 
plantations, the British recruited indentured labourers from India, creating the tripartite 
division between Indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians, and Europeans. 
 
Larson and Aminzade (2008: 801-831) noted that during colonial times, this division 
organised political life and Indigenous Fijians often allied with Europeans to resist 
demands by the near-majority Indo-Fijian population for a common electoral roll. In light 
of these political dynamics, Fiji’s negotiated independence included maintenance of 
separate voting roles and constitutionally mandated racial representation. Since 
independence, Fiji’s leaders have continuously reinforced communal identities. In a quick 
move to create some form of a national identity, the Reeves Commission in 1996 
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recommended Fiji Islanders to be the common name of all Fiji citizens. However, the 
constitution continued to identify Indigenous Fijians and other communities by their 
communal names, thereby reinforcing communal identities and defeating the intent of the 
Reeves Commission Report of 1996. Moreover, the 1997 Constitution promoted 
ethnocratic regimes that encouraged the expansion of the dominant group and power 
structures by maintaining a democratic facade. Diverse research explores this complex 
idea for example, in a study of land and identity politics in Israel and Palestine, Oren 
Yiftachel observed that “in most cases the national identity is intimately involved with 
institutionalisation and politicised religion (Yiftachel 2006: 3-16).  
 
Father Kevin Barr argued that Christianity, more precisely Methodism, in Fiji has also 
been used by Indigenous nationalists to safeguard Indigenous Fijian identity. According 
to Barr (2004: 17), Indigenous nationalists have “changed Christianity from a religion of 
love into an ideology justifying and promoting separation, domination, exclusion, racism 
and hatred”. Jacqueline Ryle (2005: 72) largely supports this observation and argues that 
Indigenous Fijians identity is based on the ownership of land, Church and Government, 
which gives rise to modalities of exclusion and ethnic otherness (Hermann & Kempf 
2005: 316). 
 
In a sense, identity in Fiji is highly politicised and this identity politics operates according 
to an “identarian logic” (LIoyd 2005: 36) where in-group unity is sought beneath 
differences. While church, land and holding political power are essential part of 
Indigenous identity (Tuwere 2002), political equality, respect, history and geography 
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have become essential elements of Indo-Fijian identity. According to Carmen Voigt-Graf 
(2008: 106), “Indo-Fijian identity has been shaped through the collective memory of 
indenture in colonial times and of political discrimination and political coups in post 
colonial times”. Similar to Indigenous Fijian nationalists, identarian logic also applies to 
the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. Beneath religious and class differences, there is an 
overwhelming centripetal communal force towards glorification of the struggles of 
indenture or girmit and the post-colonial push for political equality. 
 
Indo-Fijian author Rajendra Prasad argued that his interpretation of the past in the book 
Tears in Paradise (2004) would change the often incorrect perception of Indo-Fijian 
history by emphasising that indentured labour was not a period of shame but one of great 
sacrifice in Fiji. The stigma of shame, according to Prasad, rested solely on the shoulders 
of the British and Australian Governments, which considered indentured workers as sub- 
humans and allowed physical and sexual abuse to continue in the name of progress and 
civilization. In the second part of his book titled Uncertain Future, Prasad explained that 
the Indo-Fijians never took away the customary land rights of Indigenous Fijians but both 
in 1987 and again in 2000, Indo-Fijian community was accused by Indigenous Fijian 
nationalists of conspiring to alienate Indigenous land and as a result triggered two violent 
ethnic coups that forced many Indo-Fijians to seek a better future elsewhere. Prasad 
summarises that Indo-Fijians are the only community in the world running away from 
their embattled and embittered past.  
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2004 marked 125 years of Indo-Fijians in Fiji and to celebrate the anniversary, Indo-
Fijian historian Brij Lal (2004) edited a collection of essays that reflected the ongoing 
Indo-Fijian emotions. Lal (2004: 3) observed that “one hundred and twenty-five years 
after arriving in the islands, the future for the Indo-Fijians look almost as bleak as it did 
for their forebears when they embarked in their unpredictable journeys from Calcutta and 
Madras to destinations unheard of or unknown”. Vijay Naidu (2004: 381) further 
explained that the marginalisation of Indo-Fijians have led to frustration, stress-related 
illnesses and suicide in the community. A series of post-2004 publications including a 
collection edited by Kavita Nandan (2005: XI) recorded the memories of those who 
remembered Fiji from outside the country. Within the stories documented, Nandan notes, 
lies a palpable pain, interspersed with memories of the vanishing worlds of Indo-Fijians 
caused by the Fiji coups and the continuing discrimination and racism for those still 
living in Fiji. Nandan (2005), Lal (2004), Naidu (2004) and Prasad (2004) concur that 
Indo-Fijian identity is shaped by the collective memory of indenture and the struggles for 
self respect and belonging forced upon the community by the military coups. In contrast, 
Indigenous Fijian identity is deeply embedded in the church, village and land (Ryle 
2005). As a result, there are two different identarian trajectories within a common 
identarian logic of re-imagining and to some extent romanticising the past. 
 
The Draft Peoples’ Charter released on 5 August 2008, following consultations within 
Fiji, proposed a common name for all Fiji citizens with full recognition of Indigenous 
Fijians as the i-taukei. The Charter argued that: 
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A common name includes the members of all communities in the country within a broad 
allegiance. It binds all of them as citizens to a larger and wider sense of belonging to 
‘their’ nation state. The overarching significance of national identity, for governance and 
public policy, is that it creates a moral community within which everyone has equal 
rights to the care and attention of the government and the wider community….(The Draft 
Peoples’ Charter for Change, Peace and Progress, 5 August 2008, p.47). 
 
The deposed SDL Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase rejected the Charter recommendation 
of “Fijian” as a common name arguing that the “term (Fijian) was embedded into the 
Indigenous population: it is a very sensitive issue and it will be opposed very strongly” 
(Fijilive, 7 August 2008). Supporting Laisenia Qarase was the Methodist Church 
President Reverend Laisiasa Ratabacaca and General-Secretary Reverend Tuikilakila 
Waqairatu (The Fiji Times, 28 August 2008). Indigenous nationalists have argued that the 
word is “Indigenous” in origin and as a result alienating the word without proper 
Indigenous cultural processes violated the United Nations Declarations on Indigenous 
Peoples (Francis Waqa Sokonibogi, Fiji Indigenous Ownership Rights Association, letter 
to the editor, The Fiji Times, 11 July 2004). However, supporters of the use of “Fijian” as 
a common name respond that the word “Fijian” was a European invention and had 
nothing to do with Indigenous culture and that the word can be used to enhance national 
identity (Lal 2004).  
 
As evidenced in recent history, a national identity for Fiji via a common name is a 
difficult task. However, it is argued here that the risk of not working towards this goal 
means continuing with the instability and conflicted social and political culture that has 
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permeated Fiji for a very long time. The leader of the current government in Fiji, 
Commodore Frank Bainimarama, believes that a common name of “Fijian” will 
immensely assist in redirecting the Indigenous Fijian mindset by providing a disincentive 
for discrimination, violence and destructive nationalism that had plagued the country 
since the 1987 coup (Fijilive, 22 November 2007). However, Indigenous Fijians also 
have a deep sense of Indigenous identity and belonging. Thus the proposed alternative of 
Fiji Islander has been dismissed by the community as a contravention on Indigenous 
culture, tradition and history. Besides implementing an agreed national identity, based on 
Allport’s theory on inter-group conciliation, some form of truth and reconciliation 
process needs to compliment moves to create a national identity to lessen both inter-
group and in-group tensions as discussed below. 
 
8.3 Truth and Reconciliation  
 
Allport (1954: 495) argued that the best way to overcome discrimination, violence and 
continued prejudgment is to initiate an open and inclusive process of “national therapy” 
or “national reconciliation”. Allport (1954: 496) argued that national therapy in terms of 
truth telling and reconciling with the victims can result in changes in attitudes and simply 
by talking about past injustices, members of the group often gain new perspectives and 
can discover wholesome and constructive ways of approaching the out-group. 
 
Experiences with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa have 
influenced similar models throughout many post-conflict societies (Graybill 2002). In 
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South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established with several 
fundamental characteristics that contributed to its unique character. The most important 
feature of the South African exercise in comparison with other commissions was the 
power to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators. It was the first time that so much 
power was invested in a commission. The South African Parliament granted the TRC the 
authority to give amnesty to acts “associated with political objectives”. Despite initial 
success of the South African approach, there is still ongoing debate regarding the efficacy 
of the Truth Commission, Audrey Chapman noted that: 
 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) had difficulties in 
conceptualizing forgiveness and reconciliation on an inter-group level and concentrated 
instead on relationships between individual victims and perpetrators. Former victims and 
members of their families who testified at the violations hearings rarely mentioned these 
topics unless prompted to do so, and those who did were generally not inclined to forgive 
perpetrators. At the amnesty hearings perpetrators were reluctant to acknowledge their 
wrongdoing or to offer meaningful apologies, expressions of regret, or some form of 
compensation to those who had suffered. In light of these data, the efficacy of the TRC’s 
approach to forgiveness and healing and the capacity of transitional justice mechanisms 
in post-conflict societies to promote forgiveness and reconciliation is questionable 
(Chapman 2007:51). 
 
In Northern Ireland, for example, there has been a long-term and often heated debate, 
particularly within civil society, as to the best way to deal with the legacy of the past. 
Central to this debate is whether or not there needs to be some form of official “truth 
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recovery” process or truth commission. Lundy and McGovern (2007: 336-337) through 
their survey of attitudes among Northern Ireland residents to a truth commission conclude 
that for many in the community there is a “need for some sort of mechanism to get at the 
truth of the past conflict”. On the other hand, the researchers discovered that “precisely 
how to get to the truth, what mechanisms are best suited to do so, and what might be done 
with it afterwards, is far less clear”.  
 
A report published by the Consultative Group on the Past in January 2009 in Northern 
Ireland recommended that a “Legacy Commission” be established for truth recovery. The 
work of the Consultative Group highlighted how international justice norms are 
interpreted at a local level in a way that takes account of local histories and priorities. 
According to Aoife Duffy (2010: 26-46), instead of challenging the structural and 
institutional inequalities that underpinned the violence of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
and opening up new pathways to accessing truth and justice, the Consultative Group's 
report advocated a truth-recovery process that was not open to public scrutiny and was 
couched in the language of forgetting, which begs the question whether the Northern 
Ireland initiative on truth and reconciliation was a genuine attempt at exploring sidelined 
or dissenting narratives of conflict, or merely another forum in which to contain them. 
The Northern Ireland example highlights the difficulty in implementing social processes 
that will enable mutually trustworthy behaviour resulting in inter-group reconciliation. 
 
In Fiji, attempts by the nationalist Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) 
government at reconciliation had a devastating effect. While borrowing some elements of 
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the South African approach, the Fiji government in June 2005 politicised the 
reconciliation endeavour by describing nationalist coups of 1987 and 2000 as a legitimate 
expression of Indigenous fears. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was established to encourage truth telling with the hope of reconciling the victims and the 
perpetrators of the past injustices. According to Richard Wilson (2001: 15), “truth-telling 
healing and nation-building were integrated by the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission” to provide a meaningful framework for restorative justice, 
repentance and ultimately forgiveness for past crimes. However, in Fiji, there was no 
such integrated initiative. The Indigenous nationalist government borrowed only the 
intent of the South African truth and reconciliation initiative but chose to manipulate the 
process by arguing that the perpetrators of the past injustice only had to convince the 
Amnesty Committee of their intentions to acknowledge past injustices and not 
necessarily reconcile with the victims. The reconciliation process initiated by the Fiji 
authorities infuriated the Indo-Fijian community, which was affected by Indigenous 
nationalist violence following the 2000 coup. Besides Indo-Fijians, the Fiji Military 
Forces saw the reconciliation initiative as a recipe for continued Indigenous Fijian 
nationalist domination and intervention in government (Ramesh 2006). 
 
There were a number of concerns regarding the Racial Tolerance and Unity Bill of 2005 
in Fiji. The most controversial was the amnesty provision (Ramesh 2006). The amnesty 
clause was a problem for a number of reasons. First, it was feared that the amnesty would 
interfere with ongoing investigations into the 2000 coup and compromise the judiciary, 
the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the military. Secondly, the amnesty 
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provision was seen by many Indo-Fijians and non-government organisations as simply a 
political measure by the nationalist SDL government to position itself for the 2006 
general elections. Thirdly, it was widely held that the proposed amnesty would not 
compel perpetrators of the events of 2000 to tell the truth or offer any meaningful 
reconciliation to the victims.  
 
A more reasonable and palatable approach would have been to establish an independent 
Commission on Healing, Truth and Justice as was the case in South Africa with powers 
to receive evidence from perpetrators and victims and then recommend appropriate 
reconciliation. The truth and reconciliation for past injustices against the Indo-Fijian 
community is mentioned in the Draft Peoples’ Charter for Change, Peace and Progress of 
August 2008. In any case, similar to the South African experience, an Amnesty 
Committee comprised of three members: one representative from the victim’s group, a 
representative from the government and an independent legal expert nominated by the 
Fiji Law Society ought to be established. The role of the Amnesty Committee should be 
to invite perpetrators to tell the whole truth and subpoena individuals identified by the 
victims and seek truth regarding their actions. The Amnesty Committee should also invite 
victims to tell their side of the story and ensure that a reconciliation process that is 
culturally meaningful to both victims and perpetrators is implemented. Once the parties 
have reconciled and the Amnesty Committee is satisfied that the perpetrators have 
truthfully disclosed all facts regarding their past actions, the Amnesty Committee could 
then recommend amnesty. If the Amnesty Committee forms an opinion that the 
perpetrator or the victim is not telling the truth, then the Amnesty Committee should be 
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able to seek corroborating statements from other witnesses and potentially deny amnesty. 
According to Michael Humphrey (2005: 217) healing through victim-centred truth 
politics ensures that “victims become the vehicle for reconciliation with the therapeutic 
focus for changing individual attitudes towards the past”. Evidence from South Africa 
demonstrates that “recalling and publicly recounting hurts and humiliations endured have 
a therapeutic effect on victims and facilitate reconciliation between them and those who 
inflicted the injuries” (Solomon 2002: 224). 
 
In addition, it is also proposed in the Charter that a Reparation Committee shall be 
established and comprise of a representative from the victim’s group, a government 
representative and an independent legal expert. The victim should not have to prove 
“gross human rights violation” as stipulated by the failed Racial Tolerance and Unity Bill 
of 2005. The burden of providing the truthful account of the wrongdoing should be 
placed on the shoulders of the accused. Testimony under oath by the victims in the 
Amnesty Committee should be taken as truthful disclosure of facts relevant for 
determining reparation payment, which should take into consideration physical harm, 
damage to property, trauma, loss of earning, and post-traumatic stress.  
 
Fiji has an opportunity to progress an inclusive truth and healing process where both the 
perpetrators and the victims engage in genuine conciliation and move forward. A recent 
study (Pettigrew 2010: 425) has indicated that truth and reconciliation measures can 
provide better inter-group relations, improve attitudes and provide opportunities for 
minorities to understand and engage with majority processes. Whilst there is an 
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appreciation throughout Fiji for some kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Allport’s theoretical ideas about inter-group conciliation suggest there is also a need for a 
system that supports significant legislative reform (Allport 1954: 461). I argue this is 
evident in the Fiji context as illustrated below. 
 
8.4 Legislative Reforms 
 
Legislative reform is identified as one of the mechanisms for achieving inter-group 
consensus at the political level. Allport (1954: 461) identified the committee system as 
playing an influential role in affecting political reforms. The classic power indices 
relating to political representation assumes that the party winning the most seats forms 
the government. These assumptions are largely reflected in western democracies that are 
based on “winner takes all” systems. However in Europe, especially in Nordic countries, 
multiparty governance with mixed electoral systems, aimed at promoting better 
representation of smaller parties, remains a norm, since electoral reform started in the 
Weimer Republic in Germany in the early twentieth century. Fiji in 1997 and New 
Zealand in 1998 moved away from the first-past-the-post electoral system to a more 
mixed preferential and proportional forms of voting. 
 
In ethnically divided societies such as Guyana, Trinidad, Suriname, Sri Lanka, South 
Africa, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Fiji, precise political engineering is not only impossible but 
impractical. Evidence from Guyana, South Africa, Bosnia, Rwanda indicate that politics 
of “inclusion” with defined politico-constitutional structures, backed by good leadership 
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can lessen inter ethnic tensions and provide a national framework for multiethnic political 
discourse. In some cases, truth and reconciliation systems, like the ones established in 
South Africa (Chapman 2007: 51-69) and Rwanda (Kaminski & Nalepa 2006: 393-394), 
assisted inter-ethnic conciliation whereas in Fiji, the Racial Tolerance and Unity Bill 
(RTU) created further cleavages, because civil society as well as the opposition political 
parties were disengaged from the initial process. 
 
Following the 2006 military coup and the publication of the Draft Peoples’ Charter for 
Change, Peace and Progress on 5 August 2008, the question remained whether consensus 
democracy in Fiji could flourish and diminish, over time, inter-ethnic tensions. Moreover, 
with a lack of defined institutional structures detailing legislative processes in a 
multiparty government, instead of building and maintaining consensus democracy in Fiji, 
the cabinet in Fiji in the past became dysfunctional and divided along either party or 
racial lines. Malcolm Shaw (1998: 243) has observed that governing systems in mostly 
developing countries, including Fiji, have “embodied typically authoritarian features 
which include weak legislature with an underdeveloped committee system”. However 
evidence from states like Lithuania (Clark, Verseckait & Lukosaitis 2006: 747) and 
Zambia (Burnell 2002: 291-313) suggests that changes to party system, institutional 
balance between executive and legislature and political culture can give rise to effective 
parliamentary committees. Besides delegation, to make representative democracy work in 
divided plural communities, a number of electoral systems (Fraenkel & Grofman 2006: 
623-651) and power sharing arrangements have been recommended and even tested via 
constitutional arrangements in a number of countries.  
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Power sharing is a concept popularised by Lijphardt (1995:863-864) in his work on 
democracy in divided societies in which he developed the framework for consociational 
or consensus form of government, which allows for power sharing at the executive level 
without mandating a grand coalition of all significant parties and therefore eliminating 
significant partisan opposition in parliament (Lijphardt 2004: 103). Studies in multiparty 
government have tended to focus on the design of multiparty systems. However, little has 
been said about how different parties with often competing ideologies or interests or 
communal, ethnic and provincial allegiance can provide political as well as cabinet 
stability within a framework of multiparty government (Dryzek 2005: 218-242).  
 
Usually, government parties, in multiparty settings, have the incentives to seek, and the 
means to secure, a policy agenda that accommodates, in as much as possible, the 
preferences of all partners in a coalition (Martin 2004: 446). There are a number of 
instruments available to multiparty governments and among them are inner-cabinet 
committees of coalition leaders, inter-ministerial committees, parliamentary leadership 
groups, and party summits. According to Lanny Martin, lawmaking is a challenge for 
coalition governments because it inherently demands cooperation and compromise by 
parties with divergent policy goals (2004:457). While academics recognise that the 
concept of multiparty power sharing is problematic, there is, however, a need to develop 
parliamentary based multiparty institutional framework for both executive and non-
executive bills, especially in divided societies. This kind of consensus approach removes 
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the focus away from cabinet conformity to “consensus” at the parliamentary committee 
stage. 
 
A committee system as a means of fostering greater cooperation among parties with 
diverging views has existed in western European and American democracies for some 
time. For example, Allport (1954: 461) identified that the President’s Committee on Civil 
Rights became a rallying point for the forces of tolerance and inclusive government. 
More importantly, committees in US and European democracies initiate legislation in the 
form of committee bills. However, there are only two national parliaments in western 
Europe, Sweden and Iceland, and a number of sub-national assemblies, including the 
Scottish Parliament do committees possess largely unrestricted rights of legislative 
initiative (Arter 2003: 80). The important feature of the Scottish experience is the 
establishment of a Consultative Steering Group (CSG) that has the task of marrying 
traditional representative democracy with the elements of a form of participatory 
democracy. For example: 
 
Strong Committees in the Scottish setting are aimed at fostering greater consensus with 
an emphasis on reducing partisanship. The Scottish Parliament has permanent and 
specialised committees with relatively small numbers of members; a proportional (by 
party) number of chairs selected by a committee; committee deliberation both before and 
initial and final plenary stages; the ability to initiate and re-draft bills; and the ability to 
invite witnesses and demand government documents (Arter 2006: 183). 
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The Parliamentary committee system is not new to Fiji. Under previous parliaments, 
committees were provided for in the Standing Orders of the House. These committees 
regulated the affairs of the House and dealt with public accounts. In 1996, the 
Government of Fiji established a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitution 
(JPSC) to achieve “consensus” on the recommendations of the Reeves Commission 
Report of 1996.  
 
On 10 September 1996, Fiji’s Constitution Review Commission report was tabled in 
Parliament. Following the endorsement of the CRC report from the President, the former 
Prime Minister of Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka, successfully moved in the House the following 
motion: 
 
That the Joint Select Committee on the Constitution shall consider and 
deliberate upon the report of the Constitution Review Commission to secure 
passage of such amendments and changes to the Constitution as may be 
agreed upon by and between the various parties and groups and or as deemed 
necessary or desirable (The House of Representatives, Daily Hansard, 10 
September 1996: 1026). 
 
Sitiveni Rabuka spoke of consensus and unity and his deliberations were supported by 
opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy. It was agreed that all parties in parliament would 
participate in the discussions and arrive at a consensus upon which the foundations of the 
new Fiji Constitution would be built. 
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The Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitution was the only time when 
political leaders of Fiji attempted to seriously build consensus on a divisive issue of 
constitutional reform. A closer analysis of the approach of the Soqosoqo ni Vakevulewa 
ni Taukei (SVT) leader Sitiveni Rabuka towards constitutional accommodation of 
minorities indicate a desire by him to offset the rising tide of Indigenous in-group tension 
and conflict by forging closer cooperation with Indo-Fijians. Before the 2006 coup, Fiji 
had a system of select committees, which met to discuss issues raised within parliament 
but did not deliberate on bills. Political parties remained largely isolated in their own 
respective communal blocs as multiparty cabinet became a forum for discussing policy 
differences. Nevertheless, there were missed opportunities because the 1997 
Constitution, despite its failures, provided for a viable committee structure, which was 
never built upon by Fiji’s communal leaders because it compromised their communal 
position. 
 
The abrogated 1997 Constitution of Fiji allowed for 5 sector standing committees with 
the functions of scrutinising Government administration. They were: Administrative 
Services; Economic Services; Foreign Relations; Justice, Law and Order; Natural 
Resources; and Social Services Committee Under the SDL Government (2001-2006), 
there were a number of ad hoc committees established, including the ad hoc Committee 
on Land, formed on 27 April 2004, comprising of 8 government members, the Leader of 
the Opposition, 6 members of the Fiji Labour Party and 2 nominees of the Great Council 
of Chiefs in the Senate. 
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The ad hoc Committee on Land failed after the Fiji Labour Party refused to participate 
following the release of the Racial Tolerance and Unity Bill in 2005. The failure of the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on Land suggests that there was an urgent need for 
developing consensus among various parties in the House before presenting a bill to the 
parliament. Under Fiji’s past parliamentary practices, bills introduced in parliament and 
referred to various committees lay exposed to divisive party politicking. 
 
Allport (1954: 469) argues that legislations can affect prejudice and after drawing upon 
the history of legislative reforms in the US, Allport recommends that legislative reforms 
should be one of the avenues explored to promote inter-group tolerance. The Government 
of Fiji in 2006 should have utilised the committee approach for achieving consensus and 
making multiparty governance work. Since Fiji had a success story with multiparty 
committees in the past, it was important that the country legislated for an establishment 
of a permanent Multiparty Parliamentary Committee as a means for diminishing 
prejudice, discrimination, inter-group violence and in-group conflict. The role of the Joint 
Multiparty Parliamentary Committee is to engage in “democratic bargaining” (Kelso 
2003: 57-76) and promote consensus with respect to draft bills and legislations. The 
selection of the members should be from parliament and not necessarily from those who 
are in cabinet. This way, there will be an even greater representation of parties in the 
legislative process. 
 
In Fiji, the Joint parliamentary Committee should play a major role in all three stages of 
the legislative process, as in the case of Post-Soviet Lithuania, with draft bills before the 
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first reading, then, if needed, before the second and final third readings. Joint 
Parliamentary Committees should work in conjunction with the author of the draft, 
examine all the amendments, and engage in regular communication with relevant 
government ministries. Although a committee cannot “kill” a bill, it can present an 
alternative draft bill to the plenary, in addition to the one under review (Khmelko, Wise 
& Brown 2010: 77).  
 
Once the final legislation is ready, the government introduces the bill in Parliament for 
debate. However, since consensus is already achieved at the Joint Multiparty 
Parliamentary Committee, the parliament becomes more a debating forum rather than the 
chamber for oppositional or adversarial politics. This way deliberative democracy is 
institutionalised and multiethnic aspirations are reconciled. 
 
The Draft Peoples’ Charter for Change (2008) has recommended parliamentary 
committees as a means for fostering better inter-ethnic cooperation and reducing 
prejudice. The government led by Commodore Frank Bainimarama has pledged support 
for legislative reform but the new parliamentary structure will not be finalised until 2013. 
However, there is an appreciation, especially among the military led government of Fiji 
that legislative reforms can play a major role in addressing inter-group conflict in Fiji by 
providing political incentives to various ethnic groups to cooperate on national social and 
economic issues via multiracial political parties. 
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8.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued using Allport’s ideas about national identity, truth and 
reconciliation and parliamentary committees for a three-pronged approach to resolving 
inter-group conflict in Fiji. Firstly, ideas about national identity as a means for addressing 
inter-group prejudice, I argue that a national identity would bind different ethnic 
communities by creating over time a national consciousness which evokes diversity 
within unity. This starts with an agreement on a common name of “Fijian” or “Fiji 
Islanders”. However, as I have highlighted, Indigenous community leaders remained 
opposed to the use of “Fijian” as a common name, arguing that the term carries 
Indigenous cultural meaning. Indo-Fijians see the use of “Fijian” as a common name a 
vehicle for making them part of the nation, which has witnessed three race-based coups, 
especially targeted against the community. A common agreed name will contribute to 
better inter-group relations. Secondly, I utilise the idea of national therapy in the form of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that will address past injustices, caused by 
Indigenous nationalist coups in Fiji. In examining the South African and the Northern 
Ireland experiences, I highlighted the difficulties faced by truth and reconciliation efforts 
and analysed Fiji’s failed attempt at reconciliation through the Racial Tolerance and 
Unity Bill of 2005. I argued that unlike the South African approach, the nationalist 
government in Fiji attempted to utilise the Bill to pardon individuals involved in the coup 
of 2000. Taking in consideration the history of discrimination and violence in the 
country, I proposed an Amnesty Committee with powers to grant amnesty to perpetrators 
provided they told the truth and the victims were acknowledged and compensated for the 
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past trauma. Thirdly, Allport’s analysis of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 
1947 is examined to propose the establishment of a committee system of government. 
Fiji’s past successes with parliamentary committees and a growing appreciation in 
European and US democracies on the utility of committee systems to resolve policy, 
inter-group and inter-party issues could become a pivotal force in embedding consensus 
democracy. The three proposals form an interconnected nexus that have the ability to 
transform Fiji’s political landscape and promote inter-group harmony. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In keeping with Gordon Allport’s theory on inter-group conflict, in particular inter-group 
discrimination, violence and extropunitive in-group solidarity, I reclaim history as a 
central tenant in the analysis of inter-group conflict in Fiji. I argued that Fiji has a history 
of inter-group conflict and there were a number of approaches to the study of Fiji, 
including discourse analysis, ethnography and critical theory. However, so far, none of 
the approaches have used inter-group theory as the analytical framework to examine the 
history of inter-group conflict in Fiji and seek its resolution.  
 
The purpose of my methodology is to highlight the utility of Allport’s inter-group theory, 
which identified stages of prejudice: discrimination, violence, extropunitive in-group 
solidarity and provided a proposal for inter-group conflict resolution. Allport argued that 
discrimination was socially constructed to enable dominant groups to maintain social and 
political hegemony over the out-groups. However, he qualified that the rationale for 
discrimination was conceptually defective, because it was based on general and often 
misguided categorical prejudgment of the out-group which evolved into physical 
violence. Allport analysed in detail violence against African Americans by members of 
the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi pogroms against the Jewish community. Through his 
analysis, Allport concluded that discrimination and violence led to extropunitive in-group 
solidarity in both the dominant group and the out-group.  
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According to Allport, there are two attributes of in-group solidarity: extropunitive and 
intropunitive. The extropunitive behaviour is characterised by in-group members 
isolating themselves from any form of interaction with the dominant group, whereas in 
the intropunitive setting, members of the in-group criticise their own group. Allport  not 
only detailed the nature of prejudice in the United States but recommended strategies for 
inter-group conflict resolution by highlighting the utility of implementing national or 
common identity, national reconciliation and inclusive governance via a committee 
system. Allport’s inter-group theory is not only relevant to the post-war United States but 
also for those countries that have deep ethnic divisions. Moreover, Allport’s inter-group 
theory is grounded in history: the history of discrimination and violence against African 
Americans and the Jewish community in Europe. 
 
While Allport’s theory was embedded in the history of the United States and Europe, I 
utilised history as a method and analysed moments of history in Fiji that characterised 
Allport’s institutional and structural discrimination, physical violence and fear of 
violence and extropunitive in-group solidarity. I have demonstrated that Fiji has a history 
of inter-group conflict among Indo-Fijians and Indigenous Fijians. In my application of 
inter-group theory, it was revealed that Indo-Fijians suffered structural and institutional 
discrimination following the coup of May 1987 where an elected multiracial government 
was overthrown by a military sympathetic to Indigenous Fijian nationalists. The military 
in Fiji removed Indo-Fijians from positions of authority, denied the community a voice in 
government and initiated a discriminatory constitution that relegated them to second-class 
citizens. The analysis of structural and institutional discrimination revealed that 
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Indigenous Fijians justified discriminating against Indo-Fijians by emphasising that the 
community had secret ambitions to alienate Indigenous Fijian land and control the 
economy. These justifications, I argued, did not hold to close scrutiny because it was 
conceptually defective. The multiracial government that was in office following the April 
1987 election did not have plans to dismantle Indigenous land rights nor economically 
marginalise the Indigenous community as claimed by Indigenous nationalists. 
 
The institutionalisation of discrimination increased prejudice against Indo-Fijians and this 
resulted in widespread violence against members of the community following the 2000 
coup. The history of violence in 2000 against the Indo-Fijian community by Indigenous 
nationalists revealed that inter-group prejudice was widespread and that defenceless rural 
Indo-Fijian settlements were targeted by supporters of the 2000 coup. The 2000 coup 
leader used similar arguments that were used in 1987 in support of his action against the 
Peoples’ Coalition Government and against Indo-Fijian generally. The widespread chaos 
created by Indigenous nationalists in 2000 led to the establishment of an Indigenous 
nationalist government, which re-instituted ethnic discrimination against Indo-Fijians. As 
a result, Indo-Fijians became inward focused and strengthened in-group ties. 
 
In my analysis of violence, I argued that the physical violence and the fear of violence 
had a far reaching impact on the Indo-Fijian community. My analysis showed that inter-
group discrimination and violence led to in-group solidarity. While Indo-Fijian 
extropunitive in-group solidarity was driven by fear of violence and past experience of 
physical violence, Indigenous Fijian nationalists in-group solidarity was premised upon 
deep ethnic prejudice against the Indo-Fijians, in particular a desire to continue with the 
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control of the state and positive discrimination in favour of the Indigenous community. 
However, extropunitive in-group solidarity in the Indigenous Fijian community was 
fractured by the Indigenous military that became intropunitive by questioning and later 
ousting the Indigenous nationalist government from power in a military coup in 
December 2006.  
 
The re-interpretation of Fiji history within the analytical framework of inter-group theory 
revealed that inter-group conflict in Fiji was deeply embedded in the social fabric of the 
society. However, inter-group theory provided Fiji with an opportunity to mitigate inter-
group tensions. First, using Allport’s theory on inter-group conflict resolution, I argued 
for the establishment of a meaningful national character or national identity that allowed 
for the establishment of a single national identity devoid of any racial or ethnic 
identification. Second, I argued for national reconciliation among all ethnic groups for the 
past injustices and the process to be handled sensitively so that victims and perpetrators 
reconcile and move forward with the context of truth politics. The third approach 
involved strengthening the legislative framework around the committee system, which 
will permit political parties with opposing policies to utilise parliamentary framework in 
building consensus democracy and resolving conflict at the political level. I argued that 
Fiji has a history of successfully utilising multiparty committees to establish consensus in 
the past and that this committee framework could be utilised in the future to establish 
inter-group consensus. My recommendations, while reflecting some of the proposals 
contained in the Peoples’ Charter (2008) provide a robust approach to addressing Fiji’s 
complex inter-group problems. Moreover, my method, based on Allport’s inter-group 
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theory creates a new epistemology for examining Fiji’s history within the framework of 
inter-group theory. While Allport provides a comprehensive theoretical foundation for 
the study of inter-group conflict in Fiji, further research should be carried out on 
contrasting theoretical approaches to inter-group relations in Fiji. As highlighted by 
Leonie Huddy (2002b, 2004), the strengths and weaknesses of social dominance, social 
identity and system justification theories are required to be fleshed out in detail in order 
to leverage new and exciting approaches to the study of inter-group conflict. This thesis, 
nevertheless, has started the debate along these lines so that future approaches to inter-
group conflict in Fiji becomes embedded in multidisciplinary methodologies. 
 
Developing a methodology utilising social identity theory (Huddy 2001) is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but could be a proposal for future study on inter-group conflict in Fiji. 
Nevertheless, my use of history as a method for the study of inter-group conflict in Fiji 
has revealed the various historical moments that reflected aspects of Allport’s inter-group 
theory on discrimination, violence and in-group solidarity which in turn offer the 
prospect of conflict resolution in the form of a common national identity, truth and 
reconciliation and multiparty parliamentary committees. Finally, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the application of inter-group theory to understanding inter-group 
conflict can generate mutually exclusive synergies between theory and context. 
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Interview of 12 Indo-Fijian families which fled violence from areas that supported the 
George Speight coup was conducted at the victim’s relative’s homes in Suva in 
December 2000. The interview process and documentation was assisted by Social Action 
for Human Rights organisation (SAHARA). 
